Introduction

In United States v. Ben-Jochannan (consolidated with United States v. Laureano), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed two sentences imposed following guilty pleas to firearms offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The case arises from the 2014 shooting death of Luis Perez in West Harlem during a narcotics dispute. Appellants Carlos Laureano and Nnandi Ben‑Jochannan challenged the substantive reasonableness of their respective sentences—Laureano’s 360-month sentence on two § 924(c) counts and Ben‑Jochannan’s 120-month sentence on one § 924(c) count.

Although issued as a non-precedential summary order, the Court’s reasoning is significant for federal sentencing practice: it expressly approves large upward variances in § 924(c) cases when the Sentencing Guidelines’ treatment of § 924(c) offenses (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4) fails to reflect severe underlying conduct, such as homicide. The Court endorses a comparative method that looks to analogous Guidelines (here, the homicide guidelines, U.S.S.G. §§ 2A1.1, 2A1.2) as a “cross-check” in assessing the reasonableness of an above-Guidelines sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Note on precedential status: As a summary order, this decision has no precedential effect under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1. Still, it provides a clear window into how the Court evaluates upward variances in § 924(c) cases involving exceptionally aggravated conduct.

Summary of the Opinion

• The panel (Judges Wesley, Merriam, and Kahn) affirmed the district court’s judgments (Liman, J.).
• Laureano pleaded guilty to two § 924(c) counts—discharging a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (Count One) and possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (Count Two). The combined mandatory minimum was 15 years; he received 300 months on Count One and a consecutive 60 months on Count Two (total 360 months).
• Ben‑Jochannan pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the brandishing of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense; the mandatory minimum was 84 months, and he received 120 months.
• Both defendants challenged only the substantive reasonableness of their sentences. The Court applied deferential abuse-of-discretion review, emphasizing that reversal is warranted only for sentences so “shockingly high” (or low) as to damage the administration of justice.
• Key rationale: U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 does not differentiate between minimal and extreme conduct in § 924(c) cases. Because the firearm here was used in a premeditated killing, the district court reasonably found the cases “outside the heartland” of § 924(c) and used the homicide guidelines as an anchor to assess the variance’s reasonableness.
• For Laureano, the Court showed that if sentenced under the homicide guidelines for second-degree murder (with acceptance of responsibility) and his Criminal History Category, the advisory range would have been 262–327 months on Count One, plus the mandatory consecutive 60 months on Count Two—i.e., 322–387 months. The imposed 360 months sits comfortably within that frame.
• For Ben‑Jochannan, the Court upheld a 36‑month upward variance above the 84‑month minimum, stressing his knowing role in transporting an armed shooter to and from the scene and his post-offense deception of the police, notwithstanding mitigating factors.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Establishes abuse‑of‑discretion review for sentencing and recognizes that district courts have a superior vantage point for weighing § 3553(a) factors.
• Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007): Endorses deference to district courts’ reasoned sentencing judgments and explanations.
• United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc): Clarifies that appellate review of substantive reasonableness is highly deferential and considers the totality of the circumstances.
• United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2012): Emphasizes that appellants bear a “heavy burden” in challenging sentences as substantively unreasonable.
• United States v. Muzio, 966 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2020): Articulates the “shockingly high or low” standard for setting aside a sentence as substantively unreasonable.
• United States v. Barrett, 102 F.4th 60 (2d Cir. 2024): Confirms that § 924(c) terms must run consecutively to other sentences. The panel invokes Barrett to underscore the mandatory consecutive nature of the 60‑month term on Laureano’s second count.
• Statutes and Guidelines: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (mandatory minimums for possession/brandishing/discharge; consecutive terms); 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (federal murder); U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 (sentencing for § 924(c) counts); U.S.S.G. §§ 2A1.1, 2A1.2 (first- and second-degree murder).

Impact of these authorities: The standards from Gall, Rita, and Cavera frame the deferential review; Broxmeyer and Muzio set a demanding threshold to reverse on substantive reasonableness. Barrett provides the statutory-consecutive baseline that magnifies the practical effect of § 924(c) sentences. The Guidelines provisions are central: § 2K2.4’s atypical structure drives the Court’s acceptance of a comparative analysis to the homicide guidelines.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) The § 924(c) Guidelines anomaly and “outside the heartland”

The panel stresses that U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 is unusual: it does not supply an offense level calibrated to aggravating or mitigating facts, but instead ties the sentence to the statutory minimum. As the Court puts it, under § 2K2.4 “there is no difference” between discharging a firearm into the air causing no injury and discharging it at a victim with intent to kill—the same mandatory minimum applies. Because the Guidelines themselves cannot account for the extraordinary seriousness of a homicide accomplished with the firearm, the district court reasonably concluded these cases fall “outside of the heartland” of typical § 924(c) prosecutions and warrant variance analysis under § 3553(a).

2) Comparative, analogical use of the homicide guidelines as a cross-check

To gauge the reasonableness of the upward variance, the district court looked to the homicide guidelines that would have applied had the defendants been convicted of murder (U.S.S.G. §§ 2A1.1, 2A1.2). The panel endorsed this comparative methodology. In Laureano’s case, the district court reasoned that the conduct—“premeditated” murder—would likely equate to first- or second-degree murder. Using second-degree murder (base offense level 38), less three levels for acceptance, and Criminal History Category V, the range would be 262–327 months for the homicide conduct alone. Adding the mandatory consecutive 60 months on the second § 924(c) count yields 322–387 months. The imposed 360‑month sentence thus fits comfortably within that analogical range.

