“No Advisement, No Waiver” – The Indiana Supreme Court’s Mandatory Advisement Rule in D.W. v. State (2025)

Introduction

The Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in D.W. v. State, 25S-JV-190 (July 23 2025) clarifies, for the first time in a single opinion, the intertwined operation of two critical provisions in Indiana’s Juvenile Code:

Indiana Code § 31-37-12-5 (“Advisement Statute”) – requiring the juvenile court to inform a child of specific rights and dispositional alternatives at the initial hearing; and
Indiana Code § 31-32-5-1 (“Juvenile Waiver Statute”) – prescribing how any juvenile right (constitutional, statutory, or otherwise) may be waived.

The Court held that the Advisement Statute imposes a mandatory duty on juvenile courts to issue a formal advisement. A purported waiver of that advisement by counsel (or any adult) is invalid unless the judge personally interrogates the juvenile and determines that the child “knowingly and voluntarily” joins the waiver. Failing to do so is error, although it may be deemed harmless if the record shows no prejudice to the child’s substantial rights.

Summary of the Judgment

Justice Massa, writing for a unanimous Court, reached three core conclusions:

Statutory Duty Breached. The juvenile court violated § 31-37-12-5 by omitting a full advisement of D.W.’s rights and dispositional alternatives.
Invalid Counsel Waiver. The judge’s acceptance of counsel’s blanket waiver was invalid because the court never obtained D.W.’s personal, knowing, and voluntary joinder as required by § 31-32-5-1.
Harmless Error. Given the robust exercise of rights at the fact-finding hearing, the error did not affect D.W.’s substantial rights and therefore did not warrant reversal of the delinquency adjudication.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719 (Ind. 2023) – Reaffirmed the heightened protection juveniles receive and the limited circumstances in which waivers are valid.
Influence: Provided contemporary authority that “trial courts must take particular care to ensure a valid waiver,” which the Court expanded upon.
J.M. v. State, 727 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2000) – Found no advisement error where the juvenile did receive and acknowledge a written advisement.
Influence: The Court contrasted D.W.’s case to explain why the lack of documentation here constitutes error.
Patton v. State, 588 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. 1992) – Required personal interrogation of juveniles concerning waiver of rights.
Influence: Reaffirmed the “personal interrogation” requirement now explicitly embedded in the Advisement/Waiver framework.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) – Landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision acknowledging juveniles’ due-process rights.
Influence: Quoted for the special vulnerability of juveniles and the need for protective procedures.
Statutory interpretation cases (e.g., United Rural Elec. (1990), Family & Social Services Admin. v. Saint (2025)) – Emphasized the mandatory meaning of “shall.”

B. Legal Reasoning

Plain-language statutory construction. The Court applied the rule that “shall” is mandatory unless context dictates otherwise. No contrary legislative intent was found; therefore, § 31-37-12-5 imposes a non-discretionary duty.
Broad scope of the Juvenile Waiver Statute. Because § 31-32-5-1 covers “any rights … under any law,” the statutory right to an advisement is indeed waivable—but only via the statute’s procedures.
Strict-compliance requirement. The Court deemed the Advisement/Waiver rules “safety mechanisms,” warranting strict compliance. Merely having counsel is not enough; the judge must secure the juvenile’s personal assent.
Harmless-error assessment under App. R. 66(A). Even though the advisement error occurred, the Court found no substantial rights were jeopardized because D.W. actually exercised the rights the statute would have listed and nothing suggests the outcome would differ.

C. Potential Impact

The decision will reverberate across Indiana juvenile courts, public defender offices, and probation departments:

Bench Practice. Judges can no longer shortcut the statutory advisement. A routine script or written form—plus a brief, on-the-record colloquy—will become standard.
Defense Counsel Duties. Attorneys must advise clients beforehand and ensure the child is prepared to answer the judge’s questions. A counsel-only waiver is insufficient.
Training & Forms. Expect revised juvenile-court checklists and statewide advisement templates to emerge from the Judicial Conference and Public Defender Council.
Litigation Strategy. While errors may still be deemed harmless, counsel now have a clear blueprint for preserving (or challenging) advisement defects.
Legislative Signal. The opinion affirms that courts will enforce statutory protections as written, dissuading any implicit invitation to “flexible” compliance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Advisement (I.C. § 31-37-12-5): The judge must tell the child, at the first hearing, what the allegations are, what rights the child has (e.g., lawyer, silence, confrontation), the possibility of adult-court waiver, and the range of outcomes if adjudicated.
Waiver (I.C. § 31-32-5-1): A “waiver” is giving up a right. For juveniles, an adult (lawyer or parent) may announce a waiver only if the child personally agrees, after understanding the right in question. The judge must ask the child directly to verify this.
Personal Interrogation: A short, judge-led Q&A confirming that the juvenile (1) knows the right, (2) understands the consequences of giving it up, and (3) still wants to proceed.
Harmless Error: Even if a legal mistake occurs, an appellate court will not reverse unless the error likely changed the outcome or affected substantial rights.

Conclusion

D.W. v. State cements a bright-line rule in Indiana juvenile jurisprudence: a formal advisement cannot be skipped, and any attempt to waive it requires the juvenile’s personal, knowing, and voluntary agreement on the record. Although the Court found the lapse harmless in D.W.’s specific case, the opinion leaves little doubt that future violations—especially those accompanied by prejudice—will invite reversal. By insisting on strict adherence to statutory safeguards, the decision re-emphasizes Indiana’s longstanding commitment to treating young offenders not as miniature adults, but as children entitled to heightened care, clarity, and constitutional respect.