“Loud-Boisterous-Unreasonable”: Whitehurst v. Town of Sullivan’s Island and the Constitutional Resilience of General-Noise Ordinances

Introduction

In Meredith Logan Whitehurst v. Town of Sullivan’s Island, Opinion No. 28290 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 2025), the South Carolina Supreme Court revisited the perennial tension between local public-order regulations and the First Amendment’s robust protection of expression. After a late-night Uber quarrel culminated in profane, xenophobic yelling on a quiet residential street, Whitehurst was convicted under two subsections of the Town’s Disorderly Conduct Ordinance that prohibit “loud, boisterous and/or unreasonable” noise likely to disturb the public. She mounted a four-pronged constitutional attack: content-based suppression, vagueness, lack of fair notice, and evidentiary error. Justice Verdin’s majority opinion (joined by three Justices) rejects each argument and affirms, while Chief Justice Kittredge pens a vigorous dissent focused on vagueness and content-sensitive enforcement. The ruling sets a statewide precedent that:

• A local noise ordinance using ordinary modifiers (“loud,” “boisterous,” “unreasonable”) coupled with a scienter requirement is facially and as-applied constitutional.
• Such an ordinance constitutes a permissible, content-neutral time-place-manner restriction even when the underlying speech is protected but delivered at disruptive volume.
• Vagueness challenges falter when ordinary language plus context and intent sufficiently delineate the proscribed conduct.

Summary of the Judgment

1. First Amendment Claim. The Court holds the Ordinance is content-neutral; it targets decibel-like manner of speech, not its message. Under intermediate scrutiny, it is narrowly tailored to the Town’s significant interest in residential tranquility and leaves ample alternative channels of communication.
2. Vagueness Claim. The terms “loud,” “boisterous,” and “unreasonable,” read with a mens-rea clause (“with the purpose of causing … or likely to cause …”) give fair notice and constrain police discretion; therefore, the Ordinance is not void for vagueness.
3. Fair-Notice / Multiple-Subsection Claim. Whitehurst’s conclusory due-process arguments are deemed abandoned for lack of supporting authority.
4. Video-Suppression Claim. Objections to chain of custody and alleged incompleteness are likewise abandoned and, irrespective, meritless.
The conviction and $1,040 fine stand.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) – Framework for content-neutral time-place-manner regulation adopted; Court analogises Town’s interest in “residential quiet” to New York’s in Ward.
• City of Beaufort v. Baker, 315 S.C. 146 (1993) – South Carolina precedent that “loud and unseemly” ordinance survived First Amendment and vagueness scrutiny; provides near-controlling authority.
• Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) – Supreme Court’s seminal approval of “loud and raucous” ban invoked to show ordinary meaning suffices.
• Carolina Youth Action Project v. Wilson, 60 F.4th 770 (4th Cir. 2023) – Whitehurst’s primary reliance; majority distinguishes it (applied only to students, lacked modifiers, and omitted scienter).
• Additional supportive cases: Roy v. City of Monroe (5th Cir. 2020); Eanes v. State (Md. 1990); City of Columbia v. Brown, 316 S.C. 432 (Ct. App. 1994).

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Content Neutrality Determination
   • Text regulates volume/disturbance, making no reference to subject matter.
   • Officer testimony that volume alone could support the charge buttresses neutrality.
   • Ward’s “justified without reference to content” test satisfied.
2. Narrow Tailoring & Significant Interest
   • Sullivan’s Island is “primarily residential.”
   • Ordinance does not require the “least restrictive means”; simply must not burden substantially more speech than necessary.
3. Vagueness Rebuttal
   • Ordinary dictionary meanings & case law validate “loud,” “boisterous,” “unreasonable.”
   • Contextual limitations (“public place,” “near highway,” “public peace broken”) plus intent clause narrow application.
   • Comparison to Baker: identical linguistic structure upheld previously.
4. Mens Rea as Safeguard
   • Willfulness or foreseeable disturbance requirement prevents conviction based solely on subjective listener annoyance.
5. Standing & Preservation
   • Because her conduct plainly falls within subsections (8) & (12), Court questions but bypasses need for facial analysis of untouched subsections.

3. Impact of the Decision

• Statewide Guidance. Municipalities may confidently retain or draft “loud-boisterous-unreasonable” ordinances provided they (a) apply across content, (b) include a scienter or likelihood clause, and (c) situate the prohibition in public-peace context.
• Litigation Strategy Shift. Defendants challenging similar laws in South Carolina must now emphasise as-applied targeting or discriminatory enforcement rather than facial vagueness.
• Regional Influence. The ruling furnishes sister states a post-Carolina Youth Action Project blueprint to defend general noise laws: add modifiers and scienter.
• Dissent’s Foothold. Chief Justice Kittredge’s dissent may inspire future litigants to develop evidentiary records showing actual content-based enforcement, reviving vagueness or retaliation claims under Gonzalez v. Trevino (U.S. 2024).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Time–Place–Manner Restriction – A rule controlling when, where, or how you speak, not what you say; constitutional if it is content-neutral, serves an important goal, is narrowly tailored, and leaves other ways to speak.
• Content Neutrality – The government’s rule does not depend on topic or viewpoint; think of a speed limit that applies to every car regardless of the bumper sticker.
• Vagueness Doctrine – Laws must give ordinary people clear notice of prohibited conduct and must not invite arbitrary policing. If wording is too fuzzy, the law is unconstitutional.
• Scienter – Latin for “knowingly.” A law that punishes only if you purposefully (or foreseeably) cause harm is less likely to be vague because it narrows who can be found guilty.
• Intermediate Scrutiny – Middle constitutional test: the rule must significantly further an important government interest and must not excessively burden speech.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of South Carolina’s decision in Whitehurst fortifies municipal authority to curb nocturnal or disruptive noise without infringing constitutional speech rights. By emphasising ordinary language, contextual limits, and a purposeful-or-likely mens rea, the Court signals that general public-peace ordinances will survive both First Amendment and vagueness attacks when thoughtfully drafted and evenly enforced. Yet, the pointed dissent underscores a latent danger: if enforcement drifts toward punishing offensive ideas rather than decibels, identical ordinances could falter under the very doctrines the majority invokes. Practitioners, lawmakers, and civil-rights advocates should therefore treat Whitehurst as both a shield for reasonable regulation and a reminder that constitutional robustness ultimately depends on neutral, even-handed application.