“No Bivens for the Task-Force Warrant”: The Fourth Circuit’s New Limit on Constitutional Damages Actions Against U.S. Marshals

Introduction

In Evy B. Orellana v. Deputy United States Marshal Ryan Godec, No. 23-2224 (4th Cir. July 30 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted whether an individual injured during the execution of a state arrest warrant by a U.S. Marshals-led fugitive task force could sue the officers for damages under the implied federal cause of action recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

The plaintiff, Ms. Orellana, alleged excessive force when the task-force’s police dog mauled her while officers searched for her boyfriend in a basement apartment. The district court allowed her Fourth-Amendment Bivens claim to proceed and denied qualified immunity. The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed, holding that (1) the claim arose in a “new context” because the defendant officers were acting under a warrant and within a congressionally mandated, multi-jurisdictional task-force framework, and (2) multiple “special factors” counsel against extending Bivens.

Judge Richardson authored the majority opinion joined by Judge Rushing; Chief Judge Gregory dissented. The decision establishes a significant new limitation: Bivens does not extend to claims against U.S. Marshals (or deputized state/local officers) executing warrants as part of federally authorized fugitive task forces.

Summary of the Judgment

Jurisdiction: The court exercised collateral-order jurisdiction because the appeal involved the denial of qualified immunity, and the Bivens question is “upstream” of that defense.
Step-One (New Context): Two features rendered the case “meaningfully different” from the classic Bivens scenario:
- The defendants were U.S. Marshals operating within a congressionally created federal-state task-force structure implicating unique federalism concerns.
- The search and seizure were conducted with a warrant, whereas Bivens concerned warrantless conduct.
Step-Two (Special Factors): The majority identified several reasons to leave any remedy to Congress: potential chilling of intergovernmental cooperation, existing administrative redress, and the uncertain systemic consequences of imposing personal liability on Marshals and deputized officers.
Holding: Because both steps cut against recognition of a damages remedy, Ms. Orellana has no Bivens cause of action. The court therefore reversed without reaching qualified immunity.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) – Origin of the implied damages remedy for Fourth-Amendment violations; the court distinguished the instant facts on two axes: warrantless vs. warrant, and ordinary narcotics agents vs. task-force Marshals.
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) & Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) – The only two Supreme Court expansions of Bivens (Fifth & Eighth Amendments). The majority reiterates that no expansion has been sanctioned in 45 years.
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017); Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93 (2020); Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022) – Core modern authorities stressing that extending Bivens is a “disfavored judicial activity” and that a single “rational reason” to hesitate bars extension.
Annappareddy v. Pascale, 996 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 2021) & Hicks v. Ferreyra, 64 F.4th 156 (4th Cir. 2023) – Fourth-Circuit precedents drawing a decisive line between warrantless and warranted searches for purposes of Bivens.
Sister-circuit opinions on task forces – e.g., Logsdon v. U.S. Marshal Serv., 91 F.4th 1352 (10th Cir. 2024); Robinson v. Sauls, 102 F.4th 1337 (11th Cir. 2024); these helped the court treat U.S. Marshals in joint operations as “new defendants.”

Legal Reasoning Detailed

Two-Step Bivens Framework
- Step One – New Context? The court embraced a granular, factor-by-factor comparison demanded by Abbasi. It highlighted:
  - Different statutory mandate (§ 566 & 34 U.S.C. § 41503) – Marshals’ fugitive-apprehension mission determined by Congress.
  - Federalism overlay – deputization of state/local officers raised comity concerns paralleling cross-border concerns in Hernandez.
  - Presence of a search warrant – materially changes the “right at issue” because Fourth-Amendment jurisprudence treats warranted and warrantless intrusions differently.
- Step Two – Special Factors? Applying Egbert’s “any rational reason” standard, the court noted:
  - Risk of deterring state/local cooperation if individual liability looms.
  - Existing administrative remedies (USMS Internal Affairs, DOJ Community Relations, agency indemnification policies).
  - Separation-of-powers principle: Congress can calibrate remedies for complex interjurisdictional operations more effectively than courts fashioning ad-hoc liability.
Collateral-Order Jurisdiction The court reaffirmed that once qualified-immunity denial is appealable, a reviewing court can (and often must) reach the antecedent question of whether a cause of action exists at all (Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007)).
Rejecting the Dissent Judge Gregory argued that the similarities with Bivens (line-level arresting officers, excessive force, Fourth Amendment) outweighed the differences. The majority rebutted by treating the warrant and statutory mandate as dispositive “meaningful differences,” underscoring Ahmed v. Weyker that even “small differences matter.”

Impact of the Judgment

Practical Litigation Effect. Plaintiffs injured by task-force officers executing warrants in the Fourth Circuit must now pursue relief through the Federal Tort Claims Act (against the United States), state-law tort claims (if viable), or administrative complaint procedures rather than Bivens suits against individual officers.
Expansion of the “Bivens-free zone.” Adding fugitive-task-force operations to the list of contexts where Bivens is unavailable continues a national trend of shrinking Bivens to near non-existence—effectively confining it to its original facts.
Incentives for Congressional Action. By emphasizing that only Congress can craft an appropriate remedy, the opinion may spur legislative proposals for limited statutory causes of action or clearer indemnification frameworks.
Qualified-Immunity Litigation. Because courts may short-circuit cases at the “no cause of action” stage, fewer disputes will reach qualified-immunity analysis, altering defense strategies and discovery timelines.
Intergovernmental Cooperation. The majority’s “chilling” rationale may encourage continued state participation in federal task forces but also leaves injured bystanders without direct federal constitutional remedies—an asymmetry likely to fuel policy debates.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Bivens Action: A judge-made right to sue federal officers personally for constitutional violations when no statute authorizes such a suit. Think of it as a “do-it-yourself” remedy the Supreme Court created in 1971, now heavily restricted.
New Context: Any factual or legal variation that meaningfully differs from the original three Bivens cases. If a detail (type of officer, presence of warrant, policy backdrop, etc.) is new, courts must halt and analyze special factors.
Special Factors Counselling Hesitation: Reasons why courts should defer to Congress—e.g., national security, foreign affairs, complex statutory schemes, or potential interference with other branches.
Collateral-Order Doctrine: A narrow exception letting parties immediately appeal certain non-final orders—like denial of qualified immunity—because delaying review would defeat the defense’s purpose (immunity from suit, not just liability).
Fugitive Task Force: A partnership in which U.S. Marshals deputize local and state officers to locate and arrest fugitives; governed by 34 U.S.C. § 41503 and attendant DOJ regulations.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Orellana v. Godec adds a consequential chapter to the post-Abbasi retrenchment of Bivens. By declaring that (i) U.S. Marshals executing a warrant within a joint task force and (ii) the warrant itself are “meaningful differences,” the court forecloses a category of constitutional damages suits long assumed viable. The ruling underscores the Supreme Court’s mandate that lower courts err on the side of restraint and leave the creation of new federal remedies to Congress. Whether Congress will accept this invitation remains uncertain; what is clear is that, within the Fourth Circuit, individuals harmed in similar circumstances must seek justice through statutory or administrative avenues rather than Bivens.