“Practicable to Proceed,” Not “Probable Cause”: The Texas Supreme Court Clarifies Juvenile Transfer Standard Under Family Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A)

I. Introduction

In In the Matter of J.J.T., No. 23-1028 (Tex. Apr. 14, 2025), the Supreme Court of Texas resolved a recurring and increasingly important question in Texas juvenile law: what does it mean, under Texas Family Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A), that “for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday” of a respondent?

The case arises in the context of “late-filed” prosecutions—serious felonies allegedly committed when the accused was a juvenile, but charged only after the person has become an adult. In such cases, the State can only proceed if it convinces the juvenile court to waive its exclusive jurisdiction and transfer the matter to adult criminal court under § 54.02(j).

Two lower tribunals took a narrow, probable-cause-focused view of the “practicable to proceed” standard. The juvenile court granted transfer, but by blending statutory subsections (A) and (B) into a single, legally flawed finding. The court of appeals then went the other direction, holding that because probable cause existed before the respondent’s 18th birthday, it was necessarily “practicable” for the State to proceed and therefore transfer was barred.

The Supreme Court rejects both approaches. It holds that:

• The phrase “not practicable to proceed” in § 54.02(j)(4)(A) is not tethered to the timing of probable cause.
• Subsection (A) focuses instead on whether, for reasons beyond the State’s control, it was reasonably feasible to proceed in juvenile court before the respondent turned eighteen.
• A juvenile court that conflates “practicability” with development of probable cause misapplies the statute and abuses its discretion as a matter of law.

Because both the juvenile court and court of appeals analyzed “practicability” through the wrong legal lens, the Supreme Court reverses the court of appeals and remands to the juvenile court for a new transfer hearing under the correct standard.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Offense and Investigation

In October 2020, sixteen-year-old J.J.T. (sixteen years and eight months old at the time) was alleged to have participated in a robbery that escalated into the capital murder of Milford Gutierrez during a marijuana transaction. Video showed three perpetrators fleeing the scene. Investigators quickly tied text messages on the victim’s phone to a neighbor and friend of J.J.T., Alfonso Tovar.

Key investigative steps:

• Initial linkage to Tovar: Text messages and a latent fingerprint led to an arrest warrant for Tovar in November 2020.
• Tovar’s statement implicating J.J.T.: Tovar admitted being present and claimed that J.J.T. shot Gutierrez and took the marijuana.
• Forensic delay: Investigators seized Tovar’s password-protected phone and submitted it for decryption using a tool that could take “many months to a year.”
• Investigation pause: Deputy Crain largely “ceased investigating,” citing:
  • the COVID-19 pandemic;
  • his heavy workload; and
  • his own preference to avoid re-interviewing juvenile suspects until he had an order to apprehend them.

About a year later, in December 2021, Tovar met with prosecutors during plea negotiations, gave a more detailed proffer, and supplied the password to his phone. This allowed access to its contents. In January 2022, approximately one month later, J.J.T. turned eighteen.

In July 2022 (about six months after J.J.T. turned eighteen), Crain obtained and quickly received J.J.T.’s phone records, which corroborated Tovar’s account that both were at the scene. In November 2022, Crain obtained a warrant for J.J.T.’s arrest. After arrest, J.J.T. initially denied involvement but then admitted to participating in a robbery plan while continuing to blame Tovar as the shooter. Crain testified that this admission created probable cause to charge J.J.T. with capital murder, and the State did so.

B. The Transfer Motion and the Juvenile Court’s Order

Because the State charged J.J.T. after his 18th birthday for conduct committed at age sixteen, it was required to proceed first in juvenile court and seek a discretionary transfer for criminal prosecution as an adult under Family Code § 54.02(j).

Section 54.02(j) requires, among other things:

• Age criteria at the time of the offense;
• No prior adjudication or hearing on the offense;
• Probable cause that the respondent committed the alleged offense; and
• A statutory “good cause” showing for the State’s failure to proceed before age eighteen, under either § 54.02(j)(4)(A) or (B).

The State invoked both alternatives:

• Subsection (A): “for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person”; and
• Subsection (B)(i): after due diligence, the State did not have probable cause before age eighteen and “new evidence has been found since the 18th birthday of the person.”