For Ben‑Jochannan, while his Guidelines recommendation was the 84‑month mandatory minimum for brandishing, the district court found his conduct “more aggravated than the heartland” because the brandished firearm was used to kill and because he knowingly drove the armed shooter to and from the scene and later lied to police. A 120‑month sentence—36 months above the minimum—was therefore justified under § 3553(a).

3) Application of § 3553(a) factors

• Seriousness of the offense and respect for law: The district court emphasized the “brutal,” “brazen,” and “premeditated” nature of the killing. These considerations heavily supported lengthy sentences to reflect the gravity of the harm and promote respect for the law.
• Deterrence: The court expressly relied on general deterrence, particularly to signal that premeditated killings in the context of drug trafficking will attract severe punishment, even when the conviction is “only” under § 924(c).
• Incapacitation: For Laureano, the need to protect the public and account for his “lengthy criminal history” weighed heavily. For Ben‑Jochannan, incapacitation and specific deterrence were not significant given his more limited role and absence of subsequent criminality.
• Mitigation: The court credited mitigating factors—Laureano’s remorse, family support, educational efforts; Ben‑Jochannan’s limited role, lack of further criminal history, and capacity to live lawfully—yet found they did not overcome the aggravated nature of the offense conduct.

4) Substantive reasonableness: deference and the “shockingly high” benchmark

Applying the deferential standard of review, the panel reiterated that only sentences so “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law” warrant reversal. Given the homicide at the core of both defendants’ § 924(c) conduct, the district court’s variances were within the permissible range of choices. Indeed, Laureano’s 360‑month sentence is anchored by the very range that would have applied if the homicide had been charged and proven under the homicide guidelines, and Ben‑Jochannan’s 120‑month sentence reflects his aggravated assistance while still recognizing mitigation.

Likely Impact and Practical Implications

• Sentencing in § 924(c) cases involving extreme conduct: Even though § 2K2.4 pegs sentences to statutory minimums, district courts in the Second Circuit can, and likely will, look beyond the § 924(c) “heartland” where the firearm was used in especially grave conduct (e.g., homicide). Substantial upward variances may be sustained if adequately justified under § 3553(a).
• Comparative “cross-check” methodology: The Court’s endorsement of looking to analogous Guidelines (here, homicide) to assess the reasonableness of a variance provides a practical template for judges: when the applicable Guideline is structurally insensitive to aggravation, an analogical Guidelines range can serve as a sanity check.
• Plea bargaining dynamics: Defendants who plead to § 924(c) counts in exchange for dismissal of homicide charges should not assume the mandatory minimum defines their exposure. Where the record establishes severe underlying conduct, judges may approximate the sentence that would have applied to the unpursued homicide charge in assessing § 3553(a).
• Defense strategy: Defense counsel should proactively address the “outside-the-heartland” argument by developing mitigation and distinguishing the case from the homicide analogs (e.g., disputing premeditation, emphasizing lack of knowledge or foreseeability). They should also prepare for the possibility that the court will perform the kind of homicide-guideline cross-check used here.
• Government strategy: Prosecutors can argue for upward variances in § 924(c) cases by demonstrating how § 2K2.4 underrepresents the offense seriousness and by presenting a reasoned homicide-guideline comparator under § 3553(a).
• Doctrinal signal (non-precedential): While not binding, the order aligns with broader appellate deference to district judges’ § 3553(a) balancing, particularly where the Guidelines’ structure (as with § 2K2.4) fails to differentiate among qualitatively different harms.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantive reasonableness: On appeal, the question is not whether the appellate court would have imposed the same sentence, but whether the sentence is within the “range of permissible decisions.” Only extreme outliers—“shockingly high” or “shockingly low”—are reversed.
• § 924(c) and U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4: Section 924(c) criminalizes using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense and imposes mandatory minimums that increase for brandishing (7 years) and discharge (10 years). The Guidelines provision for § 924(c) does not calculate an offense level; it essentially points to the statutory minimum, making it insensitive to aggravating facts like homicide.
• “Heartland”: In Guidelines parlance, the “heartland” refers to the typical case to which a Guideline is tuned. When conduct is far more serious than the heartland, courts may vary from the advisory benchmark using § 3553(a).
• Analogical cross-check: When the applicable Guideline does not adequately capture seriousness, courts may look to other relevant Guidelines (e.g., homicide tables) as a comparative tool to test the reasonableness of a variance.
• Consecutive nature of § 924(c): By statute, any term imposed under § 924(c) must run consecutively to any other sentence, which can substantially increase total exposure when multiple counts are involved.
• Aiding and abetting brandishing: Aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 makes someone who knowingly assists the commission of a § 924(c) offense punishable as a principal. Even absent proof that the aider knew a murder would occur, knowledge that the principal was armed and facilitation of the armed offense can substantially aggravate sentencing under § 3553(a).

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary order affirms substantial upward variances in two § 924(c) cases where the firearm use culminated in homicide. Anchored in deferential appellate review and the realities of § 2K2.4’s design, the Court validates a comparative approach that looks to homicide guidelines as an aid to assessing reasonableness under § 3553(a). For Laureano, the 360‑month sentence corresponds to the range that would have applied had the homicide conduct been sentenced under the murder guidelines plus the mandatory consecutive term for the additional § 924(c) count. For Ben‑Jochannan, the 120‑month sentence reasonably reflects his aggravated role and the lethal outcome, notwithstanding mitigation.

While not precedential, the order is a clear signal: in § 924(c) cases featuring exceptionally serious underlying conduct, district courts may justify sizeable upward variances by demonstrating that the case lies outside § 2K2.4’s heartland and by using analogous Guidelines as a cross-check. Defendants and counsel should calibrate plea and sentencing strategies accordingly, recognizing that the statutory minimum is a floor, not a ceiling, when the firearm conduct results in the gravest harm.