Introduction

This appeal from the Northern District of Ohio asks whether a district court acted within its discretion in imposing a substantial upward variance and a lifetime term of supervised release on a defendant who pled guilty to failing to register as a sex offender in violation of SORNA, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The defendant, Travis O’Hearn, a Tier III sex offender with multiple prior sexual assaults of minors and a prior conviction for failing to register, moved from New Hampshire to Ohio, knowingly failed to register for more than a year, and worked in child-dense environments during that period.

The district court calculated a Guidelines range of 30–37 months’ imprisonment, but varied upward to 60 months (a 62% increase from the top of the range) and imposed lifetime supervised release (the statute authorizes at least five years up to life for § 2250 offenses). O’Hearn challenged both components as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Applying plain-error review to the procedural claims (because defense counsel failed to preserve specific objections at sentencing) and abuse-of-discretion review to the substantive claims, the court held that the district court sufficiently explained its sentence with reference to the § 3553(a) factors, permissibly relied on criminal history and offense conduct even though the Guidelines already accounted for them, did not need to expressly discuss sentencing disparities, and could use the same reasons to justify both the term of imprisonment and the lifetime supervised release.

Summary of the Opinion

• Procedural reasonableness (plain error): No error. The district court’s explanation referenced the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—including O’Hearn’s history of sexual assaults of minors, repeated noncompliance (parole violations and prior failure-to-register conviction), the nature and circumstances of the offense (knowingly evading registration while working around children), and the needs for deterrence and public protection. The court did not have to discuss every § 3553(a) factor or explicitly address disparities, and its rationale for imprisonment adequately supported the lifetime supervised release as well.
• Substantive reasonableness (abuse of discretion): No abuse. The district court reasonably found this was not a “run-of-the-mill” failure-to-register case and provided sufficiently compelling reasons to support the magnitude of the upward variance and the life term of supervised release. The appellate court declined to reweigh the § 3553(a) factors and deferred to the sentencing court’s judgment given O’Hearn’s history, risk profile, and demonstrated inability to comply absent supervision.
• Bottom line: Affirmed in full—60 months’ imprisonment and lifetime supervised release.

Detailed Analysis

Factual and Procedural Background

O’Hearn’s record includes three sexual assault convictions in New Hampshire. At age 19, he sexually assaulted two minor girls (ages 13 and 14) in 2004 and later, in 2012, forcibly penetrated a 16-year-old, leading to an aggravated sexual assault conviction. That offense rendered him a Tier III sex offender under SORNA, requiring lifetime registration and continuous updates in each jurisdiction of residence, employment, or schooling. See 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911(4), 20913, 20914, 20915.

His postrelease history reflected repeated noncompliance: a 2019 state conviction for failing to report a change of address, parole revocations for nonattendance at sex-offender treatment and housing violations, and—crucially for this case—moving from New Hampshire to Parma Heights, Ohio in 2022 without registering. He then worked various jobs, including a four-month stint setting up carnivals around Ohio. Arrested in 2024, he pled guilty to failing to register between November 2022 and February 2024 under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). The Guidelines range was uncontested: 30–37 months (offense level 13; criminal history category V), with a supervised release minimum of five years. Although both parties recommended a within-Guidelines sentence, the court varied upward to 60 months and imposed lifetime supervised release.

Standards of Review Framing the Decision

• Procedural reasonableness—plain error: Because counsel did not raise specific objections when prompted at sentencing (the “Bostic” inquiry), the court reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 358–60 (6th Cir. 2009).
• Substantive reasonableness—abuse of discretion: Variances are neither presumed reasonable nor unreasonable. A greater variance requires more robust justification, but appellate review remains deferential. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50–51 (2007); United States v. Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d 345, 356 (6th Cir. 2015).

