“No Diligence, No Amendment” — The Eleventh Circuit’s Firm Re-affirmation of Rule 72(a) Waiver and Rule 16(b) Good-Cause Requirements in John Oirya v. Mando America Corporation

1. Introduction

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in John Oirya v. Mando America Corporation (No. 24-12660, decided 14 May 2025) centres on a pro se plaintiff’s repeated efforts to amend his complaint—after the scheduling deadlines had long passed—to add Title VII gender-discrimination claims to an action that originally alleged only Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violations. The court’s per curiam opinion, although unpublished, offers a crystalline restatement of two procedural doctrines that frequently determine the fate of untimely motions in federal practice:

1. The irrevocable waiver created by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) when a party fails to object to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive order within 14 days; and
2. The “good-cause” threshold imposed by Rule 16(b) on any motion to amend pleadings after the court’s scheduling order deadline has expired.

The controversy arose from John Oirya’s dismissal by Mando America Corporation (“Mando”), allegedly because of a sleep disorder. After the district court rejected his first late attempt to amend the complaint, Oirya again moved—well outside all deadlines—to add sex-discrimination counts. The magistrate judge denied leave; Oirya did not object within 14 days; and subsequent manoeuvres, including a Rule 54(b)/Rule 60 motion, failed to revive the issue. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, emphasising both the procedural default and the absence of diligence.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s denial of Oirya’s second motion for leave to amend. Key holdings include:

• Rule 72(a) Waiver: Because Oirya did not object within 14 days to the magistrate judge’s 14 January 2022 order denying leave to amend, he irrevocably waived appellate review of that order.
• No Abuse of Discretion Under Rules 15(a) & 16(b): Even on the merits, the district court correctly found (a) undue delay under Rule 15(a) and (b) lack of “good cause” under Rule 16(b) because Oirya failed to pursue information diligently or explain his two-year delay.
• Pro se Litigants Held to Same Standards: The court reiterated that pro se status does not relax compliance with procedural rules.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel relied on well-established Eleventh Circuit precedents to dispose of Oirya’s appeal:

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step 1 – Jurisdictional/Procedural Bar: The court first observed that Rule 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) imposed a 14-day objection window. Oirya’s two-year delay in raising objections (only after losing on summary judgment and after a prior appellate dismissal) triggered irrevocable waiver.
2. Step 2 – Discretionary Merits Check: Despite the waiver, the panel explained why the district court still did not abuse its discretion in denying amendment:
   • Oirya knew early on that HR manager Audie Swegman was involved in his termination.
   • He had discovery documents mentioning comparator Veronica Alfa well before discovery closed.
   • Yet he waited until after discovery, dispositive motions, and summary-judgment briefing to attempt amendment.
   • This sequence demonstrated lack of diligence, failing Rule 16(b)’s good-cause requirement.
3. Step 3 – Pro se Status Irrelevant: Citing Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2003), the panel reiterated that pro se litigants must still follow procedural rules.

3.3 Potential Impact

Although unpublished, the opinion consolidates and clarifies multiple strands of Eleventh-Circuit authority and will likely influence district-court practice in three ways:

• Reinforcement of the 14-Day Rule 72(a) Deadline: District judges and magistrates can confidently rely on waiver when objections are untimely, avoiding needless re-litigation.
• Tightening of “Good-Cause” Evaluations: Litigants must demonstrate affirmative diligence, not merely the eventual discovery of key facts. Failure to pursue leads proactively will bar amendments.
• Curtailment of Strategic Post-Summary-Judgment Amendments: The decision signals that attempting to revive dead claims through Rule 54(b) or Rule 60 motions will rarely succeed where Rule 72(a) default has occurred.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 72(a) Waiver

A party has 14 days to object when a magistrate judge decides a non-dispositive issue (e.g., discovery ruling, denial of leave to amend). No objection means the issue is permanently waived—appellate courts will not review it.

Rule 16(b) “Good Cause”

After the court sets deadlines in a scheduling order, those deadlines can be changed only if the moving party shows it could not have met them even with reasonable diligence. “I later found new facts” is insufficient if the party failed to seek those facts promptly.

Rule 15(a) “Freely Give Leave”

Before deadlines expire, courts are liberal in granting amendments. Once deadlines pass, Rule 16(b)’s stricter “good cause” test controls.

Rule 54(b) & Rule 60 Motions

Mechanisms to seek relief from judgments or orders. They cannot resurrect an already-waived objection under Rule 72(a).

EEOC Charge Exhaustion

In employment cases, Title VII claims must resemble or grow out of the facts alleged in the charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Here, even assumed exhaustion could not cure procedural tardiness.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in John Oirya v. Mando America Corporation is a procedural clarion call: dead-lines matter. By fusing the Rule 72(a) waiver doctrine with the Rule 16(b) good-cause standard, the court made clear that:

• Failure to timely object to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive order is fatal, even for pro se litigants.
• Judicial leniency under Rule 15(a) evaporates once scheduling deadlines lapse; thereafter, only diligence and unavoidable impediments justify amendment.
• Attempts to salvage waived issues via Rule 54(b) or Rule 60 motions will not succeed where diligence is lacking.

In essence, the case reinforces a bright-line principle: “No diligence, no amendment.” Practitioners in the Eleventh Circuit—and litigants nationwide—should heed the lesson: pursue discovery promptly, monitor scheduling orders rigorously, and object to magistrate decisions within 14 days, or risk permanent foreclosure of potentially meritorious claims.