“Pro Bono Is Not a Shield”: Florida Supreme Court Disbars Lawyer and Clarifies Disciplinary Aggravation/Mitigation, Social‑Media Prejudice, and No‑Contact Rules — The Florida Bar v. Malik Leigh

Introduction

In The Florida Bar v. Malik Leigh, the Supreme Court of Florida disbarred attorney Malik Leigh after finding him guilty of all 24 rule violations charged by The Florida Bar. The case arose from six counts of misconduct that spanned two litigation settings: (1) a trio of related federal cases against the Palm Beach County School District (the “School Board litigation”), and (2) a state-court toxic‑tort/class‑action effort on behalf of residents of the Stonybrook Apartments in Palm Beach County.

The key issues before the Court were:

Whether the referee’s factual findings and recommendations as to guilt were sufficient and supported by the record.
What sanction was appropriate in light of the number and gravity of the violations, including social‑media threats, false accusations, grossly deficient pleadings, repeated disobedience of court orders, improper contact with a represented person via a court reporter, and baseless accusations of racial bias against a judge.
How aggravating and mitigating factors should be applied under the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

Rejecting the referee’s proposed 91‑day suspension, the Court imposed disbarment, clarified multiple aspects of the aggravation/mitigation framework, and underscored important substantive limits on lawyers’ conduct—especially in the age of social media and indirect contacts with represented parties.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that the record “clearly supports” findings of guilt for all 24 charged violations and disbarred Leigh. The Court:

Found misconduct in six counts, including:
- Threatening and humiliating social‑media posts that disrupted discovery and led to protective measures and sanctions (School Board litigation).
- False accusations that opposing counsel forged a signature on a joint pretrial stipulation, resulting in a bad-faith finding and fee sanctions.
- Grossly incompetent handling of the Stonybrook litigation, including repeated defective filings, disregard of procedural rules, noncompliance with multiple court orders (gag order, mentoring, civility course), and contempt.
- Improperly seeking defaults after failed e‑service and filing claims against a city not supported by then‑existing law, resulting in section 57.105-like fee sanctions.
- Using a court reporter to question an assistant manager of a represented party and texting during the “sworn statement” to obtain confidential documents—an attempt to circumvent the no‑contact rule.
- Appellate accusations that a circuit judge acted with racial bias, made without an objectively reasonable factual basis, in violation of Rule 4‑8.2(a).
Corrected the referee’s treatment of aggravating and mitigating factors:
- Added “dishonest or selfish motive” as an aggravator despite Leigh’s pro bono representation.
- Rejected mitigation for personal/emotional problems (no acute impairment), inexperience (not parsed by practice area), unreasonable delay (no specific prejudice), and interim rehabilitation (no concrete steps like courses or payment of sanctions).
Relied on Standards 4.5(a), 6.2(a), and 7.1(a), and prior case law, to conclude that disbarment—not a rehabilitative suspension—was necessary given the magnitude, pattern, and defiance reflected in the record.

