“No Blank-Check EEOC Charges” – Gomez v. Cameron County and the Strict Contours of Administrative Exhaustion

Introduction

Gomez v. Cameron County, No. 24-40757 (5th Cir. July 30, 2025) is a non-published summary-calendar opinion, yet it delivers an unmistakable doctrinal message: an employee cannot use a federal lawsuit to raise new facts or theories that bear no reasonable relationship to the allegations contained in his administrative charge. The Fifth Circuit, per curiam, re-affirms the centrality of the “like-or-related” test first articulated in Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc. and refuses to enlarge it into a “blank-check” doctrine that would allow parties to litigate un-charged claims merely because the employer had notice or because the charge was dually filed with a state agency.

The litigants were:

• Adam M. Gomez, Jr. – Plaintiff-Appellant, former chaplain for the Cameron County Sheriff’s Office.
• Cameron County – Defendant-Appellee, Gomez’s former employer.

After the county terminated Gomez for failing to obtain medical clearance required for a jailer position, Gomez filed an EEOC charge asserting only age and religious discrimination. He later sued under a cornucopia of federal and state statutes—Title VII, ADA, ADEA, FMLA, Texas Labor Code, and even a Texas-constitutional claim—claiming, among other things, that the county subjected him to an unnecessary medical exam prohibited by the ADA. The district court dismissed or later granted summary judgment on every claim, and the Fifth Circuit has now affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit held:

1. An ADA claim based on an allegedly unnecessary medical examination was not administratively exhausted because the EEOC charge lacked any factual predicate regarding disability or medical testing.
2. Dual filing with the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) does not automatically extend the scope of a federal charge or waive exhaustion for new claims under the Texas Labor Code or the ADA.
3. The court declined to expand Sanchez; the “like-or-related” test is limited to procedural variances, not complete factual omissions.
4. The county did not waive the exhaustion defense; it raised the issue in its first responsive pleading.
5. Even if exhaustion were waived, Gomez offered no summary-judgment evidence to carry his burden under the McDonnell-Douglas framework; thus, the ADA claim would fail on the merits.

The circuit court therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend and its grant of summary judgment to Cameron County.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970) – Established that a civil action is limited to “the scope of the EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge.” Gomez attempted, unsuccessfully, to stretch Sanchez to cover completely unmentioned factual theories.
• Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019) – Clarified that administrative exhaustion is a mandatory claim-processing rule, not jurisdictional, and can be waived. Gomez invoked Davis to argue waiver, but the appellate panel found an early, unmistakable assertion of the defense.
• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) – Provided the familiar burden-shifting rubric for circumstantial discrimination claims. The district court employed this framework in granting summary judgment once exhaustion failed.
• Dike v. Columbia Hospital Corp., 2025 WL 315126 (5th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025) – Gomez cited Dike hoping to show that uncharged evidence can survive if reasonably related, but the panel distinguished Dike because the plaintiff there did provide some factual seeds in the charge.
• Numerous statutory cross-references:
  • Age Discrimination in Employment Act – 29 U.S.C. §626(d)(1)
  • Title VII – 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1)
  • Americans with Disabilities Act – 42 U.S.C. §12117(a); §12112(d)(4)(A)
  • Texas Labor Code §§21.0015, 21.201-202
  • Texas Administrative Code, 37 TAC §§217.1(b)(11), 217.9

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Nature of the Exhaustion Requirement
   The court treats exhaustion as a threshold “claim-processing rule.” While non-jurisdictional, it remains mandatory unless the employer expressly or implicitly waives it. The county’s answer attached the EEOC charge and asserted non-exhaustion, foreclosing waiver.
2. The “Like-or-Related” Test Has Boundaries
   Sanchez tolerates discrepancies arising from “procedural technicalities,” e.g., minor variations in dates, legal theory labels, or parties. What Sanchez does not tolerate is the total absence of facts pointing to a specific discriminatory act or protected category. Here, the charge:
   • Denied disability status.
   • Mentioned only age and religion.
   • Never referenced medical examinations.
   Therefore, an ADA medical-exam claim fell outside any EEOC investigation that could reasonably have grown from the charge.
3. Dual-Filed Charges Do Not Create a Procedural Backdoor
   Gomez argued that TWC deferral should save his claim. But Texas Labor Code provisions mirror federal exhaustion language. The panel noted the absence of authority suggesting that dual filing converts a Texas charge into a “blank check.”
4. Purpose of EEOC Conciliation
   The panel emphasized that the charge’s purpose is not simply to notify the employer but to give the agency first crack at voluntary conciliation. Allowing litigation of wholly uncharged theories would bypass that statutory design.
5. Substantive Futility
   Even had exhaustion been waived, Gomez offered no evidence to rebut the county’s showing that the medical exam was “job-related and consistent with business necessity” for jailers, as required by §12112(d)(4)(A). Thus, amendment would have been futile under Rule 15(a)(2).

C. Impact of the Decision

While unpublished, Gomez sharpens Fifth Circuit lines on administrative exhaustion:

• Litigants must infuse their EEOC charges with at least minimal factual allegations supporting each theory they later intend to pursue.
• The decision discourages “kitchen-sink” pleadings filed after an EEOC right-to-sue letter, signaling that courts will police the factual scope of charges, not only the legal theories.
• State-law discrimination claims (Texas Labor Code) may also be vulnerable if the underlying EEOC/TWC charge omits the pertinent facts.
• Employers should raise exhaustion early; doing so preserves the defense post-Fort Bend.
• Practitioners in the Fifth Circuit should treat Gomez as a cautionary tale in drafting EEOC charges—particularly where multiple protected classes or ADA medical-exam claims are in play.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• EEOC Charge – A short, sworn statement filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (and often “dually filed” with a state agency) that launches an administrative investigation into alleged workplace discrimination.
• Administrative Exhaustion – The requirement that a claimant first pursue relief through the EEOC before suing in court. Only claims “like or related” to those in the charge may later be litigated.
• Dual Filing / Deferral – Under “work-sharing” agreements, a charge filed with the EEOC is automatically forwarded (“dually filed”) to the state fair-employment agency (here, the TWC), and vice-versa.
• McDonnell-Douglas Framework – A burden-shifting method used when discrimination is proven by circumstantial evidence: (1) prima facie case by the employee, (2) legitimate, non-discriminatory reason by the employer, (3) pretext showing by the employee.
• Claim-Processing Rule vs. Jurisdiction – A claim-processing rule must be followed but can be waived by the parties; a jurisdictional rule cannot be waived. Exhaustion falls in the former category after Fort Bend.

Conclusion

Gomez v. Cameron County reinforces a bright-line principle: an EEOC charge frames the universe of facts and theories that may enter a federal courtroom. Merely “dual filing” a charge or giving the employer informal notice does not circumvent the statutory exhaustion scheme designed to promote agency conciliation. The Fifth Circuit’s refusal to expand Sanchez re-affirms that the factual content of the charge—not creative post-hoc re-labeling—determines whether a claim is properly before the court. Going forward, employees and counsel must draft charges comprehensively, and defendants should invoke exhaustion early and often. In that sense, Gomez may be unpublished, but its practical lessons are anything but obscure.