The juvenile court held a hearing and granted the State’s motion. But its written finding improperly stitched together language from subsections (A) and (B), stating (paraphrased) that:

the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that for a reason beyond the control of the State it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the Respondent the State did not have probable cause to proceed in juvenile court and new evidence has been found since the 18th birthday of Respondent.

This “hybrid” finding omitted the separate statutory requirement of “due diligence” necessary for reliance on subsection (B).

C. Court of Appeals Decision

The First Court of Appeals vacated the transfer order and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, concluding that:

• The juvenile court’s attempt to splice § 54.02(j)(4)(A) and (B) together did not meet subsection (B)’s explicit “due diligence” requirement, so the transfer could not be sustained under (B).
• To uphold the order, the State therefore had to satisfy subsection (A)’s requirement that “for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed” before age eighteen.
• Applying that standard, the court held that there was probable cause to arrest and proceed against J.J.T. before he turned eighteen, based on Tovar’s accomplice-witness statement and corroborating evidence.
• Crain’s desire for more evidence, his workload, and his reluctance to re-interview minors did not qualify as reasons “beyond the control of the state,” and so the State failed § 54.02(j)(4)(A).

Accordingly, the court of appeals ruled that the statutory criteria for transfer were not met and directed dismissal of the case for lack of juvenile jurisdiction. Justice Farris dissented, arguing that:

• Subsection (A) does not make the timing of probable cause determinative; that is the function of subsection (B).
• “Practicability” under (A) requires a broader, fact-intensive inquiry into all circumstances beyond the State’s control, not a binary focus on probable cause.

D. Supreme Court Review

The Supreme Court of Texas granted the State’s petition for review. It largely agreed with Justice Farris’s dissenting interpretation of § 54.02(j)(4)(A), rejected the court of appeals’ interpretation tying “practicable to proceed” to the timing of probable cause, but also found that the juvenile court itself had misapplied the statute by relying on the later development of probable cause and “new evidence” instead of focusing squarely on “reasons beyond the control of the state.”

The Court reversed the court of appeals’ dismissal and remanded to the juvenile court for a new transfer hearing under a clarified statutory standard.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court’s core holdings can be summarized as follows:

1. “Practicable to proceed” under § 54.02(j)(4)(A) is not defined by the timing of probable cause.
   Subsection (A) makes no textual reference to probable cause. Instead, it asks whether, for reasons beyond the State’s control, it was reasonably feasible to proceed in juvenile court before the respondent’s 18th birthday.
2. Subsection (B) is the provision that directly addresses late-developing probable cause.
   When probable cause arises after age eighteen, § 54.02(j)(4)(B)(i) allows transfer if, after “due diligence,” it was not practicable to proceed earlier and new evidence after age eighteen established probable cause. That framework presupposes that probable cause developed late; (A) applies in all other situations.
3. The State may invoke both subsections (A) and (B) as alternative bases for transfer.
   If the juvenile court rejects the State’s claim that probable cause developed only after age eighteen (thus defeating (B)(i)) but still finds under (A) that external reasons rendered it impracticable to proceed before age eighteen, it may still transfer.
4. The court of appeals erred in holding that the existence of pre-eighteen probable cause conclusively defeats subsection (A).
   That ruling erroneously imports a probable-cause requirement into a provision that does not contain it.
5. The juvenile court also erred by effectively grafting subsection (B)’s “new evidence / no probable cause” concept onto a subsection (A) finding, without making the required “due diligence” finding.
   This misapplied the statute; a valid subsection (A) analysis must independently evaluate reasons beyond the State’s control that made it impracticable to proceed before the 18th birthday, separate from the timing of probable cause.
6. Because both lower courts analyzed the transfer under an incorrect legal standard, a remand is required.
   The Supreme Court clarified the law but declined to decide, as a matter of first instance, whether the State met its burden under the correct interpretation. That task belongs to the juvenile court as factfinder.

IV. Statutory Framework and Doctrinal Context

A. Juvenile Court Jurisdiction and Transfers

Under Texas law, juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over conduct committed by individuals while they are “children” under the Family Code—generally, persons aged ten through sixteen (and seventeen in some contexts). See Tex. Fam. Code § 51.04; In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1999).