The Court ordered the disbarment effective in 30 days (with an option to make it immediate upon certification), prohibited Leigh from new business as of the opinion date, directed compliance with Rules Regulating The Florida Bar 3‑5.1(h) and, if applicable, 3‑6.1, and awarded costs to The Florida Bar.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Florida Bar v. Alters (2018) and Florida Bar v. Frederick (2000): Reinforced the deferential standard for reviewing a referee’s factual findings—if supported by competent, substantial evidence, the Court will not reweigh. Here, the Court found the record clearly established all violations.
Florida Bar v. Bander (2023) and Florida Bar v. Patterson (2018): Addressed the sufficiency of findings to support guilt and placed the burden on the party challenging the referee to show lack of record support. Also, Bander clarified that “substantial experience” and “inexperience” are not parsed by subject‑matter expertise, but by the capability to recognize rule‑violative conduct. The Court used Bander to reject “inexperience” as mitigation here.
Florida Bar v. Germain (2007): Confirmed the challenger’s burden regarding the referee’s findings and recommendations.
Florida Bar v. Jacobs (2023) and Florida Bar v. Ray (2001): Established the objective test under Rule 4‑8.2(a). An attorney violates the rule if he lacks an objectively reasonable factual basis for statements impugning judicial integrity. Leigh’s appellate accusations of racial bias lacked such basis and thus violated Rule 4‑8.2(a).
Florida Bar v. Strems (2022): Demonstrated that disbarment can be appropriate even without prior discipline when misconduct is egregious and systemic. The Court cited Strems to justify bypassing incremental discipline in Leigh’s case.
Florida Bar v. Schwartz (2024): Held that mitigation for “personal or emotional problems” requires an acute impairment, not a life‑long personality trait. The Court invoked Schwartz to reject Leigh’s mitigation claim on this factor.
Florida Bar v. Irish (2010) and Florida Bar v. Valentine‑Miller (2008): Clarified “interim rehabilitation” mitigation. Conclusory claims or minimal steps are inadequate (Irish); concrete rehabilitation measures can count (Valentine‑Miller). Leigh had done neither.
Florida Bar v. Anderson (1989): Emphasized the Court’s ultimate responsibility for determining sanctions, supporting the Court’s broader review on discipline.
Florida Bar v. Springer (2004) and Florida Bar v. Committe (2014): Sanction benchmarks. Springer supported disbarment for patterns of incompetence and misconduct across matters; Committe showed lengthy suspension for frivolous filings and defiance, but Leigh’s misconduct exceeded those facts.

Legal Reasoning by Count and Rule

Counts I–II: Social Media Misconduct and False Accusations in the School Board Litigation

Leigh’s social media posts were humiliating, disparaging, and threatening. Discovery was disrupted, depositions were suspended, a protective order issued (including an armed officer’s presence), fee sanctions assessed, and the S.D. Florida suspended him for two years. These acts violated:

Rule 4‑3.6(a): Extrajudicial statements likely to materially prejudice proceedings (the Court found substantial likelihood and imminent detrimental effect).
Rule 4‑8.4(d): Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, including disparagement/humiliation of participants.
Rule 4‑8.4(a): The catch‑all ban on violating the Rules.

Separately, Leigh accused opposing counsel, in a filed “addendum” to the joint pretrial stipulation, of forging a signature—without basis. A court found bad faith and sanctioned him. This violated:

Rule 4‑8.4(d): Prejudicial conduct via unfounded accusations causing needless proceedings.
Rule 4‑8.4(a): Derivative violation.

Counts III–IV: Stonybrook Litigation — Gross Incompetence, Defiance of Orders, Frivolity, and Improper Default Practice

Leigh attempted repeatedly to secure preliminary injunctive relief by motion rather than by a proper complaint, despite clear rulings instructing otherwise, and then filed a series of defective class-action complaints that disobeyed the court’s prior orders (including stricken language), lacked required mentor certification, and ignored pleading rules (e.g., Rule 1.220 for class actions; Rule 1.130 for exhibits). He violated a gag order by posting about the case and failed to purge contempt despite an opportunity. The court disqualified him from class representation and imposed significant fee sanctions.

These facts supported violations of:

Rule 4‑1.1: Incompetent representation (failure to grasp “fundamental legal doctrines or procedures”).
Rule 4‑3.1: Frivolous filings and positions, including repeated improper motions for injunctive relief and unsupportable claims against the City.
Rule 4‑3.4(c): Knowingly disobeying tribunal orders (mentor certification, stricken language, gag order, professionalism course).
Rule 4‑3.6(a): Prejudicial extrajudicial statements violating the gag order and risking a tainted jury pool.
Rule 4‑8.4(d) and 4‑8.4(a): Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and derivative violations.

In Count IV, Leigh moved for default despite failed e‑service and missing required exhibits, and pursued claims against the City unsupported by then‑existing law (sovereign immunity). The court found no factual or legal basis and awarded fees against Leigh and his firm. This further established violations of Rules 4‑1.1, 4‑3.1, 4‑3.4(c), 4‑8.4(d), and 4‑8.4(a).

Count V: Circumventing the No‑Contact Rule Using a Court Reporter

Leigh orchestrated a “sworn statement” of a represented party’s assistant manager (Millennia) through a court reporter, supplied questions, waited outside the witness’s home, and texted the reporter during the session to obtain internal confidential documents. He then used the information in filings and to seek sanctions/disqualification of defense counsel. The trial court disqualified him from representing clients in the matter (or related matters against the defendants).

