“Participants, Not Accessories” – The Refined Scope of Felony-Murder Liability under § 53a-54c after State v. Hinton (Conn. 2025)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in State v. Hinton, SC 20881 (June 24, 2025), confronted a recurring question in felony-murder prosecutions: must the prosecution prove that the person who actually causes the homicide was an accessory to the predicate felony, or is it enough that the killer was simply a participant in the underlying crime?

Jordan Hinton was convicted of felony murder, attempted first-degree robbery, and firearms offenses arising from an altercation outside a barbershop in Bridgeport. While Hinton tried to rob Omar Rivera, a confederate, Mark Christian, fatally shot a bystander, Deon “Bishop” Rodney. On appeal Hinton argued, inter alia, that the State had to prove Christian shared Hinton’s specific intent to rob Rivera (i.e., was an accessory to the attempted robbery) before Hinton could be vicariously liable for felony murder.

The Court rejected that argument and issued a clarifying ruling that the term “participant” in Connecticut’s felony-murder statute (§ 53a-54c) does not import the accessorial-liability requirements of § 53a-8. This subtle but important clarification—essentially: the State must prove a participant, not an accessory—forms the core precedent set by the case.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Felony Murder Holding – § 53a-54c does not require the State to prove that the killer was the defendant’s accessory to the predicate felony. Proving (i) an attempted robbery, and (ii) that “another participant” caused a death “in the course of and in furtherance of” that crime suffices.
• Sufficiency of Evidence – The jury reasonably inferred Christian’s participation and that the killing occurred in the course and furtherance of Hinton’s attempted robbery.
• Jury Instructions – Because accessory liability is not an element, the trial court correctly omitted an accessory-intent instruction.
• Confrontation/Whelan Issue – Defense counsel affirmatively waived confrontation claims by expressly agreeing to the admission of Rivera’s video interviews under State v. Whelan.
• Out-of-Court Statement Sufficiency – The Court declined to overrule State v. Newsome; reliable Whelan statements can, case-by-case, constitute sole proof. Rivera’s interviews were reliable and corroborated, so the evidence was sufficient on Hinton’s intent to rob.
• Disposition – Judgment of conviction affirmed; 40-year sentence stands.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• State v. Bennett (2013) – Distinguished felony-murder liability from Pinkerton and accessory doctrines; cited to underscore the legislature’s different treatment of “participants.”
• Pinkerton v. U.S. (1946) – Mentioned for comparison; court highlighted that Pinkerton conspiracy liability is doctrinally separate from felony-murder.
• State v. Valeriano (1983) & Kyles (1992) – Earlier cases noting that felony murder requires no intent-to-kill; used to support a narrow reading of § 53a-54c.
• State v. Simms, Young, Andrews – 1980s cases whose dicta equated “participant” with “accessory.” Hinton clarifies that these passages were descriptive, not definitional.
• State v. Wilchinski (1997) – Cited for the principle that courts should not graft statutory elements absent clear legislative intent.
• State v. Newsome (1996) – Upheld; reaffirmed that a single reliable Whelan statement can suffice to convict.
• State v. Whelan (1986) – Provides hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements; foundation for admitting Rivera’s interviews.
• State v. Golding (1989) & In re Yasiel R. – Framework for unpreserved constitutional claims; used to dispose of Hinton’s waived confrontation argument.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Text Controls. The Court focused on the plain language of § 53a-54c: “such person, or another participant...” Nothing references § 53a-8 or “intent.” If the legislature had intended accessory-intent elements, it could have said so.

2. Analytical Separation of Doctrines. Felony murder is predicated on the inherent danger of certain felonies; liability is risk-based, not intent-based. Accessorial liability, by contrast, is intent-based. Grafting § 53a-8 would collapse that distinction.

3. Temporal and Causal Limits Suffice. The statutory phrases “in the course of” (temporal) and “in furtherance of” (causal) already restrict felony-murder liability. Additional intent hurdles are unnecessary.

4. Sufficiency Analysis. Surveillance footage showed Christian arming himself, coordinating with Hinton, pursuing Rivera, and shooting Rodney when Rodney blocked Hinton. That sequence satisfies both statutory limits.

5. Instructional Correctness. Because accessory status is not an element, no such jury instruction was needed; thus no error.

6. Waiver Doctrine. Counsel’s explicit “no objection” to Whelan exhibits constituted a deliberate waiver, foreclosing appellate confrontation claims under Golding.

7. Retention of Newsome. The Court saw no “most cogent reasons” to abandon stare decisis. It re-endorsed a pragmatic, case-by-case reliability inquiry for solitary Whelan statements.

3.3 Likely Impact on Connecticut Law

• Prosecution Strategy. Prosecutors can proceed on felony-murder counts without proving accessory liability of every confederate. This simplifies proof, especially in group-crime scenarios where mental states vary.
• Defense Tactics. Defense counsel cannot demand accessory-intent instructions or sufficiency challenges premised on § 53a-8. Attention will shift to disputing participation, the “in furtherance” nexus, and reliability of evidence.
• Jury Charges. Pattern instructions will likely be updated: emphasis on “participant” and deletion of language suggesting shared intent requirements.
• Legislative Dialogue. The opinion invites the General Assembly to amend the statute if it truly wants accessory-level proof; silence may be read as concurrence with Hinton.
• Whelan/Newsome Stability. By reaffirming Newsome, the Court preserves the controversial yet entrenched rule that a single reliable statement can convict—a cautionary note for trial defense lawyers.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Felony Murder (§ 53a-54c) – Liability for any death caused during and in furtherance of certain felonies (robbery, burglary, etc.), regardless of intent to kill.
• Participant vs. Accessory – A “participant” merely takes part in the felony; an “accessory” (under § 53a-8) must share the principal’s criminal intent and knowingly aid the crime.
• “In the course of” – The death occurs during the continuous sequence of events surrounding the felony.
• “In furtherance of” – A logical nexus; the homicide advances, facilitates, or results naturally from the felony.
• Whelan Statement – A prior statement (sworn, signed, or recorded) admissible for its truth if the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination.
• Functional Unavailability – When a testifying witness claims total memory loss, arguably thwarting cross-examination; under Hinton, counsel must object or the claim is waived.
• Golding Review – Appellate safety-net for unpreserved constitutional claims, defeated if the error was waived, not merely unobjected-to.

5. Conclusion

State v. Hinton makes an important, albeit narrow, doctrinal clarification: Connecticut’s felony-murder statute demands proof of a dangerous felony, a death, and participation—not shared intent. By disentangling § 53a-54c from § 53a-8, the Court aligns statutory text with legislative purpose and national felony-murder norms.

Equally significant is the Court’s reaffirmation of two practical pillars: (i) defense counsel’s no objection will waive confrontation claims, and (ii) a single reliable Whelan statement can sustain a conviction. Together, these holdings underscore the centrality of strategic objections at trial and meticulous reliability analysis on appeal.

Going forward, prosecutors can indict with greater confidence under felony murder when multiple actors are involved, while defense attorneys must pivot toward attacking “participation” and causation rather than accessory intent. Unless the General Assembly revisits the statute, Hinton will likely stand as the decisive authority on the meaning of “participant” in Connecticut felony-murder jurisprudence.