Importantly:

• With limited exceptions, a juvenile court’s dispositional authority ends when the respondent turns eighteen. Most juvenile dispositions “automatically terminate” at that point. Tex. Fam. Code § 54.05(b).
• For certain felonies, the juvenile court can waive its exclusive jurisdiction and transfer the case to criminal district court for adult prosecution under § 54.02.

Section 54.02(j) specifically governs transfers where the State initiates proceedings after the respondent has turned eighteen. The Legislature designs this provision to:

“limit the prosecution of an adult for an act he committed as a juvenile if his case could reasonably have been dealt with when he was still a juvenile.”
—Moore v. State, 532 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)

B. Elements the State Must Prove Under § 54.02(j)

For a post-eighteen filing, the State must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following elements (paraphrased from § 54.02(j)):

1. Age at the time of the offense: The respondent must have been within a specified age range when the alleged felony occurred (e.g., between ten and under seventeen for capital murder or murder). § 54.02(j)(2).
2. No prior adjudication or transfer: No court has previously conducted an adjudication hearing or transfer hearing for that offense. § 54.02(j)(3).
3. Statutory “good cause” for delay: One of two alternative good-cause grounds must be proven under § 54.02(j)(4)(A) or (B).
4. Probable cause that the respondent committed the offense: The juvenile court must find “probable cause to believe that the child before the court committed the offense alleged.” § 54.02(j)(5).

If these criteria are not satisfied, the juvenile court has no authority to transfer and must dismiss the case. See In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d at 557.

C. The Two “Good Cause” Alternatives in § 54.02(j)(4)

Section 54.02(j)(4) sets out two conceptually distinct “good cause” pathways:

1. Subsection (A): “Beyond the control of the state / not practicable to proceed.”
   The juvenile court may transfer if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:

   “for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person.”

   This provision does not mention probable cause. Its focus is on whether external circumstances rendered timely juvenile proceedings (investigation, filing, hearing) unfeasible.
2. Subsection (B): “Due diligence / late-developing probable cause or other obstacles.”
   Alternatively, the juvenile court may transfer if, after “due diligence of the state,” it was not practicable to proceed before age eighteen because:
   • (i) the State lacked probable cause before age eighteen and “new evidence has been found since the 18th birthday” establishing it;
   • (ii) “the person could not be found”; or
   • (iii) a previous transfer order was reversed or set aside.
   Here, the Legislature speaks directly to the timing of probable cause and the State’s diligence in trying to develop it before the respondent turned eighteen.

Originally, in 1975, the statute limited good cause mainly to lack of probable cause and inability to locate the juvenile. In 1995, the Legislature significantly expanded it by adding what is now subsection (A), introducing the “reason beyond the control of the state / not practicable to proceed” language as a separate, freestanding basis for transfer.

D. Standard of Appellate Review

The Court adopts the two-step review framework articulated in Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), notwithstanding Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), which overruled Moon in part on a different point (the necessity of detailed written findings in the transfer order):

1. First, determine whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings underlying the statutory requirements (including good cause)
2. Second, decide whether the juvenile court’s ultimate decision to transfer was an abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court notes that Texas courts of appeals continue to apply the Moon standard to § 54.02(j) transfers, and the parties in this case did not argue for a different standard. The Court also emphasizes that:

• Appellate courts defer to the juvenile court’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence and credibility determinations.
• However, a juvenile court has no discretion to misinterpret or misapply the governing statute; legal errors constitute abuses of discretion. See HouseCanary, Inc. v. Title Source, Inc., 622 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Tex. 2021).

V. Detailed Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Reasoning

A. Construction of “Not Practicable to Proceed” Under § 54.02(j)(4)(A)

1. Ordinary meaning of “practicable”

The Court starts with the text. Because “practicable” is undefined in the Family Code, it applies the ordinary-meaning rule: statutes use words with their common, ordinary meaning unless otherwise defined. See, e.g., Tex. Health & Hum. Servs. Comm’n v. Estate of Burt, 689 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Tex. 2024).

Citing Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court notes that “practicable” means:

“reasonably capable of being accomplished; feasible in a particular situation.”

