“Partial Progress Is Not Enough” – Vermont Supreme Court Clarifies the Doctrine of Parental Stagnation and the “Reasonable-Time” Standard in Termination-of-Parental-Rights Cases

1. Introduction

In In re J.C., Juvenile, Case No. 25-AP-052 (Vt. Aug. 8, 2025), the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Family Division’s decision to terminate the parental rights of M.C. (“Father”) to his eleven-year-old son, J.C. The opinion, issued by a three-justice panel, revisits two recurring themes in child-protection litigation:

What constitutes “stagnation” when assessing a post-disposition change in circumstances; and
How courts should measure a “reasonable time” for a parent to resume parental duties, particularly when the child has significant special needs.

Father contended on appeal that the evidence did not support findings of stagnation and that he could parent J.C. within a reasonable period. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and endorsed the trial court’s view that late-breaking improvements, confined to a single domain (sobriety) and occurring only in the final year of a four-year case, do not forestall termination when other core parenting deficits persist.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court upheld the termination on two independent grounds:

Change of Circumstances – Stagnation: Father’s progress was “so insignificant that it is unlikely [he] will be able to resume parental duties in a reasonable time.”
Best Interests of the Child: Weighing the statutory factors in 33 V.S.A. § 5114, the trial court correctly concluded that J.C.’s need for stability, coupled with Father’s unresolved mental-health issues, housing instability, and limited involvement in J.C.’s care, made reunification unrealistic.

Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed, emphasizing that “the real test is whether there is a reasonable possibility of reuniting parent and child within a reasonable period of time.”

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re J.G., 2010 VT 61 – Reiterated the two-prong definition of stagnation: (a) passage of time with no improvement, or (b) improvement so minimal that resumption of parenting duties remains unlikely. The Court leaned heavily on this framework.
In re J.B., 167 Vt. 637 (1998) (mem.) – Established the centrality of the “reasonable-time” factor. The panel quoted J.B. to reaffirm that likelihood of resumption within a reasonable time is “the most important factor.”
In re K.F., 2004 VT 40 – Recited the two-step analysis for post-disposition TPR petitions. Provided the procedural scaffold adopted here.
In re C.P., 2012 VT 100 – Explained that reasonableness is measured “from the perspective of the child’s needs,” a point accentuated in light of J.C.’s amputations and emotional challenges.
In re J.J., 143 Vt. 1 (1983) – Offered the oft-quoted aphorism on parental improvement versus permanency, underscoring that incremental parental gains cannot trump a child’s right to stability.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court accepted the Family Division’s factual findings unless “clearly erroneous.” Its legal reasoning proceeded as follows:

Stagnation Analysis:
- Father’s sobriety gains occurred only after entering treatment in October 2023, some 2½ years into the CHINS case.
- Core deficits—mental-health treatment, domestic-violence counseling, housing, attendance at J.C.’s medical/educational appointments—remained unaddressed.
- Because those domains are integral to caring for a child with physical disabilities and heightened emotional needs, the Court found “no material improvement” in parental capacity.
Best-Interests Balancing:
- J.C. was thriving under his grandparents’ constant structure.
- Father’s contact had been inconsistent; missed visits caused acute distress.
- The Court deferred to the lower court’s assessment that Father would be unable to shoulder full parental responsibilities “within a reasonable time,” especially given J.C.’s therapeutic, medical, and educational regimen.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation

Although decisions of three-justice panels are non-precedential under Vermont’s internal rules, In re J.C. still offers persuasive guidance likely to influence:

Timing of Treatment Efforts: Parents who delay meaningful engagement with services until the eleventh hour risk a finding of stagnation notwithstanding recent progress.
Multi-Domain Assessment: Courts will examine the totality of parental functioning—not merely sobriety or one area of compliance. Holistic deficits can outweigh isolated achievements.
Special-Needs Children: The opinion underscores that the “reasonable-time” calculus is child-centered and may be shorter where the child’s special needs demand predictable, skilled caregiving.
Parental Blame-Shifting: Arguments that the agency failed to facilitate services (e.g., provide appointment times) will carry little weight if the parent lacks initiative or follow-through.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Stagnation: Legally, this means a parent’s abilities are stuck in neutral. Either no real improvement happens, or any improvement is too small to matter for the child’s future.
Termination of Parental Rights (TPR): A court order that permanently ends the legal parent-child relationship, freeing the child for adoption or permanent guardianship.
Reasonable Time: Not a fixed clock; it depends on what the child—not the parent—needs. A child with intensive medical or emotional needs generally warrants a shorter timeline.
Clear and Convincing Evidence: The mid-level burden of proof in civil law, requiring a high degree of probability—more than “preponderance” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT): Use of medications (e.g., Suboxone) combined with counseling to treat substance-use disorder. In child-protection cases, MAT by itself seldom satisfies broader rehabilitation requirements.

5. Conclusion

In re J.C. reinforces a practical, child-focused message: incremental or last-minute parental improvements—even in a critical area like sobriety—will not outweigh ongoing deficiencies that jeopardize a child’s need for stability. The Court’s reasoning highlights a holistic approach to parental capacity and clarifies that the statutory “reasonable-time” test is keyed to the individual child’s circumstances, not the parent’s aspirations or treatment timeline.

Practitioners should counsel clients that comprehensive, timely engagement with all case plan domains—mental health, housing, domestic-violence accountability, and consistent visitation—is indispensable. Courts will not gamble a child’s future on late-developing or partial compliance when permanence is within reach through alternative caregivers.

— Commentary prepared by AI Legal Analyst, 2025