“No Romance, No Inference”: State v. Threadgill and the Refined Standard for When Consent Must Be Charged

1. Introduction

In State v. Larry Threadgill, No. 2023-23-C.A. (R.I. July 18 2025), the Rhode Island Supreme Court revisited three perennial flash-points in criminal trials: (1) when a jury must be instructed on the defense of consent in a sexual-assault prosecution, (2) how missing evidence triggers (or fails to trigger) a spoliation inference, and (3) the permissible reach of an Allen charge delivered to a seemingly deadlocked jury.

Although the Court ultimately affirmed the conviction, it used the occasion to sharpen doctrinal contours, most notably declaring that “a mere history of friendly or even incipient romantic interactions between the complainant and the accused, without any specific proof of consensual sexual conduct, is insufficient as a matter of law to require a separate consent instruction once the jury has been fully charged on force or coercion.” This pronouncement—summarised by counsel and commentators as “No Romance, No Inference”—now guides trial judges in calibrating jury instructions in sexual-assault cases.

2. Background of the Case

• Parties: The State of Rhode Island (appellee) and Larry Threadgill (appellant).
• Charge: First-degree sexual assault (G.L. 1956 §§ 11-37-2, 11-37-3) for an incident that occurred on July 8 1999.
• Procedural Posture: Convicted by jury in 2022; sentenced to 35 years (12 to serve, 23 suspended); appealed on three grounds.
• Issues Raised:
  1. Failure to give a consent instruction.
  2. Refusal to give a spoliation (missing-evidence) instruction regarding jeans allegedly torn during the assault.
  3. Delivery of an Allen charge instead of declaring a mistrial when the jury reported an 11-1 deadlock.

3. Summary of the Judgment

Justice Goldberg, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected each assignment of error:

1. Consent Instruction: No error where record lacked even a “scintilla” of evidence suggesting voluntary sexual activity; the trial justice’s comprehensive charge on “force or coercion” sufficed.
2. Spoliation Instruction: Absent proof of bad faith or apparent exculpatory value in the lost jeans, no due-process violation occurred and no adverse-inference instruction was warranted.
3. Allen Charge: The supplemental charge, though delivered after disclosure of an 11-1 split, remained balanced, non-coercive, and consistent with State v. Rodriguez; mistrial was not required.

4. In-Depth Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• State v. Martin, 68 A.3d 467 (R.I. 2013) — Foundation for the principle that a separate consent instruction is superfluous if the force/coercion element is adequately charged.
• State v. Lynch, 19 A.3d 51 (R.I. 2011) — Confirmed that “lack of consent” is not an element but rather the State’s burden once “force or coercion” is asserted.
• State v. Vanover, 721 A.2d 430 (R.I. 1998) & State v. Garcia, 643 A.2d 180 (R.I. 1994) — Adopted the Youngblood–Trombetta bad-faith standard for lost evidence in criminal cases.
• State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894 (R.I. 2003) & State v. Luanglath, 863 A.2d 631 (R.I. 2005) — Leading Rhode Island rulings on the propriety of Allen charges.
• Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) — U.S. Supreme Court authority on constitutional implications of lost or destroyed evidence.

4.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Consent Instruction

The Court distilled a two-step test:

1. Is the statutory “force or coercion” element fully and accurately charged? If yes, the default position is that no separate consent instruction is needed.
2. Has the defense introduced competent evidence sufficient to raise the issue of consent? The threshold is “more than a scintilla.” Mere prior friendship, acquaintance, or even an incipient romantic encounter (e.g., shared ice cream, exchange of phone numbers, meeting family) does not suffice.

Applying this framework, the Court deemed the trial justice correct in refusing the requested charge because the record contained no evidence at all of consensual sexual penetration—Threadgill had not testified, and Jeffrey’s account was uncontradicted.

b. Spoliation / Missing Evidence

The defense sought an instruction that the jury may infer the missing jeans would have been unfavorable to the State. Relying on Garcia and Vanover, the Court reiterated that in criminal cases the defendant must establish:

1. Apprent exculpatory value before destruction;
2. Inability to obtain comparable evidence elsewhere;
3. Bad faith (or at least gross negligence) by the State.

Because the record lacked proof of the jeans’ exculpatory value and contained no showing that authorities acted in bad faith, the trial justice correctly refused the spoliation instruction.

c. The Allen Charge

Despite learning the jury was split 11-1 for guilt, the trial court gave a measured supplemental charge. The Supreme Court endorsed it, emphasising three safeguards:

• Reminders that no juror should abandon an “honest conviction.”
• Absence of language implying a retrial was inevitable or that the hold-out’s vote was unreasonable.
• Relatively short deliberation time (≈10 hours over two days) signalled the jury was not yet exhausted.

Thus, the charge comported with the “meticulously fair” standard of Rodriguez.

4.3 Impact on Future Litigation

• Consent Instructions: Trial judges now have explicit guidance: unless the defense produces concrete evidence of actual consent to the sexual act, requests for a consent instruction should be denied when the jury is already charged on force/coercion. Expect more streamlined jury charges and fewer appellate reversals premised on consent-instruction denials.
• Evidence Preservation: The decision re-affirms a stricter burden on criminal defendants seeking spoliation relief than on civil litigants. Prosecutors and law-enforcement agencies, however, are reminded to document chain-of-custody clearly to avoid “bad faith” arguments.
• Allen Charges: The Court’s acceptance of a supplemental instruction despite knowledge of the numerical split will embolden trial judges to use a similar template, so long as the language stays neutral and the deliberation timeline is reasonable.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Force or Coercion (Sexual Assault): Any act that overcomes a victim’s will by physical power or credible threats. Once the State proves force/coercion, the law presumes non-consent unless the defense offers evidence to the contrary.
• Spoliation: Destruction or loss of evidence. In criminal cases, defendants must show the State destroyed evidence on purpose (or in bad faith) and that the evidence was obviously helpful to the defense. Only then may jurors draw an adverse inference.
• Allen Charge: A “keep working” instruction named after Allen v. United States (1896). It encourages a deadlocked jury to re-examine positions without coercing any juror to capitulate.

6. Conclusion

State v. Threadgill does not revolutionise Rhode Island criminal procedure, but it clarifies and tightens three doctrinal zones. Most notably, it installs the “No Romance, No Inference” principle: friendly or potentially romantic precursors between complainant and defendant, standing alone, do not mandate a consent instruction once the jury hears a complete charge on force or coercion. Coupled with fortification of the bad-faith requirement for spoliation and affirmation of balanced Allen charges, the ruling supplies trial judges and litigators with a clearer roadmap for navigating common but contentious trial dilemmas.

In the broader legal landscape, the decision underscores the Court’s continuing effort to balance defendants’ constitutional protections with practical trial management—ensuring juries receive neither too little guidance (risking confusion) nor too much (risking coercion). Future sexual-assault prosecutions in Rhode Island will undoubtedly cite Threadgill when debating jury instructions, evidentiary loss, and the propriety of supplemental charges.