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007): A sentencing judge need not mechanically recite each § 3553(a) factor; the explanation must show consideration of the arguments and a reasoned basis for the chosen sentence.
• United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2007): No requirement to discuss every § 3553(a) factor explicitly.
• United States v. Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2015): (1) Clarifies procedural reasonableness and sentencing explanation standards; (2) factors for supervised release overlap with § 3553(a) and are evaluated under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c).
• United States v. Morris, 71 F.4th 475, 482 (6th Cir. 2023): A district court may consider criminal history and offense conduct within § 3553(a) even if the Guidelines already account for them; this is not procedural error.
• United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 625–26 (6th Cir. 2007): Consideration of unwarranted disparities can be satisfied by accurately calculating the Guidelines and recognizing when a case is atypical (not mine-run).
• United States v. Zabel, 35 F.4th 493, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2022): The same reasons supporting imprisonment can justify the supervised release term; deference to the district court’s factor weighting.
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50–51 (2007): Greater variances require more significant justification; appellate courts must accord due deference to district courts’ factor balancing.
• United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 754 (6th Cir. 2020): Upholds variances where the case deviates from the “mine-run” contemplated by the Guidelines.
• United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018): Substantive reasonableness looks to whether the district court placed too much weight on certain factors or too little on others.
• United States v. Ely, 468 F.3d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2006): Appellate courts cannot reweigh § 3553(a) factors; they review for abuse of discretion.
• United States v. Drake, 126 F.4th 1242, 1246–47 (6th Cir. 2025): Supports giving substantial weight to deterrence and public protection in sex-offense registration contexts, noting the continuing obligations under SORNA.
• Statutes:
  • 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911(4), 20913, 20914, 20915 (SORNA definitions and registration requirements).
  • 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (federal failure-to-register offense).
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (sentencing factors).
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c), (k) (supervised release factors and authorized terms: for § 2250 offenses, at least five years up to life).

Legal Reasoning

1) Procedural reasonableness (plain error standard). Because defense counsel did not lodge specific post-sentence objections when asked (see Bostic), O’Hearn’s procedural challenges faced the plain-error bar. The panel found none. The district court explicitly referenced and substantively engaged the § 3553(a) factors by:

• Detailing O’Hearn’s history and characteristics—multiple sexual assaults of minors, repeated parole violations, and a prior failure-to-register conviction (§ 3553(a)(1)).
• Emphasizing the nature and circumstances of this offense—knowing evasion of registration while working at child-oriented venues, which magnified the public-safety concern and made the case atypical (§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)).
• Underscoring the need for deterrence and protection of the public given O’Hearn’s demonstrated noncompliance and inability to self-regulate without oversight (§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C)).

Two key defense theories failed:

• No “double counting” bar at § 3553(a): The court could consider criminal history and offense conduct even if the Guidelines already reflected them. Morris forecloses the argument that such reliance is procedural error.
• No requirement to expressly analyze sentencing disparities: The court’s accurate Guidelines calculation and its finding that the case was not mine-run sufficed to show it considered disparities under § 3553(a)(6). See Simmons (2007). The opinion also ties the imprisonment rationale to supervised release, which is proper under § 3583(c) and Zabel.

On supervised release, the district court’s conclusion—that O’Hearn “did not seem able to conduct himself appropriately without supervision”—was a reasoned application of overlapping § 3553(a)/§ 3583(c) considerations and supported the life term, which is statutorily authorized for § 2250 offenses (minimum 5 years up to life).

2) Substantive reasonableness (abuse of discretion standard). The panel affirmed both the 60-month prison term and lifetime supervised release:

• Magnitude of variance justified: The 62% upward variance (from 37 to 60 months) was supported by “significant” reasons: repeated sexual assaults of minors, prior failure to register, prolonged knowing evasion, and work around children while unregistered. These facts rendered the case not “run-of-the-mill.” See Gall; Perez-Rodriguez.
• Deference to factor weighting: Though O’Hearn argued the court overemphasized criminal history, deterrence, and public safety at the expense of disparity concerns, the appellate court declined to reweigh. See Rayyan; Ely. The public-protection and deterrence rationales carry particular force in sex-offense registration contexts. See Drake.
• Lifetime supervised release: Given the defendant’s persistent noncompliance and risk profile—and the statutory authorization of a life term for § 2250—a lifetime term was within the heartland of the district court’s discretion. The district court permissibly anchored that term in the same concerns justifying imprisonment. See Zabel; § 3583(k).

What This Opinion Adds (and What It Reaffirms)

• Reaffirmed: District courts may give significant weight to criminal history, offense conduct, deterrence, and public safety even where the Guidelines partially capture those elements; doing so is neither procedural error nor per se substantive unreasonableness (Morris, Rayyan).
• Reaffirmed: A failure-to-register case can warrant an upward variance where facts show elevated risk and deliberate evasion, i.e., the case is not “mine-run” (Perez-Rodriguez).
• Reaffirmed and illustrated: The same § 3553(a) reasoning can justify both the custodial term and the supervised release term; a life term of supervised release for § 2250 is statutorily authorized and can be reasonable given persistent noncompliance (Zabel; § 3583(k)).
• Clarified in application: Courts may treat a defendant’s choice to work in child-centric environments while unregistered as heightening the gravity and risk of a § 2250 offense, supporting an upward variance and longer supervision.
• Practice point underscored: Failing to lodge specific objections at sentencing triggers plain-error review on appeal for procedural claims, substantially raising the bar for reversal (Bostic; Simmons 2009).

