“No Shortcuts to Summary Judgment” –
Rupp v. City of Pocatello and the Idaho Supreme Court’s Dual Message on Discovery Diligence and Rule 56 Analysis

Introduction

Rupp v. City of Pocatello, 174 Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Aug. 19, 2025) confronts the tension between two recurring trial-level problems: (1) parties who delay or obstruct discovery and then seek extensions at the eleventh hour, and (2) trial courts that dispose of cases via summary judgment without engaging in the analysis Rule 56 demands. The plaintiffs—trustees of two family trusts (collectively “the Trusts”)—sued the City of Pocatello, its mayor, and multiple private developers after a 930-acre development project allegedly deprived them of promised road access and diminished land value by more than $21 million. When each defendant moved for summary judgment, the Trusts—still embroiled in discovery fights—twice sought continuances. The district court denied both continuance motions, struck the Trusts’ late opposition materials, declared the summary-judgment motions “unopposed,” dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and awarded fees to all defendants.

On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the denials of the continuance motions, yet reversed the summary-judgment rulings, vacated the judgment and fee award, and remanded. The Court’s opinion crystallises two new, complementary principles:

1. Parties who have not diligently pursued discovery will rarely obtain relief under Rules 56(d) or 56(b)(3).
2. Trial courts may not treat a late opposition as a de facto default; they must still test the motion against Rule 56(a) and may not use summary judgment as a “sanction” absent the findings required for case-terminating sanctions.

Summary of the Judgment

• Continuances: The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Trusts’ first and second motions to continue. The first motion failed to meet the “specified reasons” standard of Rule 56(d) and showed no diligence; the second added nothing new and likewise lacked “good cause” under Rule 56(b)(3).
• Summary Judgment: Reversed and remanded. The district court struck the Trusts’ late filings, concluded the motions were unopposed, and granted judgment without analysing defendants’ evidentiary showings. This violated Rule 56 and effectively imposed a dismissal sanction without the required balancing of factors.
• Attorney Fees: District-court fee award vacated; no fees on appeal because no party fully prevailed.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

a. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life (2018)

Established Idaho’s four-part abuse-of-discretion test. The Court repeatedly applied Lunneborg to review the district judge’s rulings on the continuance motions, ultimately finding the judge had recognised the discretionary nature of the issue, stayed within permissible bounds, applied correct legal standards, and acted rationally.

b. Nipper v. Wootton (2024)

Nipper sets the modern benchmark for Rule 56(d) requests: a movant must (1) specify why it cannot yet present essential facts and (2) detail what discovery will reveal and how that would defeat summary judgment. The Trusts’ first motion failed this test, and that failure became the cornerstone for affirming the denial.

c. Hastings v. IDWR (2024)

Authorises trial courts to consider a party’s diligence when determining Rule 56(d) motions. Hastings underscored that Rule 56(d) protects diligence, not procrastination—language quoted by the Rupp court when branding the Trusts “unprepared.”

d. Ciccarello v. Davies (2019) and Gordon v. U.S. Bank (2019)

Ciccarello upheld a judge’s discretion to disregard untimely filings to prevent gamesmanship. Though Gordon lists factors for shortening time, Rupp clarifies those factors are not mandatory for continuances. Ciccarello’s anti-gamesmanship principle guided the denial of the second continuance and the striking of late papers.

e. Gem State Ins. v. Hutchison (2007)

Recognises that even an unopposed motion for summary judgment must be tested under Rule 56. Rupp cites Gem State to highlight the district court’s duty to permit oral argument and to analyse the merits before entry of judgment.

f. Sanctions Trilogy: Lee v. Nickerson (2008), Kantor v. Kantor (2016), Petersen v. Millennial Development (2025)

These cases outline prerequisites for case-terminating sanctions: balancing equities, considering lesser sanctions, and entering specific findings. Because the district court’s order lacked this analysis, the Supreme Court viewed the dismissal as an improper sanction.

2. Legal Reasoning of the Court

• Discovery Diligence: The Court meticulously catalogued both sides’ discovery missteps. Yet it placed the ultimate burden on the Trusts, explaining that Rule 56(d) affords refuge only to parties who first pursue discovery with reasonable speed and persistence.
• Rule 56 Duty Survives Silence: Granting unopposed summary judgment without analysing the record violates the plain text of Rule 56(a) and (e). A court must scrutinise the movant’s affidavits and whether they negate each element of the opponent’s claims.
• Summary Judgment ≠ Sanction: When late filings precede a dismissal, the court must expressly distinguish between an evidentiary consequence (striking papers) and an ultimate sanction (dismissing claims). Failure to consider the Kantor factors made the dismissal reversible.
• Discovery Doctrine Reinforced: The opinion devotes five full pages to admonishing boiler-plate objections, evasive answers, and the need for meaningful meet-and-confer sessions—issuing what practitioners will regard as a “mini-treatise” on Idaho discovery etiquette.

3. Potential Impact of the Decision

• Uniform Trial Practice: Trial judges will feel compelled to add explicit Rule 56 analyses—even where the opponent is silent—to insulate judgments from reversal.
• Heightened Continuance Scrutiny: Parties may no longer rely on broad claims of “pending discovery.” Diligence metrics—dates of requests, follow-up emails, motions to compel—will decide continuance motions.
• Discovery Culture Shift: Rupp’s extended dicta on civil-rule compliance could invigorate motions to compel and sanctions against recalcitrant parties, especially those who hide behind blanket objections.
• Clear Divide Between Evidence and Sanctions: Courts must now articulate when they are merely striking evidence versus wielding dismissal as a sanction, including the balancing required by Kantor.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 56(d) (Discovery Continuance): Think of it as hitting the “pause” button on summary judgment because you still need evidence. You must explain what you’re missing, why you don’t yet have it, and how it will help defeat the motion.
• Rule 56(b)(3) (Schedule Adjustment): A more general power letting courts shift deadlines if there is “good cause”—something outside a party’s control that warrants more time.
• Case-terminating Sanction: The civil-procedure equivalent of ejecting a team from a tournament. It’s only allowed after weighing fairness factors and deciding lesser penalties won’t work.
• Boiler-plate Objection: A generic, catch-all refusal to answer discovery (e.g., “vague, ambiguous, overbroad”). Rupp warns that such objections, if not specifically justified, equal “no answer.”
• Meet-and-Confer: Required lawyer-to-lawyer dialogue to iron out discovery disputes before burdening the court. Failure to engage may doom a later motion for relief.

Conclusion

Rupp v. City of Pocatello delivers a two-pronged cautionary tale. First, parties must act diligently and transparently in discovery—stonewalling, delay, and vague excuses will not unlock Rule 56(d) or 56(b)(3) relief. Second, district courts must honour the architecture of Rule 56: even in the face of default-like silence, they must test the evidentiary record and, if considering dismissal as a sanction, make the explicit findings Idaho precedent demands. By simultaneously chastising litigants’ discovery tactics and trial courts’ shortcutting of summary-judgment analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court has forged a new, balanced precedent that will guide and discipline civil practice across the state.