This conduct violated:

Rule 4‑4.2(a): Communicating about the representation with a known represented person—indirectly via a proxy (the court reporter). Attempting to “outsource” the prohibited contact does not avoid the rule.
Rule 4‑4.4(a): Using methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of another (targeting the represented employee’s confidential company information).
Rule 3‑4.3: Conduct contrary to honesty and justice.
Rule 4‑8.4(d) and 4‑8.4(a): Prejudicial conduct and derivative violation.

Count VI: Baseless Accusations of Racial Bias Against the Trial Judge

On appeal to the Fourth DCA, Leigh attributed adverse rulings to racial bias rather than case merits, but offered no objective factual basis. Under the objective standard articulated in Jacobs and Ray, this violated:

Rule 4‑8.2(a): False or reckless statements regarding a judge’s integrity.
Rule 4‑8.4(d) and 4‑8.4(a): Prejudicial conduct and derivative violation.

Discipline: Standards, Aggravation/Mitigation, and Case Comparisons

Standards Supporting Disbarment

Standard 4.5(a): Disbarment when a lawyer’s course of conduct shows a failure to understand fundamental legal doctrines or procedures and causes injury/potential injury.
Standard 6.2(a): Disbarment when a lawyer seriously interferes with a legal proceeding or knowingly violates orders/rules intending a benefit and causes serious (or potential) injury.
Standard 7.1(a): Disbarment for intentional violations of duties owed as a professional causing serious (or potential) injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

Aggravating Factors

Pattern of misconduct and multiple violations (as found by the referee) were sustained.
Indifference to making restitution (sustained).
Added by the Court: Dishonest or selfish motive—rejecting the referee’s contrary view. Pro bono representation does not negate dishonesty; the court‑reporter stratagem and other rule‑breaching tactics demonstrated dishonesty.

Mitigating Factors (Corrected)

Rejected: Absence of dishonest/selfish motive (inconsistent with the record and aggravation).
Rejected: Personal/emotional problems (no acute impairment; life‑long traits do not qualify—Schwartz).
Rejected: Inexperience in the practice of law (mitigation is not parsed by subject area—Bander).
Rejected: Unreasonable delay (no specific prejudice shown).
Rejected: Interim rehabilitation (no ethics/professionalism courses completed; sanctions unpaid; vague responses to mental‑health/education efforts—cf. Irish and Valentine‑Miller).
Left intact: Other unchallenged mitigators such as absence of prior discipline, character/reputation, and cooperation to the extent supported.

Case Comparisons

Springer: Disbarment affirmed for multiple matters showing incompetence, lack of diligence, and misrepresentations—supporting disbarment here.
Committe: Three‑year suspension for frivolous litigation and refusal to pay sanctions; the Court found Leigh’s pattern and severity worse and thus disbarment warranted.
Strems: Demonstrates disbarment can be appropriate even for a lawyer with no prior discipline when misconduct is egregious and systemic.

Bottom line: The magnitude, persistence, and defiance in Leigh’s conduct—coupled with his failure to comply with orders and to take remedial steps—made rehabilitative suspension inadequate.

Impact and Practical Significance

For Attorney Discipline in Florida

Pro bono status does not shield a lawyer from the “dishonest or selfish motive” aggravator. Dishonesty is measured by conduct, not fee arrangements.
“Inexperience” is not a mitigation catch‑all for missteps in a particular practice area. The inquiry is whether the lawyer could recognize rule‑violative conduct.
Mitigation for “personal/emotional problems” requires an acute impairment causally connected to the misconduct. Life‑long personality traits do not suffice.
“Unreasonable delay” requires proof of specific prejudice.
“Interim rehabilitation” demands concrete action—compliance with court‑ordered education, payment of sanctions, and demonstrable behavioral change.
The Court will not hesitate to impose disbarment for gross incompetence and defiance of orders even where a lawyer has no prior discipline.
Where a referee’s report lacks detail, the Court may nonetheless find guilt on all charges if the record clearly supports it.

