“No Toll for Minors”: The Supreme Court of Georgia Declares OCGA § 9-3-90(b) Inapplicable to Municipal Ante Litem Notices in Dates v. City of Atlanta

1. Introduction

In Dates v. City of Atlanta, decided on 10 June 2025, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed whether the statutory tolling privilege afforded to minors under OCGA § 9-3-90(b) suspends the six-month municipal ante litem notice requirement imposed by OCGA § 36-33-5. The Court held—unanimously—that it does not. This ruling cements the view that municipal ante litem notice is a condition precedent to suit rather than a statute of limitations, and therefore falls outside the reach of the general tolling provisions, even for injured minors.

The decision resolves a significant conflict within Georgia’s lower courts, disapproving decades of Court of Appeals authority that treated OCGA § 36-33-5 as “functionally” a statute of limitation subject to tolling. Practically, the ruling compels parents and guardians to file ante litem notices on behalf of minors within six months of injury—or risk total dismissal—regardless of the child’s age.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court affirmed both the trial court’s dismissal of Kierra Dates’s lawsuit and the Court of Appeals’ decision, concluding that:

• Dates’ initial ante litem notice—stating damages “in excess of $500,000”—failed to meet the statutory requirement of specifying a “specific amount of monetary damages.”
• Her supplemental notice, filed thirteen months later and claiming $1,000,000, was untimely because the six-month window in OCGA § 36-33-5(b) is not subject to the minor-tolling provision of OCGA § 9-3-90(b).
• Consequently, the suit could not be “entertained” by the courts.

In reaching this conclusion the Court expressly adopted the analytical framework from Dept. of Public Safety v. Ragsdale, 308 Ga. 210 (2020), and reaffirmed City of Chamblee v. Maxwell, 264 Ga. 635 (1994).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• City of Chamblee v. Maxwell, 264 Ga. 635 (1994)
  – Classified OCGA § 36-33-5 as a “condition precedent” rather than a statute of limitation.
• Dept. of Public Safety v. Ragsdale, 308 Ga. 210 (2020)
  – Held that criminal-tolling statute OCGA § 9-3-99 does not toll the ante litem notice period under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA); emphasized textual analysis and legislative silence.
• OCGA § 36-11-1 (County ante litem statute)
  – Explicitly grants tolling for minors, serving as a legislative contrast showing that the General Assembly “knows how” to provide tolling when intended.
• Disapproved Court of Appeals cases: Barrett, Barnum, Lowe, Jacobs, Carter, Powell—all previously extended tolling to municipal notices.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Textual Interpretation. The Court began with the language of OCGA § 36-33-5(b): notice must be given “Within six months of the happening of the event.” No mention of tolling or disability appears. Conversely, the county analogue § 36-11-1 expressly carves out an exception for minors. The Court inferred that the omission in § 36-33-5 was deliberate (expressio unius).

b) Distinction Between “Bring an Action” and “Entertain an Action.” OCGA § 9-3-90(b) extends the time to “bring an action,” whereas § 36-33-5 limits when a court may “entertain” an action. The Court treated these verbs as addressing different procedural stages: the former relates to statutes of limitation; the latter, to ante litem notice as a prerequisite.

c) Condition Precedent vs. Statute of Limitation. Drawing on Maxwell and Ragsdale, the Court reiterated that ante litem notice periods condition a party’s right to sue; they are not limitation statutes “restricting an already-accrued cause of action.” Therefore, tolling statutes—drafted to suspend limitation periods—cannot operate on those notice periods unless the legislature says so.

d) Legislative Acquiescence Argument Rejected. Dates urged that decades of Court of Appeals precedent implicitly garnered legislative approval. The Court dismissed this, noting that Maxwell (Supreme Court precedent) contradicted those cases and had never been overruled—thus, no settled construction existed for the General Assembly to affirm.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

• Practical Effects. Parents or guardians must file municipal ante litem notices on behalf of injured minors within six months, regardless of minority. Failure to do so bars suit outright.
• Litigation Strategy. Plaintiffs’ attorneys handling local-government tort claims must calendar the six-month notice deadline as strictly jurisdictional. Waiting for medical stabilization or damage-quantification may risk dismissal.
• Clarification for Courts. Trial courts may confidently apply Dates to dismiss late municipal notices even where minors are involved; conversely, timely county notices may still benefit from express minor tolling under § 36-11-1.
• Legislative Prompt. The General Assembly now faces a policy question: should minors receive the same ante litem protection against municipalities they now have against counties? If yes, statutory amendment will be required.
• Doctrinal Coherence. The ruling harmonizes the treatment of ante litem provisions across contexts (municipal, state, GTCA) under the “condition precedent” theory, reducing doctrinal confusion.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Ante Litem Notice: A written notice that must be delivered to a government entity before filing a lawsuit, allowing the entity an opportunity to investigate and settle. Think of it as a mandatory “heads-up” rather than part of the lawsuit itself.
• Condition Precedent: A prerequisite step that must occur before a legal right (here, filing suit) becomes enforceable. If unmet, the court lacks authority to proceed.
• Statute of Limitation vs. Ante Litem Period: A statute of limitation limits the time to file a lawsuit after the cause of action accrues. An ante litem period governs a preliminary notice before filing. Tolling statutes usually apply only to limitations, not conditions precedent.
• Tolling: A rule that pauses or extends the running of a deadline (typically a statute of limitation) due to certain circumstances—e.g., minority, fraud, or a related pending criminal case.

5. Conclusion

Dates v. City of Atlanta firmly establishes that Georgia’s minor-tolling statute, OCGA § 9-3-90(b), does not enlarge the six-month window for municipal ante litem notices under OCGA § 36-33-5. By emphasizing statutory text, contrasting legislative treatment of county claims, and reinforcing the “condition precedent” doctrine, the Court has ended a line of contrary appellate authority and provided clear guidance to litigants, courts, and lawmakers. The decision underscores the judiciary’s role in faithful textual interpretation and invites the General Assembly to revisit the policy balance between protecting governmental entities and safeguarding minors’ access to the courts.