“Notice + Barricades” Suffice: Second Circuit Affirms No Jones Act Negligence or Unseaworthiness for a Temporarily Open Hatch, and Rejects Case-Dispositive Spoliation Sanctions

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Summary Order — non‑precedential under Local Rule 32.1.1)

Date: October 16, 2025

Case: Mezzina v. Port Imperial Ferry Corp., No. 24-2985-cv

Panel: Judges Parker, Carney, and Nardini

Introduction

This maritime personal-injury appeal arises from a seaman’s fall into a temporarily open hatch aboard the passenger ferry Garden State, owned and operated by Port Imperial Ferry Corp. (NY Waterway). Plaintiff-Appellant Cosmo Mezzina sued his employer under two familiar maritime theories: Jones Act negligence (46 U.S.C. § 688 as cited by the court; now codified at 46 U.S.C. § 30104) and unseaworthiness under general maritime law. He also sought a case-dispositive discovery sanction based on alleged destruction of photographs taken by the vessel’s captain.

The district court (S.D.N.Y., Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald) granted summary judgment to NY Waterway on both substantive claims and declined to impose the requested sanction. The Second Circuit affirmed in full. Although issued as a non-precedential summary order, the decision provides persuasive guidance on three recurring issues in maritime litigation:

When warnings and barricades around a temporary hazard satisfy an employer’s duty under the Jones Act;
Why failure to close a hatch does not, without more, render a vessel “insufficiently or defectively equipped” for unseaworthiness; and
Why drastic, case-determinative sanctions under Rule 37(b) require relevance plus willfulness/bad faith and should be considered only after lesser sanctions are explored.

Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and affirmed, concluding that no reasonable jury could find NY Waterway negligent or the vessel unseaworthy on the undisputed facts:

Mezzina helped the captain remove the hatch cover and erect bright yellow barricades on two sides of the 39-by-32-inch hatch opening;
He twice saw the barricades in place shortly before the accident, and he never saw anyone remove them;
The only other persons aboard were the captain (who left after ordering Mezzina to get a line) and an injured deckhand seated among passengers;
Approximately six minutes after the hatch was opened and barricaded, Mezzina fell;
There was a safe, obvious alternative route to the line that avoided the hatch; and
Given his ~20 years of experience, no specialized training was required to use the safe route.

On these facts, NY Waterway provided effective notice and took reasonable precautions; the captain’s generic order to “get the line” did not direct Mezzina along a hazardous path; and an experienced seaman did not require additional training to choose the safe route. The unseaworthiness claim failed for similar reasons: leaving a hatch open for work with barricades did not render the vessel “insufficiently or defectively equipped.”

As to discovery, the court upheld the denial of a case-preclusive sanction. The purportedly destroyed photographs depicted only the vessel’s exterior before the hatch was opened and thus were not shown to be relevant to whether interior barricades were present. Even if they were marginally relevant, there was no showing of willfulness, bad faith, or fault by NY Waterway, and the plaintiff did not request a lesser sanction before seeking the “drastic remedy” of precluding the defense on liability.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Eaton v. Estabrook, 144 F.4th 80 (2d Cir. 2025) — Reaffirms the de novo standard of review for summary judgment and the requirement that no genuine dispute of material fact exist to warrant affirmance. This frames the appellate lens: even with the Jones Act’s jury-friendly posture, summary judgment is appropriate where the only reasonable verdict favors the employer.
Diebold v. Moore McCormack Bulk Transp. Lines, Inc., 805 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1986) — Provides the Jones Act negligence elements: existence of a dangerous condition, shipowner notice with reasonable foreseeability of injury, and proximate causation. Diebold also articulates that summary judgment is proper where “there can be but one conclusion” a reasonable jury could reach.
Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2004) — Emphasizes that juries are generally entrusted with Jones Act fault and causation questions and that the standard is liberally favorable to seamen. The court acknowledges this but explains why this case nonetheless falls into the narrow set where summary judgment is warranted.
Miller v. The Sultana, 176 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1949) — A crucial, factually analogous decision: no negligence where an experienced seaman fell into a plainly visible, daylight-illuminated open hatch. This historic precedent supports the proposition that effective notice of a temporary open hatch can discharge the shipowner’s duty.
Oxley v. City of New York, 923 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1991) — Sets the unseaworthiness benchmark: a vessel is unseaworthy if “insufficiently or defectively equipped.” That standard focuses on condition and equipment, not merely on momentary operational choices.
Atlantic Specialty Ins. Co. v. Coastal Envt’l Grp. Inc., 945 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) — Clarifies that the seaworthiness standard is reasonableness, not perfection. This is pivotal: a temporarily open hatch with warnings can be reasonable even if it is not ideal in hindsight.
Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1978) — Provides the classic formulation that a seaworthy vessel is “staunch, strong, well equipped for the intended voyage and manned by a competent and skillful master.” The presence of barricades and competent crew aligns with this standard.
Savard v. Marine Contracting, Inc., 471 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1972) — Notes that seaworthiness is ordinarily for the jury. The Second Circuit distinguishes this case as one where the undisputed evidence provides no basis for a reasonable jury to find the vessel “insufficiently or defectively equipped.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A); West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776 (2d Cir. 1999); Funk v. Belneftkhim, 861 F.3d 354 (2d Cir. 2017) — Together, these authorities set the standards for discovery sanctions: case-dispositive sanctions require willfulness, bad faith, or fault; they are a “drastic remedy” reserved for extreme cases; and appellate review is for abuse of discretion. The court applied these principles to deny plaintiff’s request to preclude the defense on liability.