Thus, under § 54.02(j)(4)(A), the juvenile court must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, it was reasonably feasible for the State to:

• complete the investigation;
• initiate juvenile proceedings; and
• obtain a transfer decision

before the respondent turned eighteen, or whether some factor beyond the State’s control rendered that sequence of actions not reasonably capable of being accomplished.

2. Subsection (A) is not a proxy for when probable cause developed

The First Court of Appeals effectively treated the existence of probable cause before age eighteen as dispositive of the “practicability” inquiry. If the State could have proceeded because it had probable cause, the court reasoned, then by definition it was “practicable to proceed” and the State could not meet subsection (A).

The Supreme Court rejects that interpretation for several reasons:

• Textual silence: Subsection (A) does not mention probable cause at all. Courts should not read into statutory language conditions that the Legislature did not include, especially in an adjacent subsection (B) where the Legislature did address probable cause expressly.
• Structural clarity: Subsection (B)(i) specifically addresses situations where the State “did not have probable cause to proceed” before age eighteen but later obtained new evidence. If subsection (A) were also controlled by the timing of probable cause, the careful architecture of § 54.02(j)(4) would be redundant or incoherent.
• Legislative history: The 1995 amendment adding (A) broadened the transfer authority beyond the previous probable-cause–centric grounds. Reading probable cause back into (A) would undo that expansion.

In short, the fact that probable cause existed before the 18th birthday may be relevant evidence in the larger “practicability” analysis, but it is not decisive of the § 54.02(j)(4)(A) question.

3. How subsections (A) and (B) interact

The Court offers a functional distinction:

• If probable cause developed after age eighteen, the State may seek transfer under subsection (B)(i), but must show:
  • it exercised “due diligence” before age eighteen, and
  • only later obtained “new evidence” establishing probable cause.
• If probable cause developed before age eighteen, subsection (B)(i) is inherently inapplicable, and the State must instead rely on subsection (A) by proving that, for reasons beyond its control, it was not practicable to proceed before the juvenile turned eighteen.

The State is free to plead/argue both subsections as alternative bases. If the court rejects the claim that probable cause arose post-eighteen (defeating (B)(i)), it may still find, under (A), that other external obstacles made it impracticable to move the juvenile case forward in time.

B. Application to This Case: Errors by Both the Court of Appeals and the Juvenile Court

1. Error by the court of appeals

The court of appeals held that the State failed § 54.02(j)(4)(A) because:

• There was probable cause to arrest and prosecute J.J.T. before he turned eighteen, based on Tovar’s accomplice testimony and corroboration; and therefore
• It was by definition “practicable to proceed,” so the State could not show that it was “not practicable” for reasons beyond its control.

The Supreme Court finds this reasoning inconsistent with the statutory text. By importing a condition (timing of probable cause) that the Legislature placed only in subsection (B)(i), the court of appeals effectively collapsed (A) into a mere restatement of (B)’s probable-cause rule, depriving (A) of independent meaning.

2. Error by the juvenile court

The juvenile court’s error went in the opposite direction. Instead of treating (A) and (B) as distinct alternatives, it:

• spliced language from (A) and (B) together: “for a reason beyond the control of the State it was not practicable to proceed … [and] the State did not have probable cause … and new evidence has been found since the 18th birthday.”
• made no separate “due diligence” finding, which is a mandatory element of subsection (B).

In substance, the juvenile court appeared to:

• rely on the idea that probable cause developed only after J.J.T. turned eighteen (a (B)(i)-type notion); and
• treat that timing of probable cause as itself sufficient to satisfy “not practicable to proceed” under (A), instead of focusing on the statutory question: What reasons beyond the State’s control prevented timely juvenile proceedings?

The Supreme Court concludes that this conflation misinterprets § 54.02(j)(4)(A). A proper (A) analysis must:

• identify specific reasons beyond the State’s control; and
• explain how those reasons made it not reasonably feasible to proceed in juvenile court before the respondent’s 18th birthday,

not simply rely on a claimed absence of probable cause.

3. Why remand, not rendition?

Some records facts suggest potential reasons “beyond the control of the state,” including:

• the relatively short period between offense (October 2020) and eighteenth birthday (January 2022)—about fourteen months;
• the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on court operations and investigations;
• the long decryption times for password-protected phones using specialized tools; and
• Tovar’s delayed proffer and provision of the phone password in December 2021.

