“No Constructive Conditional Plea”: The Fourth Circuit’s Clarification on Appellate Rights and Rogers Consistency in United States v. Kyrie Thompson

Introduction

In United States v. Kyrie Thompson, No. 23-4638 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2025) (unpublished), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted two recurring post-conviction problems:

1. Whether a defendant who entered an unconditional guilty plea may nevertheless appeal the denial of a pre-trial suppression motion where the district court erroneously told him he had “an unlimited right” to appeal; and
2. Whether facial differences between the oral pronouncement of supervised-release conditions and the subsequent written judgment amount to Rogers error requiring resentencing.

Judge DeAndrea Gist Benjamin, joined by Judges Niemeyer and King, delivered an opinion that both affirms the district court’s sentence and dismisses Thompson’s Fourth Amendment appeal. The decision sharply delineates the boundary between unconditional and conditional pleas, clarifies that a district court’s misstatement cannot transform an unconditional plea into a conditional one, and refines the Fourth Circuit’s growing jurisprudence on the consistency requirement of supervised-release conditions under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020).

Summary of the Judgment

• Fourth-Amendment Challenge Dismissed: Thompson’s attempt to appeal the denial of his suppression motion is barred because an unconditional guilty plea, even if entered after judicial misadvice, removes antecedent Fourth-Amendment issues from appellate consideration. There is no “waiver” to invalidate because nothing was reserved.
• Sentence and Supervised Release Affirmed: The court found no inconsistency—and therefore no Rogers error—between (i) oral and written directives concerning the district where Thompson must report, and (ii) oral and written drug-testing conditions. The written judgment merely clarified what was already pronounced.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel canvassed several key authorities:

• Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983) – establishes that a guilty plea renders pre-plea Fourth-Amendment claims irrelevant rather than waived. The panel relied heavily on Haring to explain why there was no “appellate-rights waiver” to invalidate.
• Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018) – distinguishes between claims that survive a plea (e.g., constitutional challenges to the statute of conviction) and those extinguished by it. Used to reinforce that suppression issues disappear after a valid plea.
• United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2010) – held that a plea-agreement appellate waiver was invalid where the court misadvised the defendant; Thompson invoked Manigan, but the panel limited it to contractual appellate waivers, not to pre-plea suppression challenges.
• United States v. Fitzgerald, 820 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 2016) – restated that absent a Rule 11(a)(2) conditional plea, an appeal of an adverse suppression ruling is dismissed. The panel applied Fitzgerald directly.
• United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Mathis, 103 F.4th 193 (4th Cir. 2024) – frame the rule that all discretionary supervised-release conditions must be orally pronounced. The panel harmonised these cases when it found no material discrepancy.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. No “Waiver” Exists to Challenge
   • An unconditional guilty plea is an admission of factual guilt; once entered knowingly and voluntarily, it renders earlier constitutional litigation irrelevant (Haring).
   • Because such a plea removes, rather than waives, the suppression issue, there is nothing akin to an “appellate waiver” for the court to rescind.
   • Manigan deals with express waivers in plea agreements; here there was no plea agreement at all, making Manigan inapposite.
2. No Constructive Conditional Plea
   • A conditional plea under Rule 11(a)(2) requires (a) an express reservation of a specific issue, and (b) government consent.
   • The district judge’s statements—although imprecise—did not transform the plea into a conditional one because neither prong was met. Thompson never said he was reserving suppression, and the government never consented.
3. Supervised-Release Conditions Consistent
   • Reporting District: The phrase “district to which the defendant is released” naturally equals “district where the defendant is authorized to reside”; thus the written language clarified, rather than expanded, the requirement.
   • Drug Testing: “Submit to” intrinsically forbids obstruction; adding “you must not attempt to obstruct or tamper” merely explicates compliance. Therefore no new burden was imposed.

3. Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

• Reinforced Importance of Rule 11(a)(2) Compliance – Defense counsel must formally request, and the court must memorialise, any conditional plea. Informal judicial assurances will not salvage suppression claims.
• Limited Reach of Manigan – The decision confines Manigan to contractual appeal waivers and declines to extend its misadvice rationale to suppression appeals after unconditional pleas.
• Practical Guidance for Sentencing Courts – When minor wording differences appear between oral and written conditions, the dispositive question is whether the written judgment adds a burden or merely clarifies the same obligation.
  • Probation officers and counsel can cite this case to rebut rote Rogers challenges where the wording differences are semantic rather than substantive.
• Procedural Discipline for Defendants – Defendants contemplating plea bargains must lodge suppression challenges through either pre-trial litigation followed by a conditional plea or proceed to trial. Post-plea resurrection is foreclosed in the Fourth Circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Unconditional vs. Conditional Plea

• Unconditional: Defendant admits guilt without reserving any issues; most pre-plea rulings become unreviewable.
• Conditional (Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2)): Defendant pleads guilty but explicitly reserves the right to appeal a specified ruling (e.g., suppression), with government consent and court approval.

Waiver vs. Extinguishment

• Waiver: Intentional relinquishment of a known right (often contractual in a plea agreement).
• Extinguishment: The right no longer exists because the plea removes the underlying controversy (Haring), not because the defendant “waived” it.

Rogers Error

Failure to orally pronounce a discretionary supervised-release condition, or imposing in writing a condition materially different from that orally stated, requires resentencing. Clarifying or restating the same obligation is not error.

“Submit” vs. “Participate”

• Participate: Take part (may allow imperfect compliance).
• Submit: Yield fully to authority and procedures (implies no obstruction or tampering).

Conclusion

United States v. Kyrie Thompson cements two doctrine-shaping points for Fourth-Circuit practitioners:

1. A district court’s broad assurance of appeal rights cannot transmute an unconditional guilty plea into a conditional one; suppression claims die with the plea unless preserved under Rule 11(a)(2).
2. Not every discrepancy between oral and written supervision conditions is a Rogers violation; where the written judgment merely clarifies the scope of an orally declared requirement, affirmance—not remand—is appropriate.

By foregrounding these principles, the decision promotes plea-colloquy precision, discourages attempts to evade the consequences of unconditional pleas, and gives sentencing courts a workable framework for drafting supervised-release conditions that survive appellate scrutiny.