“Neutral-Factor” COVID-19 Delays and Mandatory Specificity: United States v. Flynn’s Clarification of Waiver Doctrine under the Speedy Trial Act and Rule 12

Introduction

United States v. Flynn, No. 22-4124, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on 20 August 2025, arises out of a sprawling multi-year narcotics and firearms conspiracy in Salt Lake City. Defendant-Appellant Christopher Kenneth Flynn was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and heroin and two firearms offenses. On appeal he advanced three principal contentions:

• Violation of the Speedy Trial Act (“STA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.
• Violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment.
• Insufficient evidence for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

The Tenth Circuit rejected each argument and affirmed the 236-month sentence. Of broader doctrinal importance, the panel refined the waiver framework for untimely speedy-trial objections, emphasized Rule 12(b)(3)/(c)(3) “good-cause” requirements, and treated COVID-19 institutional delays as a “truly neutral justification” rather than automatically chargeable to either side.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Speedy Trial Act. The court held that Flynn waived his STA challenges by failing to raise, with specificity, the ten discrete time periods he later contested on appeal. Citing United States v. Ray, 899 F.3d 852 (10th Cir. 2018), the panel reaffirmed a bright-line rule: a defendant’s pre-trial motion must “include the specific STA objection” later urged on appeal; otherwise the objection is forfeited.
2. Sixth Amendment. Rule 12(b)(3)(A)(iii) obliges a defendant to raise any Sixth-Amendment speedy-trial claim before trial if the basis is reasonably available. Flynn’s pro se reference to a generic “constitutional right” was too vague. Because he demonstrated no “good cause” for the omission, Rule 12(c)(3) rendered the claim waived.
3. Merits (alternative). Even assuming no waiver, balancing the Barker v. Wingo factors yielded no constitutional violation: most delay stemmed from (i) Flynn’s own conduct (seven attorney changes, multiple continuances, numerous motions) and (ii) pandemic-related court closures, which the panel treated as “neutral.” No actual prejudice existed.
4. Sufficiency of the Evidence (§ 924(c)). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government, a rational juror could find that Flynn’s transfer of a Cobra .380 pistol to kingpin Perez-Tapia was made in repayment of drug debt and thus “in furtherance of” the trafficking conspiracy.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Ray, 899 F.3d 852 (10th Cir. 2018) & United States v. Loughrin, 710 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2013)
  Both cases establish that STA objections not raised in a pre-trial motion are unreviewable. By invoking this line, the panel foreclosed plain-error review and required total waiver when specificity is lacking.
• Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)
  Provides the four-factor test (length, reason, assertion, prejudice) for Sixth-Amendment speedy-trial analysis. Flynn reaffirms but adapts it, classifying COVID-19 delays as “neutral,” echoing United States v. Keith, 61 F.4th 839 (10th Cir. 2023).
• United States v. Bowline, 917 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2019) & United States v. Vance, 893 F.3d 763 (10th Cir. 2018)
  Interpreting Rule 12(c)(3): untimely motions are barred absent good cause. Flynn incorporates Bowline’s reading, cementing a unified waiver standard for statutory and constitutional speedy-trial claims.
• United States v. Medina, 918 F.3d 774 (10th Cir. 2019) & United States v. Keith, 61 F.4th 839 (10th Cir. 2023)
  Provide recent Tenth-Circuit guidance on pandemic delays. The panel quotes Keith’s “truly neutral justification” language, converting dicta into an applied holding.
• United States v. Lowe, 117 F.4th 1253 (10th Cir. 2024); United States v. Dermen, 143 F.4th 1148 (10th Cir. 2025); United States v. Williams, 934 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2019)
  Outline the evidentiary test for § 924(c) and the standard for plain-error sufficiency review, which the panel applies to affirm Flynn’s firearms conviction.