But other aspects of the record cut the other way:

• Crain’s decision to halt significant investigation for extended periods;
• his workload issues;
• his admitted personal discomfort with re-interviewing juveniles; and
• his failure to seek J.J.T.’s phone records until months after the 18th birthday.

Whether the State met its preponderance burden under (A) is a fact-intensive question—one properly left to the juvenile court under the correct legal standard. The Supreme Court accordingly:

• declines to “harmonize” the flawed findings or substitute its own factfinding; and
• remands for a new transfer hearing where the juvenile court must:
  • apply § 54.02(j)(4)(A) correctly, and
  • if the State again invokes (B), make the required “due diligence” findings explicitly and separately.

C. Precedents and Authorities Influencing the Decision

1. Moore v. State, 532 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)

Moore is central to the Court’s understanding of § 54.02(j)(4)(A). There, as here:

• The defendant was charged as an adult for conduct allegedly committed as a juvenile.
• The original investigation began when he was sixteen, but law enforcement:
  • delayed sending the case to the district attorney for more than two years,
  • blamed the delay on the detective’s heavy caseload and mistaken belief about Moore’s age.

The Court of Criminal Appeals held that:

• Investigative delays attributable to workload and age miscalculation are chargeable to the State in the “beyond the control of the state / practicable to proceed” analysis.
• Those self-imposed delays did not justify a finding that it was not practicable to proceed before Moore turned eighteen.

Although Moore did not explicitly turn on the timing of probable cause, it confirms two important principles that the Supreme Court relies on in J.J.T.:

• Subsection (A) is a practicability inquiry grounded in the totality of circumstances, not just a probable-cause question.
• Delays due to internal State factors (like heavy caseloads and errors) are generally not “beyond the control of the state.”

2. In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1999), and Legislative Response (§ 51.0412)

N.J.A. placed a spotlight on the jurisdictional consequences when the statutory transfer prerequisites are not met:

• If § 54.02(j)’s criteria are unsatisfied and the individual is already over eighteen, the juvenile court’s only option is to dismiss the case; it cannot adjudicate it, and no criminal court has jurisdiction absent a valid transfer.

Following N.J.A., the Legislature enacted § 51.0412 to create “continuing jurisdiction” for certain cases filed before the 18th birthday, mitigating some of the harshness of jurisdictional cutoffs. But § 54.02(j) remains the exclusive doorway for late-filed charges like those at issue in J.J.T.. This helps explain why courts often interpret § 54.02(j) carefully: an erroneous transfer ruling can functionally determine whether a serious felony will be prosecuted at all.

3. Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), and Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)

Moon established the two-step review of juvenile transfers (sufficiency of the evidence plus abuse of discretion) and originally required detailed written findings addressing each transfer factor. In Ex parte Thomas, the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled Moon’s requirement for detailed findings, but did not alter the core appellate-review framework.

In J.J.T.:

• The Supreme Court adopts the Moon approach to reviewing § 54.02(j) transfers.
• It highlights that while factual determinations are reviewed deferentially, legal interpretation of § 54.02(j)(4)(A) is a pure question of law that appellate courts review de novo.

4. Other Courts of Appeals’ Interpretations of “Beyond the Control of the State”

The opinion canvasses and implicitly harmonizes several intermediate appellate cases dealing with:

• short windows between outcry and 18th birthday (In re B.C.B.; In re L.M.B.);
• pandemic-related and court-calendar delays (In re N.J.T.);
• delays while investigators seek additional corroborating evidence (In re A.M. vs. In re E.B.).

Collectively, these cases underscore that:

• Whether a particular reason for delay is “beyond the control of the state” is a highly fact-specific determination.
• Certain systemic or external factors (e.g., the timing of an outcry close to the 18th birthday, pandemic court closures) may legitimately make it impracticable to proceed in time.
• Conversely, purely internal State choices (prosecutorial strategy, investigative preferences, unexplained inaction) often will not qualify.

5. Statutory-interpretation and procedural authorities

The Court cites:

• Estate of Burt for its general approach to undefined statutory terms;
• HouseCanary for the principle that misapplication of law is an abuse of discretion;
• In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. 2024), for the deference owed to trial-court factfinding.