Legal Reasoning Applied to the Facts

1) Jones Act Negligence

The Jones Act requires employers to provide a reasonably safe place to work. Plaintiffs often emphasize the Jones Act’s “featherweight” causation standard, but causation is irrelevant if negligence is absent. Here, the court found no triable negligence for several interlocking reasons:

Effective notice and reasonable precautions: The captain and Mezzina jointly removed the hatch cover, erected bright yellow barricades around two sides, and the barricades remained visible on at least two occasions after erection. The captain’s actions—warning and barricading the hazard—met the employer’s duty, as even plaintiff’s expert framed the duty as “ensuring that appropriate barricades were in place.” The record contained no evidence that anyone removed the barricades in the six-minute window before the fall.
“Open and obvious” as a duty/notice concept, not a bar: The court carefully explained that its use of “open and obvious” spoke to NY Waterway’s duty (i.e., whether more was required beyond barricades), not to comparative negligence as a bar to recovery. In other words, the hazard’s obviousness helped establish that the employer had provided adequate notice and did not need to close the hatch to fulfill its duty under the circumstances.
No negligent order: Plaintiff argued the captain gave an imprudent order by directing him to go “next to” the open hatch through a particular door. The record showed only repeated instructions to “get the line” with a general pointing toward the main-deck rear door. With an obvious, safe alternative route available—up the forward stair, aft along the upper level, and back down—the court held no reasonable jury could construe the captain’s generic directive as an order to take the hazardous path.
No failure-to-train theory on these facts: With ~20 years at NY Waterway and duties that included tying up the vessel, Mezzina did not need “specialized training” to choose the safe route. The court rejected a duty-to-train theory that would require instructing an experienced seaman to use the upper level to avoid a plainly barricaded hazard he helped create.

Taken together, these points echo Miller v. The Sultana’s teaching: when an experienced seaman has clear, effective notice of a temporary opening and precautionary measures are in place, the shipowner’s conduct can be reasonable as a matter of law.

2) Unseaworthiness

Unseaworthiness is a condition-based warranty—strict in the sense that negligence need not be proven, but focused on the vessel’s equipment and condition. The Second Circuit concluded that leaving a hatch open for work, while deploying bright yellow barricades to warn, did not render the vessel “insufficiently or defectively equipped.”

Equipment and condition, not perfection: Applying Oxley and Atlantic Specialty, the court emphasized that the standard is reasonableness. The barricades supported the conclusion that the vessel was “well equipped for [its] intended voyage” in the language of Tug Ocean Prince.
No record basis for a “defective equipment” finding: Plaintiff cited no authority that a hatch must be closed (or physically blocked on all sides) to avoid unseaworthiness when barricades and warnings are in place and effective alternatives exist.
Jury question inapplicable where no evidentiary foothold: While seaworthiness is “ordinarily” a jury question (Savard), the court found no evidence from which a jury could reasonably find an unseaworthy condition here.

3) Discovery Sanctions (Rule 37)

Plaintiff sought to preclude NY Waterway from contesting liability based on alleged destruction of photographs. The court affirmed the denial of this “drastic remedy”:

Relevance not shown: The photos at issue concerned the vessel’s exterior before the hatch was opened; the hazard and barricades were inside. On this record, the photos did not bear on whether barricades were present at the time of the fall.
No willfulness, bad faith, or fault: Even assuming some relevance, Mezzina made no showing of willfulness or bad faith by NY Waterway. Under West, that showing is generally required for case-dispositive sanctions.
Lesser sanctions not pursued: The court noted plaintiff failed to seek lesser, alternative sanctions before requesting the harshest remedy—another factor weighing against preclusion.

The decision underscores the Second Circuit’s caution against dispositive sanctions absent clear relevance and culpability, and its expectation that incremental remedies be considered first.

