“Occasional Superficial Interaction” Re-affirmed: Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Flexibility in RFC Hypotheticals and Step-Two Severity
Commentary on Jason B. Risch v. Commissioner of the U.S. Social Security Administration (11th Cir. May 14 2025)

I. Introduction

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in a non-published but precedentially persuasive opinion, has delivered a robust clarification of two recurring controversies in Social Security disability litigation:

1. How closely the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ’s) written Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) finding must track the wording of the hypothetical question posed to a Vocational Expert (VE); and
2. Whether an ALJ commits reversible error by declining to label every medically determinable impairment “severe” at step two of the sequential evaluation.

The appellant, Jason B. Risch, alleged disabling back disorders, obesity, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety. The ALJ deemed him not disabled, a decision the district court affirmed. On appeal, Risch attacked the semantic alignment of the RFC and hypothetical, the purported vagueness of certain RFC descriptors, and the ALJ’s handling of his anxiety disorder. The Eleventh Circuit rejected each contention and affirmed.

II. Summary of the Judgment

• RFC/Hypothetical Consistency: The court ruled that wording differences (“semi-isolation” vs. “small groups or something in isolation”) did not render the VE’s testimony insubstantial so long as the functional limitations—“occasional superficial interaction with coworkers and supervisors”—remained the same.
• Descriptor Vagueness: Terms such as “superficial,” “semi-isolation,” and “preferably” are sufficiently definite in the disability context; the claimant’s counsel failed to seek clarification and the VE demonstrated understanding.
• Anxiety Disorder Findings: Because the ALJ identified other severe impairments, any failure to designate anxiety as severe was harmless; moreover, anxiety was analyzed in the RFC and did not meet Listing 12.06.
• Outcome: The Commissioner’s denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence; district court’s judgment affirmed.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Winschel v. Commissioner, 631 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2011)
   The cornerstone precedent requiring that the hypothetical incorporate all impairments. The panel distinguished Winschel, noting that the hypothetical here did incorporate the very limitation (“occasional superficial interaction”) at issue.
2. Crawford v. Commissioner, 363 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 2004)
   Defines “substantial evidence.” The opinion repeatedly invokes Crawford to remind reviewing courts not to re-weigh evidence.
3. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005) and Samuels v. Acting Commissioner, 959 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2020)
   Establish the scope of appellate review—legal issues de novo; fact findings for substantial evidence.
4. Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585 (11th Cir. 1987)
   Clarifies that step two is a “threshold” filter; presence of any severe impairment allows the process to proceed, mooting the need to tag every impairment as severe.
5. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 771 F.3d 780 (11th Cir. 2014) and Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2005)
   Permit ALJs to omit exhaustive evidence citations so long as decision shows holistic consideration. Used to rebut Risch’s claim of inadequate discussion of anxiety.
6. Hutchison v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1461 (11th Cir. 1986)
   Authorizes implied findings that listings are not met when ALJ’s reasoning covers equivalent criteria.

These cases form the doctrinal lattice that upheld the Commissioner’s decision and, collectively, they yield today’s reinforced principle: semantic fidelity is less important than functional equivalence in VE hypotheticals.

B. Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Substantial Evidence Review: The court recited the narrow standard—if a reasonable person would accept the ALJ’s evidentiary basis, the decision stands even if contrary evidence exists.
2. Comparative Textual Analysis: By laying the RFC and hypothetical side-by-side, the panel demonstrated that both contain the operative limitation. Minor stylistic variations do not create a material mismatch.
3. Plain-Meaning Approach to Descriptor Vagueness: Absence of record confusion, combined with vocational expertise, sufficed to treat the terms as occupationally intelligible.
4. Step-Two Harmless Error Doctrine: Jamison supports that once any severe impairment is found, the evaluation proceeds. The ALJ’s failure to label anxiety severe did not prejudice Risch.
5. Listing 12.06 Equivalency: Because Listings 12.04 and 12.15 share identical B/C criteria with 12.06, findings under those listings necessarily foreclose listing-level anxiety disability.

C. Potential Impact on Future Cases

• Reduced Litigation over Wording Nuances: Claimants often challenge VE testimony on minor linguistic discrepancies. The Eleventh Circuit’s tolerance for reasonable semantic variation will likely limit successful appeals on that ground.
• Validation of Common RFC Descriptors: By endorsing “superficial interaction” and “semi-isolation,” the court supplies ALJs and VEs with judicially approved vocabulary, decreasing expert-testimony uncertainty.
• Harmless-Error Continuity on Step Two: The opinion reaffirms that labeling every impairment severe is unnecessary. Expect district courts to cite Risch when dismissing step-two arguments that do not alter the RFC.
• Listing Analysis Efficiency: The ruling approves an “implied” cross-listing analysis where listings share criteria, providing ALJs a streamlined path and reduced decision length.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)

The ALJ’s assessment of the most a claimant can still do in a work setting despite medical limitations, expressed in specific physical and mental abilities.

Vocational Expert (VE)

An expert, typically in work-force placement or vocational rehabilitation, who testifies about the type and number of jobs a hypothetical individual with certain limitations can perform.

“Occasional” vs. “Superficial” Interaction

“Occasional” concerns frequency (up to one-third of the workday). “Superficial” concerns depth (brief, non-conflictual, task-oriented contact, not prolonged negotiation or teamwork).

Listing of Impairments

A regulatory catalog of medical conditions so severe they are presumptively disabling if specified criteria are fully met. Listing 12.06 covers anxiety disorders.

Step Two “Severe Impairment”

A condition that imposes more than a minimal effect on work ability. Only one is needed to pass the step; additional severe findings do not alter the ultimate disability decision if later steps address all limitations.

V. Conclusion

Jason B. Risch v. Commissioner fortifies Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence on two fronts. First, it holds that minor wording variations between an ALJ’s RFC and the VE hypothetical do not vitiate substantial evidence when the functional substance is the same. Second, it underscores that failing to classify every impairment as severe at step two is not reversible error where the ALJ continues through the sequential evaluation and accounts for all limitations in the RFC. Practitioners should view Risch as a caution against hyper-technical challenges and a reminder to build the record—through cross-examination of the VE—if vagueness is truly at issue. In the broader legal landscape, the opinion promotes pragmatic adjudication over semantic exactitude, advancing administrative efficiency while safeguarding claimant rights through the substantial-evidence standard.