These citations reinforce that the Court’s role in J.J.T. is primarily clarifying statutory meaning, then remanding for the juvenile court to reapply that meaning to the factual record.

D. The Court’s View of State Investigative Discretion vs. Impermissible Delay

The Court acknowledges that:

• The State has “considerable discretion in the manner and means of conducting its investigation.”

However, § 54.02(j)(4)(A) empowers the juvenile court to scrutinize whether the exercise of that discretion has “devolved into unreasonable delay,” particularly when a respondent’s 18th birthday approaches.

Thus:

• Investigative choices, such as:
  • waiting for additional corroboration,
  • prioritizing certain cases over others,
  • delaying re-interviews,
  
  can be reasonable or unreasonable in context, and the juvenile court, as factfinder, must evaluate them.
• Even if officers acted in good faith, delays traceable to workload, comfort level in interviewing juveniles, or internal resource allocation may still weigh against a finding that the delay was “beyond the control of the state.”

E. Interaction Between Probable Cause and Transfer Decisions Going Forward

J.J.T. clarifies the distinct roles of probable cause in § 54.02(j):

1. As a separate requirement for transfer:
   Under § 54.02(j)(5), the juvenile court must always find probable cause that the respondent committed the offense. That requirement is independent of the good-cause analysis under § 54.02(j)(4).
2. As a timing factor under subsection (B):
   Subsection (B)(i) focuses on whether probable cause was lacking before age eighteen and only later established by new evidence, coupled with “due diligence.” This is where the timing of probable cause is doctrinally central.
3. As evidentiary context under subsection (A):
   Under § 54.02(j)(4)(A), the mere fact that probable cause existed or could have been established before the 18th birthday is not dispositive of “practicability,” but it may form part of the factual narrative. For example:
   • If probable cause was obvious and longstanding, and no significant external obstacles existed, it will be harder for the State to show that it was “not practicable” to proceed.
   • Yet a case could exist where probable cause was present, but other genuine external barriers (e.g., sudden pandemic closures, natural disasters, key witnesses being medically unavailable) made it impossible to schedule or conduct the necessary juvenile proceedings in time.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts and Terminology

1. Probable Cause

“Probable cause” is a relatively low threshold: it is the set of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe that a particular individual has committed a crime. It is more than a mere suspicion, but far less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

In juvenile transfer settings, probable cause serves two roles:

• As a precondition to transfer itself (§ 54.02(j)(5)); and
• As a timing trigger under § 54.02(j)(4)(B)(i) when it is not developed until after age eighteen.

2. Preponderance of the Evidence

“Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof the State must meet to show “good cause” under § 54.02(j)(4). It means “more likely than not” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” It is a civil standard, lower than the criminal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

3. Abuse of Discretion

An “abuse of discretion” occurs when a trial court:

• acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, or
• fails to correctly interpret or apply the governing law.

In this case, misreading § 54.02(j)(4)(A) and conflating its standard with the timing of probable cause is a legal error, and therefore an abuse of discretion.

4. “Beyond the Control of the State”

This phrase refers to circumstances that the State could not reasonably prevent or overcome, even through diligent effort. Examples might include:

• Unforeseeable natural disasters;
• Sudden illness or death of key witnesses;
• Court system shutdowns due to a pandemic;
• Technology limitations (e.g., unavoidable delays in forensic decryption technology), if credibly shown to be beyond the State’s ability to expedite.

By contrast, events such as:

• Officer workload;
• Internal administrative errors;
• Strategic decisions not to seek obvious evidence or not to file charges;

are typically considered “within the control of the state” and thus weigh against a finding of good cause under subsection (A).

5. “Not Practicable to Proceed”

This does not mean “absolutely impossible,” nor does it mean “inconvenient.” Rather, it asks:

Was it reasonably feasible for the State, given all external constraints, to initiate and litigate the juvenile case (including any transfer motion) before the respondent turned eighteen?

If, for reasons genuinely beyond its control, the State could not reasonably be expected to accomplish that, then it may satisfy § 54.02(j)(4)(A).