How This Order Fits Within Broader Maritime Doctrine

Although non-precedential, the order coheres with enduring maritime principles:

Temporary hazards and warnings: Maritime work often entails temporarily hazardous conditions (e.g., open hatches during maintenance). Courts weigh the reasonableness of precautions—warnings, barricades, and available safe alternatives—against the operational need for the hazard.
Negligent order doctrine: A liability theory premised on “improvident” or unsafe orders typically requires proof that the order compelled the unsafe route or method. Here, a generic “get the line” instruction, coupled with a safe and obvious alternative, did not meet that threshold.
Unseaworthiness vs. operational negligence: The court’s focus on equipment/condition echoes the line between unseaworthiness and mere operational negligence; a vessel is not unseaworthy simply because a routine, temporary condition exists if reasonable safeguards and alternatives are provided.

Impact and Practical Implications

While not binding, the decision offers practical guidance for maritime operators, litigants, and trial courts:

Employers/Operators:
- When creating temporary hazards (like open hatches), deploy conspicuous barricades and communicate clearly. Bright yellow barriers and contemporaneous warnings proved decisive here.
- Document hazard mitigation steps (who erected barriers, when, where). Even absent photos, testimony about the exterior-only nature of the captain’s pictures minimized spoliation risk.
- Ensure that safe alternative routes are available and apparent; operators need not close every hazard if reasonable workarounds exist and are obvious to experienced crew.
- Training: baseline training is essential, but courts may be reluctant to impose liability for failing to instruct experienced seamen on self-evident routing choices.
Plaintiffs’ Counsel:
- To defeat summary judgment in “open hazard + barricade” cases, focus on evidence that warnings were inadequate, barricades were removed or insufficient, orders compelled an unsafe route, or no safe alternative existed.
- On spoliation, establish relevance concretely and develop a record of willfulness/bad faith; consider requesting lesser sanctions before seeking preclusion.
Trial Courts:
- This order reinforces that Jones Act claims, while jury-friendly, can be resolved on summary judgment where the undisputed facts demonstrate reasonable precautions and no negligent compulsion of unsafe behavior.
- On Rule 37, it reiterates the importance of tailoring sanctions to culpability and prejudice, and of preferring incremental remedies absent extreme circumstances.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Jones Act negligence: A maritime employer must act reasonably to provide a safe workplace. The plaintiff must prove (1) a dangerous condition, (2) the employer’s notice and foreseeability of injury, and (3) that negligence played a part in causing the injury. Jury review is liberal, but no negligence means no case.
“Open and obvious” hazards: Not an automatic bar to a seaman’s recovery. Here, the obviousness supported the conclusion that the employer provided adequate notice and reasonable precautions (barricades), eliminating a duty to do more on these facts.
Unseaworthiness: A warranty that the vessel, crew, and equipment are reasonably fit. It concerns the vessel’s condition/equipment, not just momentary operations. A vessel is not “defectively equipped” merely because a hatch is open for work when warnings and barriers are used.
Summary judgment: A case can be decided without a trial if, on the undisputed facts, no reasonable jury could find for the non-movant. Even in Jones Act cases, summary judgment is proper where only one verdict is reasonably possible.
“Improvident order”: An alleged negligent directive that compels an unsafe method or route. Vague or general orders (“get the line”) typically do not qualify if a safe and obvious alternative route exists.
Rule 37 sanctions: Courts may sanction discovery violations, but to shut down a party’s defense entirely, there must usually be proof of willfulness, bad faith, or fault, and relevance. Courts favor lesser sanctions when possible.
Summary Orders (2d Cir.): Dispositions labeled “Summary Order” lack precedential effect under Local Rule 32.1.1. They may be cited (FRAP 32.1) as persuasive authority with a “SUMMARY ORDER” notation.

Conclusion

Mezzina reinforces—albeit in non-precedential form—a pragmatic rule for maritime workplaces: where a temporary hazard like an open hatch is necessary for work, the employer’s duty can be satisfied by effective warning and conspicuous barricades, especially when a safe alternative route is plainly available and not contradicted by orders. Under those circumstances, Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims will not survive summary judgment on a bare assertion that the hatch should have been closed or that more training was required for an experienced seaman.

On discovery, the decision illustrates the Second Circuit’s disciplined approach to sanctions. Preclusion of a defense is a last resort, predicated on relevance and culpability; plaintiffs should make targeted showings and, where appropriate, seek lesser sanctions before requesting case-dispositive remedies.

The order’s practical guidance is clear: document and deploy safety measures around temporary hazards, keep instructions general unless a safe path is unavailable, and treat spoliation claims with the rigor they require. For litigants and courts, Mezzina offers a careful application of longstanding maritime principles to a common shipboard scenario.