“No Automatic Federal Hook”: Tenth Circuit Declares that Motor Vehicles Are NOT Per Se “Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce” under the Federal Kidnapping Act

Introduction

United States v. Chavarria, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on 16 June 2025, confronts the ever-expanding reach of federal criminal law. Jerrold Chavarria and Jerry Romero were charged federally under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) for kidnapping resulting in death, after an alleged abduction and murder that never crossed a state line. The sole jurisdictional allegation in the superseding indictment was that the defendants “used a motor vehicle, a means, facility, and instrumentality of interstate commerce.” The district court dismissed the indictment. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that motor vehicles are not, merely by their nature, “instrumentalities of interstate commerce”. Absent a pleaded factual nexus between the vehicle’s use and interstate commerce, the federal courts lacked jurisdiction.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Federal Kidnapping Act requires either interstate transportation of the victim or the use of a “means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate commerce.”
• The indictment stated only that a “motor vehicle” (a Jeep Cherokee) had been used; it gave no facts tying the vehicle or the offense to interstate commerce.
• The Court (Judge Tymkovich, joined by Judges Hartz and Bacharach) held:
  1. “Instrumentality of interstate commerce” is a term of art informed by Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
  2. Not every object that moves people or things—i.e., not every motor vehicle—qualifies as such an instrumentality.
  3. Categorically treating all motor vehicles as instrumentalities would obliterate the constitutional distinction between national and local authority.
• Because the indictment relied solely on a conclusory allegation and did not allege any interstate commercial nexus, it was fatally deficient and properly dismissed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) – First articulated the idea that Congress may regulate “instruments” of commerce only insofar as they are employed in interstate commerce. This historical anchor supplied the Tenth Circuit’s limiting principle.
• Pensacola Telegraph (1877) – Recognised the telegraph as an instrumentality because it was a “necessity of commerce.” The Court contrasts this with motor vehicles, which are frequently non-commercial.
• Houston, East & West Texas Railway (1914) and Perez (1971) – Railroads and aircraft are per se instrumentalities because they overwhelmingly operate in interstate markets. These cases illustrate how some classes of objects comfortably fit the category, unlike generic “motor vehicles.”
• United States v. Lopez (1995) – Supplies the modern three-category Commerce Clause framework. The federal kidnapping statute relies on “Category 2” power (instrumentalities), not Category 3 (“substantial effects”).
• 10th Circuit decisions: Patton (2006) & Durham (2018) – Explain channels/instrumentalities distinction and caution that federal power has outer limits.
• Contrary authority – United States v. Windham (6th Cir. 2022) & United States v. Protho (7th Cir. 2022) – Treated “automobiles” as instrumentalities per se. The Tenth Circuit distinguishes them on the ground that they addressed “cars/automobiles,” not the broader category “motor vehicles,” and offered little constitutional analysis.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Term of Art. Congress deliberately used the established constitutional term “instrumentality of interstate commerce.” Under the “old soil” canon, that term carries its historical limitations.
2. Dictionaries Are Not Enough. A dictionary meaning—“something that helps achieve an end”—is too open-ended. The end must be commerce among the states.
3. No Limiting Principle. If every motorized object were an instrumentality, Congress would possess a general police power over “everything that drives,” erasing federalism.
4. Category Matters. The indictment attempted to invoke Category 2 without alleging facts showing the Jeep’s use in commerce; therefore, it failed. The Court expressly left open the possibility that, with specific allegations (e.g., crossing state lines, transporting commercial goods, using a rental car engaged in interstate business), a motor vehicle could qualify.
5. Avoiding Constitutional Overreach. Consistent with the avoidance canon, the Court interpreted the statute narrowly rather than striking it down.

3. Potential Impact

• Circuit Split. The decision conflicts with Sixth and Seventh Circuit pronouncements, making Supreme Court review plausible.
• Federal Kidnapping Prosecutions. Prosecutors in the Tenth Circuit must plead and prove either interstate victim movement or a concrete interstate-commerce nexus (e.g., use of a commercial bus, truck, rideshare vehicle operating interstate, etc.). Conclusory “motor-vehicle” allegations will not do.
• Ripple to Other Statutes. Although the Court limited its holding to § 1201, its Commerce Clause analysis may inspire challenges under:
  • 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (carjacking)
  • 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (murder-for-hire)
  • Assorted firearm-in-commerce provisions
  where indictments rely on broad “instrumentality” language.
• Federal–State Balance. Reinforces that violent crimes with purely local footprints remain largely within state jurisdiction unless Congress clearly stays within its enumerated powers.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conclusion

United States v. Chavarria draws a constitutional boundary around federal criminal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause. By rejecting a blanket equation of “motor vehicle” with “instrumentality of interstate commerce,” the Tenth Circuit re-asserts that federal power must be tied to genuine interstate activity, not mere convenience. The decision narrows federal kidnapping prosecutions within the circuit, creates a direct split with sister circuits, and provides a doctrinal foothold for challenging the ever-growing “federalization” of local crime. Whether the Supreme Court will resolve the conflict or Congress will amend § 1201 remains to be seen, but for now the key takeaway is clear: prosecutors must plead (and eventually prove) a real interstate nexus—simply alleging use of “a motor vehicle” is no longer enough.