“One Sovereign, One Voice”
The Fifth Circuit Confirms Federal Supremacy over State Immigration Enforcement and Revives Havens-Style Organizational Standing

I. Introduction

United States v. State of Texas (5th Cir. July 3, 2025) is the first published federal appellate decision addressing the constitutionality of Texas Senate Bill 4 (“S.B. 4”)—a sweeping state scheme that criminalises unlawful entry and re-entry into Texas and empowers state courts to order removal of non-citizens to Mexico. After the district court enjoined the statute, Texas appealed. A divided panel (Richman, Oldham, Ramirez, JJ.) affirms the injunction as to Director Martin of the Texas Department of Public Safety, holding that:

1. at least one plaintiff (Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center) has organizational standing under Havens Realty v. Coleman;
2. S.B. 4’s core provisions are field- and conflict-pre-empted by the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”); and
3. Texas cannot invoke the “State-War Clause” (Art. I §10 cl. 3) to escape pre-emption.

Judge Oldham dissents in a 90-page opinion that accuses the majority of “usurping” state sovereignty, misreading standing doctrine, and disregarding Murthy, Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and Salerno.

II. Case Background

• Statute: S.B. 4 creates two new state crimes—Illegal Entry (§51.02) and Illegal Re-entry (§51.03)—and compels judges to issue return orders directing aliens to Mexico. Failure to comply is a 2nd-degree felony.
• Plaintiffs: Las Americas & American Gateways (non-profit law-service organisations) and El Paso County. The United States originally sued but voluntarily dismissed after the 2024 election.
• District Court: Preliminary injunction entered February 29 2024; denied Texas’s stay request.
• Appeal: Following consolidation and briefing, only DPS Director Martin remained as appellant; state District Attorney dismissed his appeal; United States withdrew.

III. Summary of the Judgment

1. Standing. Las Americas showed a likely injury-in-fact because S.B. 4 would force it to divert staff, training, and outreach resources and impair its core mission of representing asylum-seekers—squarely within Havens. The injury is traceable to DPS’s announced plan (75-80 k arrests/yr) and redressable by enjoining Martin.
2. Political-question. Determining whether the State-War Clause authorises Texas’s self-help is a justiciable question of constitutional interpretation; Sterling v. Constantin, not Baker, governs.
3. Pre-emption.
   a) Field. INA occupies the field of entry & removal: comprehensive scheme, exclusive executive discretion, foreign-relations sensitivities.
   b) Conflict. S.B. 4 adds penalties and removal orders that: (i) bypass federal asylum/CAT processes; (ii) forbid state judges from abating prosecutions pending federal status determinations; (iii) require deportation to Mexico even for third-country nationals; and (iv) nullify federal discretion. That “stands as an obstacle” under Arizona v. US.
4. State-War Clause. The Clause limits—not expands—state power; no evidence of “actual invasion” or imminence that forecloses judicial review.
5. Injunction Factors. Irreparable harm proven (non-recoverable diversion costs; loss of mission). Balance of equities and public interest favour injunction (international comity, treaty obligations, supremacy of federal law).

IV. Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Havens Realty v. Coleman (1982) – organisational standing; majority applies; dissent says Alliance for Hippocratic Med. cabin Havens.
• Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine v. FDA (2024) – majority distinguishes; dissent says majority “defenestrates” it.
• Arizona v. United States (2012) – template for field & conflict pre-emption when state mirrors federal immigration crimes.
• Sterling v. Constantin (1932) – courts may review claims even when state invokes military necessity.
• Murthy v. Missouri, Nken, Salerno – debated in dissent regarding standing and facial relief standards.
• Trump v. CASA (2025) – majority notes but remands scope of universal injunction to district court.

2. Core Legal Reasoning

1. Organizational injury = concrete cost. Majority treats staff-training, jail-access logistics, and reduced capacity as “diversion of resources” that satisfies Article III.
2. INA’s structure. By detailing who may enter, inspection, expedited removal, asylum, CAT, and discretionary relief, Congress left “no room” for parallel state crimes.
3. Executive discretion central. Arizona, United States v. Texas (2023) underscore that removal decisions implicate foreign policy; S.B. 4 would compel removals irrespective of federal priorities.
4. Conflict with treaty obligations. Automatic return orders risk refoulement contrary to CAT; thus obstruct federal objectives.
5. State-War defence rejected. Text and history show Clause is mostly prohibitory; federal law remains supreme even during migration “crises.”

3. Impact Assessment

• Immigration federalism curtailed. Any state statute targeting entry/re-entry or ordering removal is now at grave risk of invalidation.
• Organizational standing broadened. Decision signals that Havens remains robust despite Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine; expect surge in NGO challenges to state and local immigration measures.
• State “invasion” theories limited. Confirmation that border-state declarations cannot override pre-emption.
• District-court injunctions. Remand for narrowing invites debate over nationwide vs. defendant-specific relief under Trump v. CASA.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Field Pre-emption: When Congress legislates so comprehensively that states are pushed entirely out of a policy area—even if state law agrees with federal law.
• Conflict Pre-emption: Even if Congress hasn’t occupied the whole field, a state law is void if it is impossible to follow both state and federal commands or if state law undermines federal goals.
• Organizational Standing vs. Associational Standing: An organization may sue in its own name if it is itself injured (e.g., must spend money or shift resources). That differs from suing on behalf of members.
• State-War Clause: A rarely litigated clause allowing states to “engage in war” if “actually invaded.” Court treats it as a narrow emergency power, not a blank cheque to legislate immigration.
• Return Order vs. Removal Order: S.B. 4’s “return” directs alien to cross back into the foreign nation; federal “removal” follows adjudication, selects destination country, and may allow relief.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. State of Texas cements two far-reaching propositions. First, immigration enforcement—particularly entry and removal—remains an exclusively federal domain; even “mirror” state crimes are pre-empted when they disturb the INA’s finely tuned procedures and diplomatic sensitivities. Second, non-profits whose missions are impeded by state laws retain Havens-style standing, despite recent scepticism in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. While the panel’s remand on the scope of injunctive relief leaves open whether a narrower order will emerge, the core holding limits the ability of border states to act unilaterally during migration surges. Going forward, litigants can be expected to invoke this precedent both to challenge state immigration initiatives and to assert standing based on resource diversion. Whether the Supreme Court will refine these doctrines—especially the tension between organizational standing and the Article III limits emphasised in Murray, TransUnion, and Alliance—is the next chapter to watch.