Legal Reasoning

1. Specificity Requirement under § 3162(a)(2).
   Congress conditioned STA relief on a pre-trial motion “containing the reason” for the claimed violation. The court read “the reason” to mean the precise non-excluded days. Flynn’s generic assertion that the “first indictment was still pending” did not signal the ten periods later invoked. This textualist reading enforces docket management and prevents post-verdict sandbagging.
2. Rule 12 as a Unifying Waiver Mechanism.
   The panel treated statutory (STA) and constitutional (Sixth Amendment) speedy-trial rights symmetrically: both are subject to Rule 12(b)(3) timing, and both may be deemed waived under Rule 12(c)(3) absent good cause. This resolves a lingering ambiguity over whether constitutional speedy-trial claims are “jurisdictional” or “claims that can be forfeited.”
3. Classification of COVID-19 Delays as “Neutral.”
   Building on Keith, the court refused to weigh pandemic continuances against the government. Instead, such delays tipped neither way under Barker’s second factor. By doing so, the panel signaled a pragmatic understanding of unavoidable public-health postponements while preserving doctrinal symmetry: only strategic or negligent delays are attributed to the prosecution.
4. Defendant-Caused Delay Heavily Weighs Against Him.
   Flynn’s seven lawyer changes, twenty continuances, and voluminous pre-trial motions rendered the delay largely self-inflicted. Thus, even a six-year hiatus did not “affect the fairness” of the proceedings.
5. No Actual Prejudice Shown.
   The death of coconspirator-witness Martinez was insufficient: the Appellant failed to articulate exculpatory value. On a complete record, head conspirator Perez-Tapia’s live testimony supplied compelling inculpatory evidence.
6. Nexus Showing under § 924(c).
   Delivery of firearms as narcotics debt repayment constitutes use “in furtherance” because it secures continued drug supply and shields the operation. The court endorsed a functional, economic approach to the nexus element.

Impact of the Judgment

1. Tightened Waiver Doctrine. Counsel in the Tenth Circuit must now enumerate challenged STA days with precision. Post-trial identification of miscoded periods is unlikely to survive.
2. Uniform Application of Rule 12 Good-Cause Standard. The case closes a loophole whereby defendants attempted to elevate Sixth-Amendment claims above procedural default rules.
3. Pandemic Litigation Blueprint. Trial courts within the circuit may safely treat COVID-19 closures as neutral under Barker, minimizing appellate uncertainty.
4. § 924(c) “Debt-Repayment” Theory Strengthened. Prosecutors can rely on economic-benefit logic to prove “in furtherance” where firearms extinguish drug debts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Speedy Trial Act (STA): A federal statute giving defendants the right to be brought to trial within 70 days of indictment or first appearance, subject to specified “excludable time” (e.g., motion practice, continuances granted “in the ends of justice”). Violation requires dismissal, but only if the defendant timely moves.
• Rule 12(b)(3)/(c)(3): Federal procedural rules that obligate certain defenses—such as speedy-trial violations—to be made before trial when the basis is knowable. Untimely motions are waived unless the party shows “good cause.”
• Barker Factors: A four-part balancing test for constitutional speedy-trial claims: (1) length of delay, (2) reasons, (3) timely assertion, (4) prejudice.
• “In Furtherance of” (§ 924(c)): Not mere possession of a firearm during a crime, but possession that advances or promotes the crime—for example, protecting drugs, intimidating rivals, or, as here, repaying drug debt.
• Ends-of-Justice Continuance: A trial postponement the court may grant when the interests of justice outweigh the public’s and defendant’s speedy-trial interests. Proper findings must be placed on the record.

Conclusion

United States v. Flynn is less about blockbuster substantive criminal law than it is about procedural rigor. By insisting on specific, contemporaneous speedy-trial objections and integrating Rule 12’s good-cause requirement into both statutory and constitutional analyses, the Tenth Circuit fortified the waiver barrier. The decision also harmonizes pandemic-era jurisprudence by classifying COVID-19 delays as neutral under Barker. On the evidentiary front, Flynn broadens the “economic nexus” interpretation of § 924(c) by declaring that using firearms to settle drug debts furthers trafficking objectives. Practitioners should treat the case as a cautionary tale: safeguard speedy-trial rights early and precisely, or risk irrevocable forfeiture. Trial courts, conversely, gain clearer guidance on how to docket complex cases amid unforeseen public crises without fear of reversal.