“Mini-Cabins Are Houses” – Sixth Circuit Extends Curtilage Protection and Denies Qualified Immunity in Mockeridge v. Harvey

Introduction

In Michael & Susan Mockeridge v. Harry Harvey, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit confronted a modern twist on an old Fourth Amendment question: may local officials, investigating potential code violations, step off neighboring property into the clearing of a private 40-acre woodland retreat, peer through the windows of five small “mini-cabins,” take measurements, and gather evidence without a warrant or consent?

Plaintiffs Michael and Susan Mockeridge installed five 200-square-foot prefabricated structures near their primary cabin to serve as family sleeping quarters. Alarmed neighbors feared the creation of an unlicensed public campground and summoned three officials:

• Harry Harvey – Alcona County building inspector
• David Schmidt – Environmental health coordinator (District Health Dept. No. 2)
• Kenneth Gibson – Caledonia Township zoning administrator

Escorted by the complaining neighbor, the officials entered through dense woods, crossed the property line, completed a visual and physical inspection, and later mailed the Mockeridges a letter threatening regulatory enforcement. When the County demanded after-the-fact permit penalties, the owners sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging an unreasonable search and seeking damages. The district court granted summary judgment for the owners, denied qualified immunity to the officials, and certified only damages for trial. The officials appealed; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Mathis, held:

1. The five mini-cabins are “houses” under the Fourth Amendment, and their surrounding clearings constitute protected curtilage.
2. By physically entering that curtilage to gather information, the officials performed a search under the property-based approach revived in United States v. Jones (2012) and Florida v. Jardines (2013).
3. No exception to the warrant requirement—particularly not a “de minimis” or administrative-inspection exception—justified the warrantless entry.
4. Precedent had “clearly established” the unlawfulness of such conduct as of at least 2019 (Gardner v. Evans, Morgan v. Fairfield County, and Watson v. Pearson), so qualified immunity was unavailable.
5. Because the appeal raised pure questions of law, the court possessed interlocutory jurisdiction under Mitchell v. Forsyth and Johnson v. Jones.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity, dismissed cross-appeals and motions as moot, and left only the damages phase pending below.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Florida v. Jardines (2013) – Recognized that a license exists for visitors (including officers) to approach a front door, knock, and depart, but no implied license permits wandering elsewhere on curtilage. The Sixth Circuit used Jardines as the benchmark for “knock-and-talk” scope.
• Collins v. Virginia (2018) – Confirmed curtilage sanctity even when an automobile sits there. Supports the notion that physical intrusion on curtilage is a search.
• United States v. Dunn (1987) – Provided the four-factor test (proximity, enclosure, use, protection from observation) to define curtilage. Applied to the 80-foot cluster around the mini-cabins.
• Widgren v. Maple Grove Township (6th Cir. 2005) – Suggested property assessors could enter curtilage for “naked-eye” assessment; the court distinguished and arguably limited Widgren in light of post-2012 Supreme Court jurisprudence.
• Morgan v. Fairfield County (6th Cir. 2018) & Watson v. Pearson (6th Cir. 2019) – Clarified that Jardines principles apply in this circuit; Morgan gave future officers explicit warning.
• Gardner v. Evans (6th Cir. 2019) – Held that warrantless housing-code inspections without pre-compliance review violate clearly established rights.
• United States v. Jacobsen (1984) – Source of the “de minimis intrusion” balancing; court found the officials’ interests weak compared with privacy invasion.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Property-Based Search Test Supremacy. Emphasizing the Supreme Court’s renewed focus on physical trespass, the court bypassed the Katz reasonable-expectation test and held that crossing the property line and collecting evidence was sufficient to label the conduct a search.
2. Curtilage Determination. Applying Dunn factors, the court stressed proximity (mere feet), use (immediate sleeping quarters), and visual protection (dense forest, window blinds, locks) to rule that the clearing immediately surrounding each mini-cabin fell within curtilage.
3. Classification of Mini-Cabins as “Houses.” Drawing upon dicta spanning back to 1948 (Roberson) and commentary on hunting cabins, the panel rejected any notion that size, plumbing, or intermittent occupancy diminishes Fourth Amendment status.
4. No Warrant Exception Applied. The officials failed to show exigency, consent, special needs, or administrative-inspection compliance (which would require a warrant substitute such as pre-compliance review). The “de minimis” claim collapsed under Jacobsen.
5. Clearly Established Prong. Because multiple Sixth Circuit panels after Jardines warned officials that wandering beyond the front approach without a warrant is unlawful, any reasonable health, building, or zoning officer would know the search was unconstitutional by 2021.

C. Potential Impact

1. Administrative Enforcement Nationwide. Local inspectors, surveyors, and zoning officers must now treat even small or prefabricated structures as full “houses” once owners use them for dwelling purposes. The decision curtails common practice in rural jurisdictions of “informal walk-throughs” on private land.

2. Clarification of Widgren’s Reach. By narrowing Widgren to tax-assessment scenarios and suggesting it may not survive Jones/Jardines, the court removes a frequent defense used by townships in the Sixth Circuit.

3. Extension of Curtilage Distance. The decision reinforces that no fixed measurement limits curtilage; 80-foot clearance in a forest can still be intimate with the dwelling. Future litigants will likely cite Mockeridge when arguing for expansive curtilage in rural settings.

4. Qualified-Immunity Line. Officials across fields—code, health, environmental—now have unmistakable notice; post-2025 incidents of similar warrantless inspections could invite not only § 1983 liability but also punitive damages.

5. Property-Rights Advocacy. The opinion furnishes property-rights litigators with fresh language equating the “frail cottage” with luxury residences, limiting governmental latitude on secluded private lands.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Curtilage: The immediate area surrounding a home—yards, porches, driveways—seen by law as part of the home itself.
• Implied License (“Knock-and-Talk”): The socially accepted privilege to walk up the normal route to the front door, knock, and, if unanswered, leave. It does not include wandering side-yards, backyards, or off-path approaches.
• Qualified Immunity: A legal shield protecting government officials from monetary liability unless they violate “clearly established” rights. Courts ask (1) Was there a constitutional violation? and (2) Was the right clearly established?
• Property-Based vs. Privacy-Expectation Tests: Under the property (trespass) test, any physical intrusion to obtain information can be a search. Under Katz, a search also occurs when government violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, even without physical entry.
• De Minimis Exception: Very minor intrusions may be excused if outweighed by significant governmental interests. The Sixth Circuit found the officials’ interests here trivial.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Mockeridge v. Harvey sets an unambiguous precedent: prefabricated mini-cabins erected for sleeping are protected “houses,” and their curtilage remains sacrosanct against warrantless, non-consensual administrative inspections. By harmonizing Supreme Court property-based search doctrine with modern rural-property realities, the court tightened the boundaries of implied license, clarified that Widgren’s assessor carve-out is narrow, and broadcast to code-enforcement officers that they must seek warrants—or risk personal liability. In the broader constitutional landscape, Mockeridge underscores the enduring vitality of the Fourth Amendment across every dwelling, from “the most frail cottage” to the humblest mini-cabin nestled in Michigan’s woods.