VII. Practical and Prospective Impact

A. For Prosecutors and Law Enforcement

• No categorical bar based solely on early probable cause: Prosecutors cannot assume that developing probable cause before the 18th birthday automatically precludes transfer under § 54.02(j)(4)(A). They may still seek transfer if genuine external barriers made timely juvenile proceedings impracticable.
• Heightened need for documentation of external obstacles: To carry their preponderance burden under (A), prosecutors will increasingly need a record showing:
  • court calendar realities,
  • COVID or other systemic disruptions,
  • technology delays,
  • witness unavailability, and so on.
• Less tolerance for self-inflicted delay: Following Moore and J.J.T., reasons like caseload, internal miscommunication, or personal preferences (e.g., reluctance to interview juveniles) will rarely suffice as “beyond the control of the state.”
• Strategic dual pleading under (A) and (B): The opinion explicitly approves the State’s practice of invoking both subsections. Prosecutors should continue to do so where factually supportable, while ensuring they separately satisfy (B)’s “due diligence” requirement when they rely on late-developing probable cause.

B. For Defense Counsel

• Expanded avenues to challenge transfer: Counsel can attack:
  • whether delays were truly beyond the State’s control, and
  • whether State inaction or strategic choices contributed to missing the juvenile window.
• Focus on internal delay and missed investigative steps: Defense can highlight:
  • gaps in investigation (e.g., failing to seek phone records until after age 18),
  • officer testimony about workload and preferences,
  • alternative steps the State reasonably could have taken earlier.
• Preservation of appellate issues: Because legal misinterpretation of § 54.02(j)(4)(A) is an abuse of discretion, defense counsel should insist that juvenile courts:
  • separately analyze subsections (A) and (B), and
  • avoid conflating “practicability” with the timing of probable cause.

C. For Juvenile Courts

• Need for clearer, statute-tracking findings: Although detailed findings are not strictly required after Thomas, J.J.T. demonstrates the risk of “splicing” statutory phrases. Courts are well-advised to:
  • make distinct findings under § 54.02(j)(4)(A) and (B), when both are invoked; and
  • explicitly address “due diligence” if they rely on (B).
• Fact-intensive evaluative role: Juvenile courts remain the primary factfinders on whether reasons were “beyond the control of the state” and whether it was “not practicable” to proceed. Appellate courts will typically defer to these assessments if the correct legal standard is used.
• Consistency across districts: By clarifying that “practicable to proceed” is not a proxy for the timing of probable cause, the Court harmonizes conflicting approaches among the courts of appeals, reducing jurisdictional dismissals based solely on early probable cause.

D. For the Law of Juvenile Justice in Texas

This opinion further refines the balance that § 54.02(j) strikes between:

• Protecting juveniles from adult criminal prosecution where the State could reasonably have pursued their cases in juvenile court; and
• Allowing prosecution of serious juvenile conduct that, for legitimate, external reasons, could not be addressed before the respondent turned eighteen.

By decoupling “practicability” under subsection (A) from the timing of probable cause, the Court prevents an overly rigid rule that would bar transfer whenever probable cause could have been established earlier, regardless of genuine external constraints.

VIII. Key Takeaways and Conclusion

In the Matter of J.J.T. establishes an important clarifying principle in Texas juvenile-transfer law:

Under Texas Family Code § 54.02(j)(4)(A), the question whether it was “not practicable to proceed” in juvenile court before the respondent’s 18th birthday is governed by reasons “beyond the control of the state,” not by the mere existence or timing of probable cause.

The Court:

• Rejects the view that early probable cause automatically forecloses transfer under subsection (A);
• Confirms that subsection (B), not (A), is where the timing of probable cause and “new evidence” are expressly addressed;
• Holds that both the juvenile court and court of appeals misapplied the statute by improperly tying “practicability” to probable cause; and
• Remands for a new hearing so that the juvenile court can apply the correct standard to the specific record.

In doing so, the Supreme Court reinforces a nuanced, fact-sensitive approach to late-filed juvenile cases. It respects the juvenile court’s role as factfinder while preserving appellate oversight on questions of statutory meaning. Going forward, both prosecutors and defense counsel must grapple more directly with the concrete, external reasons for delay—and juvenile courts must carefully articulate how those reasons bear on whether it was truly “not practicable” to bring the case while the respondent was still a juvenile.