“More Than a Lunch-Group”: Seventh Circuit Re-Affirms the High Bar for Proving Pretext at Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases

Introduction

Michelle Hagen, a 54-year-old high-school principal, was transferred to an elementary school and received a consequent reduction in pay. Believing the decision was driven by age and sex discrimination, she sued the Fond du Lac School District under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment to the District, concluding that Hagen had not produced evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer discrimination. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Judges Kirsch, Lee, and Kolar) affirmed.

The opinion—designated “Nonprecedential” under Circuit Rule 32.1—nonetheless offers a thorough restatement of the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs at the summary-judgment phase, particularly regarding pretext. The Court underscores that anecdotal evidence (such as participation in an informal “lunch group”) and temporal proximity, without more, do not create a genuine dispute of material fact. While the ruling does not create binding precedent, it clarifies and amplifies existing standards, providing practical guidance for litigants and lower courts alike.

Summary of the Judgment

• Standard Applied: De novo review of summary judgment; plaintiff must either satisfy the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework or otherwise present evidence from which a reasonable jury could find discrimination (Ortiz v. Werner).
• Nondiscriminatory Reason Offered: Superintendent Sebert believed Hagen would be a “better fit” at the elementary level because of persistent climate problems at the high school and the comparative success of her younger male colleague, Matt Steinbarth.
• Pretext Analysis: Court held that Hagen’s evidence—Sebert’s participation in a mostly-male lunch group, alleged favoritism toward its members, suspicious timing, and Steinbarth’s purported lack of qualifications—did not expose the proffered reason as “a lie rather than an oddity or an error.”
• Causation Standards Reiterated: “Motivating factor” (Title VII) vs. “but-for cause” (ADEA).
• Disposition: Summary judgment for the District affirmed; no reasonable jury could find that age or sex discrimination caused the reassignment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) – Provides the canonical burden-shifting framework. The Court acknowledged the framework but skipped directly to pretext because the defendant articulated a neutral reason.
• Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) – Emphasizes a holistic view of evidence. The panel applied Ortiz after completing the McDonnell Douglas analysis, ensuring consistency.
• Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) – Established “but-for” causation for ADEA claims; reiterated here.
• Igasaki v. Illinois Dept. of Financial & Professional Regulation, 988 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2021) – Clarified the different causation standards and prima-facie elements; cited for both points.
• Wolf v. Buss (America) Inc., 77 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 1996) – Discussed situations where multiple shifting reasons can create an inference of pretext. Hagen relied on Wolf, but the Court distinguished it because only one reason was actually offered by the District.
• Paschall v. Tube Processing Corp., 28 F.4th 805 (7th Cir. 2022) – Cited for the summary-judgment standard of viewing facts favorably to the non-movant.
• McCann v. Badger Mining Corp., 965 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2020) – “Suspicious timing” alone rarely defeats summary judgment; directly applied to Hagen’s timing argument.
• Vassileva v. City of Chicago, 118 F.4th 869 (7th Cir. 2024) – Endorses bypassing the prima-facie stage when it overlaps with pretext; the panel cited this to streamline its discussion.
• Cunningham v. Austin, 125 F.4th 783 (7th Cir. 2025) – For the proposition that minor differences in qualifications do not imply pretext.

Legal Reasoning

1. Prima facie vs. Pretext Shortcut
   Because the School District offered a neutral justification, the Court focused on whether that justification was pretextual, citing Vassileva. If the stated reason is not a cover-up for discrimination, the plaintiff’s case fails regardless of whether she technically established every prima-facie element.
2. Narrow Interpretation of “Better Fit”
   The phrase “better fit” can sometimes mask discriminatory motives. Here, however, objective evidence (multi-year climate surveys, performance evaluations and targeted remedial support) substantiated Sebert’s judgment that Hagen was underperforming in school climate—an area in which Steinbarth excelled. This objective corroboration prevented a jury from viewing the “better fit” rationale as dishonest.
3. Anecdotal Evidence: The Lunch Group
   Hagen sought to frame Sebert’s lunchtime camaraderie with younger male administrators as evidence of a “boys’ club.” The panel held that:
   • Mere socialization does not equal discriminatory animus.
   • Alleged favoritism, standing alone, does not violate Title VII or the ADEA unless tied to protected-class status.
   • Disparate treatment allegations (different discipline, inflated ratings) were unsupported by policy deviations or comparability of performance.
4. Timing and Mixed Motives
   Although Sebert invited Steinbarth to the lunch group around the time of the reassignment, the Court applied McCann to reiterate that “suspicious timing alone is rarely enough,” especially where legitimate performance-based explanations exist.
5. Qualification Comparison
   Hagen argued that Steinbarth lacked high-school experience. The Court pointed out that Hagen herself lacked such experience when initially hired, and that Steinbarth had significant tenure within the District. Under Cunningham, marginal differences in credentials cannot show pretext absent evidence of a lie or bias.
6. Holistic Review Under Ortiz
   Even aggregating all evidence—lunch group, timing, qualifications—no reasonable jury could conclude age was the but-for cause or sex was even a motivating factor.

Impact of the Judgment

Although labeled nonprecedential, the decision’s detailed engagement with pretext is likely to influence:

• Litigation Strategy – Plaintiffs in the Seventh Circuit will need more than workplace trivia or proximity in time to survive summary judgment; corroborating documentation, policy breaches, or direct evidence becomes essential.
• Employer Policies – Boards and HR departments may feel vindicated in relying on documented performance metrics and climate surveys when making transfers, provided the data is consistent and contemporaneously recorded.
• Judicial Economy – The case aligns with a growing line of post-Ortiz opinions favoring streamlined summary-judgment analyses, reducing needless duplication between “prima facie” and “pretext” discussions.
• Non-traditional Evidence – The opinion implicitly sets cautionary limits on the probative value of social-club type evidence unless paired with policy violations or direct discriminatory statements.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Title VII vs. ADEA Causation
  • Title VII (sex discrimination): Plaintiff wins if sex was a “motivating factor,” even if other factors also played a role.
  • ADEA (age discrimination): Plaintiff must show age was the “but-for cause,” meaning the adverse action would not have occurred without considering age.
• Pretext
  In employment law, “pretext” means a phony reason offered by the employer to hide illegal discrimination. The plaintiff must prove not merely that the reason is wrong, but that the employer doesn’t believe it.
• Suspicious Timing
  An adverse action taken soon after a protected activity or event might look suspicious. But courts require additional evidence—such as inconsistent statements or policy violations—to convert suspicion into a triable issue.
• Nonprecedential Disposition
  The Court has chosen not to publish the opinion as binding precedent. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, it may still be cited, but its authority is persuasive, not controlling.

Conclusion

In Hagen v. Fond du Lac School District, the Seventh Circuit reiterates that evidence of pretext must be concrete. Social interactions, temporal proximity, and modest disparities in qualifications do not suffice absent proof that the employer’s performance-based rationale is dishonest. The decision reinforces the split causation standards between Title VII and the ADEA and exemplifies post-Ortiz efficiency by collapsing the prima-facie and pretext stages when appropriate. As such, the ruling serves as a cautionary tale for plaintiffs and an instructive roadmap for employers documenting legitimate performance concerns.