“Not Every Toker Is a Trigger-Puller”: The Eleventh Circuit Declares that State-Compliant Medical-Marijuana Users Are Not Automatically Disarmed under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)

1. Introduction

Florida Commissioner of Agriculture v. Attorney General of the United States, No. 22-13893 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2025), confronts a growing tension between evolving state marijuana regimes and the federal prohibition on firearm possession by “unlawful users of controlled substances” (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)). Three Floridians—two active medical-marijuana patients and one prospective patient who already owned firearms—filed a pre-enforcement action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They contended that, as “state-law compliant” medical-marijuana users, they cannot constitutionally be deprived of their Second Amendment rights.

The District Court for the Northern District of Florida dismissed the complaint, relying on historical analogues that disarm felons and dangerous persons. The Eleventh Circuit, applying the Supreme Court’s modern Second Amendment methodology (Heller → Bruen → Rahimi), vacated that dismissal. It ruled that medical-marijuana patients, as pleaded, are not “relevantly similar” to either felons or categorically dangerous citizens, and thus the Government failed—at the motion-to-dismiss stage—to justify § 922(g)(3)’s application to them.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Step-One (Bruen): The court held that the plaintiffs’ desired conduct—buying and possessing firearms for self-defence—falls squarely within the Second Amendment’s text. They remain part of “the people,” notwithstanding their marijuana use.
Step-Two (Bruen/Rahimi): The Government bore the burden of proving that disarming medical-marijuana users fits within the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. It offered two analogues: laws disarming felons and laws disarming dangerous persons (e.g., the mentally ill or habitual drunkards).
Holding: Accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the panel (Branch, Luck, Tjoflat, JJ.) found plaintiffs neither convicted felons nor proven dangerous. The Government’s analogues therefore failed. Conviction-based dispossession and behaviour-based danger restrictions impose different burdens (“how”) and pursue different justifications (“why”) than § 922(g)(3) as applied here.
Disposition: Judgment vacated and case remanded for further proceedings; the plaintiffs have plausibly stated an as-applied Second Amendment claim.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) – Recognised an individual right to keep and bear arms; noted the right belongs to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) – Replaced tiered scrutiny with a two-step “text-and-history” test. Emphasised Government’s burden to provide historical analogues.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) – Clarified Bruen, stressing that courts must compare the “how” and “why” of regulations, not engage in museum-piece originalism. Rejected a vague “responsible citizen” test.
United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269 (5th Cir. 2024) – Found § 922(g)(3) unconstitutional as applied to a non-violent marijuana user; Eleventh Circuit aligned with its reasoning.
Other Circuit Cases (2025) – Sixth (VanOchten), Third (Harris), and Eighth (Cooper) Circuits offer nuanced, danger-based readings; the Eleventh Circuit notes but does not fully adopt those fact-intensive approaches.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Scope of “the people.” The Court rejected the Government’s argument that medical-marijuana users lie outside the Second Amendment community because Rahimi disapproved reading “law-abiding” as a free-floating exclusion.
Faulty Felon Analogy. Felon dispossession follows conviction of a serious crime. Plaintiffs have no convictions; at worst they commit a federal misdemeanour (simple possession). Thus the “how” (post-conviction deprivation) and “why” (punishment/recidivism concerns) differ markedly.
Faulty Dangerousness Analogy. Historical laws targeted demonstrably dangerous, often intoxicated individuals at the moment of danger. The complaint alleged no impairment, addiction, violent propensity or drug-commerce involvement. Therefore § 922(g)(3) imposes a broader, categorical burden.
Pleading Posture Matters. On Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, courts must accept well-pleaded facts. Plaintiffs’ bare medical use sufficed to defeat the Government’s analogues; future evidence may alter the calculus but cannot be presumed.

3.3 Likely Impact

Second Amendment Jurisprudence. The decision tightens the Government’s burden when invoking § 922(g)(3) and signals scepticism toward status-based bans divorced from concrete danger findings.
Marijuana-Law Landscape. As more states legalise medical/recreational cannabis (and DEA contemplates rescheduling to Schedule III), the ruling protects millions of compliant users from automatic federal disarmament, at least within the Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida, Georgia).
Criminal Prosecutions. Prosecutors must now consider individualised facts—frequency of use, impairment, nexus to violence—before charging under § 922(g)(3). Blanket indictments against mere card-holders are vulnerable.
Civil Litigation & ATF Forms. Expect challenges to ATF Form 4473’s marijuana question and to firearms dealers’ refusal of sales where only state-legal use exists.
Circuit Split Momentum. The decision deepens emerging splits (Fifth & Eleventh sceptical; Sixth, Third, Eighth allowing danger-based application). Supreme Court review on § 922(g)(3)’s breadth is increasingly likely.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“As-Applied” vs. “Facial” Challenge – Plaintiffs do not seek to erase § 922(g)(3) entirely (facial); they argue it cannot be applied to them given their specific circumstances.
Historical Analogue – A past law offering a similar “why” (purpose) and “how” (mechanism) to justify a modern restriction.
Controlled Substance Scheduling – Schedule I drugs (e.g., current federal cannabis status) are deemed highly dangerous with no accepted medical use; Schedule III (where DEA proposes to move cannabis) implies accepted medical value and lower abuse potential. Rescheduling could undermine § 922(g)(3)’s application entirely.
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion – A procedural device to dismiss a case when the complaint fails to state a plausible claim, assuming every factual allegation is true.
“How” and “Why” Test – Coined in Bruen and emphasised in Rahimi, courts compare the burden imposed (how) and the governmental objective (why) between modern and historical regulations.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling carves out a significant limitation on § 922(g)(3): state-law compliant medical-marijuana use, by itself, does not render a citizen equivalent to a felon or a proven danger. The opinion refines Bruen/Rahimi methodology, underscores the need for concrete historical analogues, and recognises that fast-changing marijuana policies necessitate equally nuanced Second Amendment analysis.

For practitioners, the case counsels meticulous factual development in § 922(g)(3) prosecutions and invites reconsideration of standing § 922(g) categories through the twin lenses of “how” and “why.” More broadly, it signals that federal firearm disabilities cannot float on “status” alone—they must be anchored in demonstrable historical tradition or specific, provable risk.