“No Bootstrap through Mathis” – The First Circuit Narrows Johnson II Relief in United States v. Capozzi

1. Introduction

United States v. Capozzi, No. 22-1243 (1st Cir. July 2, 2025) clarifies the intersection of two pivotal federal sentencing statutes: the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).

Derek Capozzi, serving a 300-month ACCA-enhanced sentence (plus a since-vacated 60-month § 924(c) consecutive term), launched a second § 2255 attack. He claimed that the Supreme Court’s vagueness holding in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (“Johnson II”) invalidated his enhancement, and—separately—that vacatur of the § 924(c) count under United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019) compelled a full resentencing.

The First Circuit rejected both claims, holding (1) that AEDPA’s one-year limitations period bars “Johnson-styled” motions where the sentence was not solely based on ACCA’s residual clause, and (2) that the district court did not abuse its discretion in merely subtracting the 60-month consecutive term instead of reopening the entire sentencing package.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Jurisdictional bar. To benefit from AEDPA § 2255(f)(3), a movant must show that his sentence rested exclusively on the residual clause struck down in Johnson II. Capozzi could not, because the sentencing court had relied on the enumerated-offense clause (burglary) for at least four of his predicates. His claim therefore sounded in Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016)—a decision that is not retroactive—rendering the motion untimely.
Resentencing discretion. After vacating the § 924(c) conviction in light of Davis, the district court opted merely to “lop off” the 60-month term. The First Circuit, applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Johnson II (2015): Invalidated ACCA’s residual clause; declared retroactive (Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016)). Opens a one-year § 2255 window only for sentences based on that clause.
Mathis (2016): Clarified ACCA’s enumerated clause methodology. Not a new substantive rule, hence not retroactive (First Circuit: Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232 (1st Cir. 2018)).
Dimott (1st Cir. 2018): Forbids “bootstrapping” non-retroactive Mathis arguments into a Johnson motion.
Shea v. United States, 976 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2020): Reiterated Johnson retroactivity and the “based solely” requirement.
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990): Defined generic burglary. Capozzi relied on it first in 2005; too late now.
Rodriguez, 112 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1997): Source of the “sentencing package” doctrine that can warrant resentencing after partial vacatur.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Identifying the clause actually used. Because the original sentencing transcript was silent, the panel gave “due weight” to later findings by the same district judge (Capozzi I & II). Those findings showed reliance on the enumerated clause—specifically, generic burglary—based on the PSR demonstrating that Capozzi’s break-and-enter convictions involved buildings.
Applying AEDPA. Under § 2255(f)(3) the one-year re-start occurs only when (a) SCOTUS recognizes a new right and (b) makes it retroactive. Johnson II meets both; Mathis meets neither. Because Capozzi’s argument ultimately required Mathis to undermine the enumerated-clause predicates, his motion was untimely.
No reopening via Taylor. Taylor preceded the conviction; any Taylor-based claim was, and was once, available within the original limitations period. AEDPA forecloses serial relitigation.
Choice of remedy. Section 2255(b) remedies are discretionary. Using the “package” theory is permissible, not compulsory. The district judge considered Capozzi’s arguments and simply excised the invalid count—well within discretion, especially given the unchanged 300-month statutory minimum under ACCA.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision

Re-affirms Dimott. Litigants cannot escape AEDPA’s statute of limitations by creatively labeling a Mathis issue as a Johnson claim. The First Circuit doubles-down on the “solely residual clause” test.
Elevates sentencing-judge commentary. Post-conviction findings by the original sentencing judge receive significant “due weight” when reconstructing ambiguous sentencing records.
Restrains resentencing demands. Even after Davis vacates a § 924(c) count, district courts need not automatically embark on plenary resentencing. Expect more “sentence-correction only” dispositions.
Advises defense counsel. Defendants must raise enumerated-clause/statutory-elements challenges promptly; Johnson-based filings will not revive those arguments.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

ACCA’s Three Clauses
- Force clause: Crimes involving actual or threatened force.
- Enumerated clause: Burglary, arson, extortion, explosives.
- Residual clause (struck down): Catch-all for “conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury.”
AEDPA One-Year Clock – Generally starts when conviction becomes final. It resets only if SCOTUS later announces a new, retroactive right that applies to the case (e.g., Johnson II).
Bootstrapping – Trying to smuggle an untimely claim inside a timely one by re-labeling it. Here, calling a Mathis enumerated-clause argument a Johnson residual-clause claim.
Sentencing Package Doctrine – When sentences on multiple counts form one “package,” vacating a count may allow resentencing on others, but only if the district court believes the package concept requires it.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Capozzi cements an important limitation on post-conviction ACCA litigation in the First Circuit: the Johnson II retroactivity window opens only for defendants whose sentences were actually predicated exclusively on the now-void residual clause. Attempts to employ Mathis or other non-retroactive decisions to back-door substantive challenges are time-barred.

Additionally, the decision underscores the latitude district courts possess in tailoring remedies once a single conviction within a sentencing package fails. Merely shaving off the invalid count, without revisiting the entire sentence, will often survive appellate scrutiny.

For practitioners, the case is a stark reminder: develop and preserve enumerated-clause arguments early; do not bank on Johnson to revive them later. And when seeking resentencing after partial relief, be prepared to show more than jurisprudential evolution—demonstrate how the original package truly hinged on the now-invalid count.