“Next Preceding” Means “Immediately Preceding”: The Supreme Court of Ohio’s Definitive Construction of Charter-Based Residency Requirements

1. Introduction

In State ex rel. Elmore v. Franklin County Board of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-2585, the Supreme Court of Ohio resolved a long-simmering semantic dispute at the heart of Ohio municipal election law: does the phrase “next preceding” in a city-charter residency clause mean the same thing as “immediately preceding”? The Court held that it does. This apparently modest lexical ruling has significant consequences. It not only determined the fate of Holly Stein’s candidacy for the Ward 4 seat on the Whitehall City Council, but it also realigned Ohio jurisprudence away from a 2017 plurality decision (State ex rel. Rocco) that had advanced the opposite view.

The dispute arose after Relator Lori Elmore—an at-large Whitehall councilmember—and the City of Whitehall challenged Stein’s candidacy on the ground that Stein had not lived in Ward 4 for the two years directly before the upcoming November 4, 2025 election, as required by Section 3(a) of the Whitehall Charter. The Franklin County Board of Elections certified Stein’s candidacy; Elmore sought a writ of prohibition; and the Supreme Court granted that writ, ordering Stein’s name removed from the ballot.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Relief Granted: Writ of prohibition issued; the Franklin County Board of Elections is barred from placing Holly Stein’s name on the November 4, 2025 general-election ballot.
• Holding #1: In Section 3(a) of the Whitehall Charter, the clause requiring that council candidates have “resided … for at least two years next preceding their election” refers to the two years immediately preceding the election in question.
• Holding #2: The two-year residency requirement applies to both ward and at-large council candidates notwithstanding the placement of the word “and” in the charter sentence.
• Consequences: Because Stein lived in Licking County throughout 2023, she did not satisfy the two-year, immediately-preceding residency requirement; the Board’s certification of her candidacy was therefore “unauthorized by law.”

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. State ex rel. Rocco v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2017-Ohio-4466
   • A fractured Court produced no majority rationale.
   • The 2-Justice lead opinion treated “next preceding” as different from “immediately preceding,” allowing the candidate to rely on any qualifying period in the past.
   • Two dissents (O’Connor, C.J., and DeWine, J.) reasoned that ordinary English treats the two phrases as synonyms.
   • Influence: The present Court explicitly finds the Rocco lead opinion unpersuasive and embraces the dissents’ analysis, thereby diminishing Rocco’s precedential weight.
2. State ex rel. Nasal v. Miami Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2021-Ohio-2993 & State ex rel. Emhoff v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2018-Ohio-1660
   • Both cases relied on the Rocco plurality for guidance on professional-experience requirements but are now implicitly limited to their facts.
3. Statutes & Canons Referenced
   • R.C. 2113.41(A) (notice “next preceding the sale”) and R.C. 6105.08 (budget certification “the next preceding paragraph”) were used to demonstrate that Ohio law commonly treats “next preceding” as “immediately preceding.”
   • Canons: Presumption of consistent usage, series-qualifier canon, reliance on dictionary definitions (Webster’s Third, Black’s Law Dictionary), and policy canon favoring voter choice.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court approached the charter text the way it would approach a statute, emphasizing plain meaning and context:

1. Dictionary Evidence. Recognizing no statutory or charter definition of “next preceding,” the Court used lexicographical sources showing the term’s synonymy with “immediately preceding.”
2. Rejection of the “Presumption of Different Meaning.” The Board and Stein argued that, because Section 23(a) (mayoral residency) uses the phrase “immediately prior,” Section 3(a)’s different wording must intend a different time frame. The Court declined to apply that canon rigidly, observing that context and common usage override formal symmetry where they clash.
3. Structural Comparison to Rocco. Unlike the Westlake charter at issue in Rocco, Section 3(a) does not place the indefinite article “a” before “two years,” nor does it juxtapose “immediately” and “next” in the same sentence. Therefore, Rocco’s grammatical cue—already suspect—does not exist here.
4. Series-Qualifier Logic. The Court applied a modified version of the series-qualifier canon to hold that the two-year clause modifies both ward and at-large candidates. The absence of a repeated determiner (“the,” “an”) before the second noun phrase indicated that the modifier carries through the conjunction “and.”
5. Policy Rationale. A two-year immediately-preceding residency requirement promotes representational accountability by ensuring that candidates are recently, and continuously, embedded in the communities they seek to represent.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Precedential Realignment. Ohio election boards and lower courts must now treat “next preceding” and “immediately preceding” as interchangeable unless a charter or statute unmistakably distinguishes them. This undermines the practical authority of the Rocco lead opinion.
• Charter Drafting & Revision. Municipalities that relied on varying phrases to signal different residency durations may need to clarify their charters to preserve any intended distinctions.
• Candidacy Vetting. Boards of elections must verify continuous residency for the specified period right up to election day. Candidates who temporarily lived outside their districts during that window are vulnerable to protests and litigation.
• Litigation Strategy. Future litigants may invoke Elmore to challenge delayed interpretations of similar charter or statutory terms, while respondents will have to pivot to arguments other than linguistic distinction.
• Judicial Methodology. The decision reaffirms textualism tempered by pragmatic context, signaling reluctance to apply canons mechanically where textual evidence of synonymy is robust.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Writ of Prohibition: A court order preventing a lower tribunal or administrative body from acting outside its legal authority. Here, it stopped the Board of Elections from placing an ineligible candidate on the ballot.
• Quasi-Judicial Power: When an administrative agency (e.g., a board of elections) conducts hearings, weighs evidence, and issues decisions resembling court judgments, it acts quasi-judicially.
• Presumption of Consistent Usage: A drafting principle suggesting that different words within the same document are presumed to carry different meanings. The Court found the presumption overcome in this context.
• Series-Qualifier Canon: A rule of interpretation that a modifier placed before or after parallel items typically applies to each item unless grammatical cues indicate otherwise.
• “Next Preceding” v. “Immediately Preceding”: Though sometimes treated as distinct, ordinary English and statutory usage show they are synonyms; both refer to the period directly before a given event.

5. Conclusion

State ex rel. Elmore provides definitive guidance on how Ohio courts are to read time-bound eligibility clauses containing the phrase “next preceding.” By equating that phrase with “immediately preceding” and clarifying its application to both ward and at-large candidates, the Supreme Court of Ohio ensures uniform enforcement of residency requirements across the state’s chartered municipalities. The judgment resets the interpretive baseline, curtails reliance on the Rocco plurality, and underscores that linguistic nuance—while important—must bow to ordinary meaning and pragmatic context. Election officials, drafters of local charters, and prospective candidates should now proceed with the understanding that residency means continuous, immediate, and recent connection to the community one seeks to serve.