Impact and Implications

For district courts: The opinion provides a roadmap for adequately explaining upward variances and lifetime supervised release in SORNA cases: anchor the variance in concrete, case-specific facts showing elevated risk and non-mine-run circumstances; explicitly tie history of noncompliance and public-safety concerns to both imprisonment and supervision; make clear that deterrence and protection drive the decision.

For prosecutors: The case supports seeking upward variances and lifetime supervision when a defendant’s history of sexual offenses, prior registration violations, and ongoing noncompliance signal persistent risk. Evidence that the defendant worked around children while unregistered can be a potent aggravator.

For defense counsel: Two strategic lessons loom large:

• Preserve objections with specificity after the court pronounces sentence to avoid plain-error review.
• Develop disparity arguments with comparators and granular data if urging adherence to the Guidelines; merely invoking § 3553(a)(6) in the abstract is unlikely to succeed, especially where the court has identified non-mine-run facts.

On supervised release policy: This case reinforces that lifetime supervision for § 2250 can be reasonable where repeated noncompliance suggests the defendant cannot “conduct himself appropriately without supervision.” Practitioners should remember that, even where a life term is imposed, early termination may be sought under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) upon a sufficient showing after one year, offering a safety valve for demonstrated rehabilitation.

Precedential effect: The opinion is “Not Recommended for Publication.” Under Sixth Circuit practice, unpublished decisions are not binding but can be cited as persuasive authority. Even so, the analysis aligns closely with published Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court precedents, making it a practical template for similar cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• SORNA/Tier III: A federal system requiring sex offenders to register and keep current their residence, employment, and schooling information in every jurisdiction they live, work, or study. Tier III is the most serious category, typically requiring lifetime registration.
• Failure to Register (§ 2250): A federal crime when a person required to register under SORNA knowingly fails to do so or to update registration after certain interstate movements. It carries up to 10 years’ imprisonment and supervised release of at least five years up to life (§ 3583(k)).
• Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness:
  • Procedural asks whether the sentencing process was proper (e.g., correct Guidelines calculation, consideration of § 3553(a), adequate explanation).
  • Substantive asks whether, in light of the § 3553(a) factors, the sentence is reasonable in length and not an abuse of discretion.
• Plain Error: A demanding appellate standard applied when objections weren’t properly preserved below. The error must be clear or obvious, affect substantial rights, and seriously affect the fairness or integrity of proceedings.
• “Mine-Run” Case: A case fitting the ordinary scenario anticipated by the Guidelines. Showing that a case is not “mine-run” can justify an upward or downward variance.
• Lifetime Supervised Release: Court supervision after prison with conditions tailored to protect the public and aid rehabilitation. For § 2250, a life term is legally authorized. Courts may later shorten it for good cause under § 3583(e)(1).
• Unwarranted Disparities (§ 3553(a)(6)): Courts aim to avoid unjustified differences in sentences for similar defendants and offenses. Accurately applying the Guidelines and explaining why a case is atypical are standard ways to account for this factor.

Conclusion

United States v. O’Hearn fits squarely within the Sixth Circuit’s established sentencing jurisprudence and illustrates how a failure-to-register case can earn a substantial upward variance and lifetime supervised release when the facts show persistent noncompliance and heightened risk. The court’s reasoning clarifies that:

• Sentencing judges may rely heavily on criminal history, offense conduct, and the needs for deterrence and public safety—even where the Guidelines already account for these considerations.
• A case-specific narrative explaining why the conduct is not “run-of-the-mill” can justify a significant variance, with appellate courts deferring to the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors.
• The same reasons that support a longer prison term can justify lifetime supervised release in § 2250 cases, especially when a defendant’s track record indicates he cannot safely comply without close supervision.

Though unpublished, the opinion reinforces well-settled principles and provides a practical, persuasive blueprint for handling upward variances and lifetime supervision in SORNA failure-to-register prosecutions.