For Litigation Practice and Professional Conduct

Social media is not a safe venting outlet during litigation. Posts that threaten, disparage, or risk prejudicing proceedings will trigger Rule 4‑3.6(a) and Rule 4‑8.4(d) consequences, including protective orders, fee sanctions, and discipline.
Do not weaponize accusations. Publicly accusing opposing counsel of crimes or forgery without a factual basis is bad faith, invites sanctions, and violates Rule 4‑8.4(d).
Obey orders. Court‑mandated mentoring, civility/professionalism courses, gag orders, and fee sanctions are not optional. Repeated noncompliance escalates to contempt, disqualification, and discipline.
Honor no‑contact boundaries. You cannot circumvent Rule 4‑4.2 by using a third party (court reporter, investigator, or anyone) to communicate with a represented person, nor can you exploit that channel to solicit confidential information.
Be precise with e‑service and pleadings. Defaults require proper service of operative pleadings and exhibits. Class action requirements (Rule 1.220) and exhibit rules (Rule 1.130) must be observed.
Accusing a judge of bias is serious. Under Rule 4‑8.2(a), you must have an objectively reasonable factual basis. Mere disagreement with rulings is not enough.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 4‑3.6(a) (Extrajudicial statements): Lawyers must refrain from public statements that are likely to materially prejudice a pending case. Social media counts as “public communication.”
Rule 4‑8.4(d) (Prejudicial to administration of justice): A broad prohibition on conduct that undermines the fairness, dignity, or orderly administration of the legal system, including disparaging litigants, witnesses, or lawyers.
Rule 4‑1.1 (Competence): Requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary. Persistent procedural missteps signal incompetence.
Rule 4‑3.1 (Frivolous claims): Lawyers must have a good‑faith basis in law and fact to assert positions. Ignoring controlling law (e.g., sovereign immunity) and filing baseless motions violates this rule.
Rule 4‑3.4(c) (Obeying tribunal rules/orders): Do not knowingly disobey courts. “Open refusal” requires asserting that no valid obligation exists—properly and on the record.
Rule 4‑4.2 (No contact with represented persons): No direct or indirect communications about the subject of the representation with a person known to be represented, absent consent or legal authorization.
Rule 4‑4.4(a) (Respect for rights of third persons): Do not use methods of obtaining evidence that violate legal rights (e.g., soliciting confidential company documents from a represented employee).
Rule 4‑8.2(a) (Statements about judges): An objective test: Would a reasonable lawyer have a factual basis to make the statement about a judge’s integrity? If not, it’s sanctionable.
Mitigating/Aggravating Factors: Factors that can increase or decrease sanctions. Mitigation must be proven and tied to concrete, credible evidence; aggravation focuses on patterns, intent, harm, and defiance.

Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in The Florida Bar v. Malik Leigh is a forceful reaffirmation that bar discipline protects the integrity of the legal system, not just clients. The Court disbarred Leigh for a pervasive pattern of gross incompetence, defiance of court orders, misuse of social media, baseless attacks on opposing counsel and the judiciary, and an attempted end‑run around the no‑contact rule.

Doctrinally, the opinion clarifies several recurring disciplinary issues:

Pro bono status does not negate dishonest motive as an aggravator.
Inexperience is not measured by practice niche but by the ability to recognize and avoid rule‑violative conduct.
Mitigation for personal/emotional problems requires an acute impairment; “unreasonable delay” requires specific prejudice; “interim rehabilitation” requires concrete remedial steps.
Accusations of judicial bias must rest on an objectively reasonable factual basis.
Indirect communications through intermediaries are still communications under the no‑contact rule.

Practitioners should heed the opinion’s unambiguous message: zealous advocacy does not excuse incompetence, incivility, dishonesty, or contempt for court orders. Social media is subject to the same professional rules as any other public forum, and creative work‑arounds for ethical prohibitions will be treated as violations, not ingenuity. For the disciplinary system, the opinion provides useful guidance on calibrating aggravation and mitigation and confirms that, in egregious cases, disbarment remains an appropriate first‑step sanction—even absent prior discipline.