“Law” Includes Local Ordinances: The Michigan Supreme Court’s Re-calibration of County Separation-of-Powers in Hackel v. Macomb County Board of Commissioners

Introduction

In Mark A. Hackel v. Macomb County Board of Commissioners, Docket No. 166363 (decided 16 June 2025), the Michigan Supreme Court delivered a unanimous decision that profoundly clarifies the extent to which a county’s legislative body may check the executive branch through the ordinary ordinance-making power. At issue was whether the Board of Commissioners (the “Commission”) could compel County Executive Mark Hackel to grant its Director of Legislative Affairs real-time, read-only access to the County’s financial-management software—an access right embedded in the Commission’s annual appropriations ordinance since 2017.

Lower courts had sided with the Executive, holding that such an ordinance impermissibly infringed the executive’s “control” over county departments under § 3.5(a) of the Macomb County Home Rule Charter. Reversing those rulings, the Supreme Court declared that:

“Section 3.5(a) authorizes limitations imposed not only by the Charter itself but also by ‘law,’ and in this context ‘law’ includes a validly enacted county ordinance.”

By elevating county ordinances to the status of “law” for separation-of-powers purposes, the Court created a precedent that will resonate far beyond Macomb County, affecting budgeting transparency, intra-county litigation, and the drafting of charters and ordinances across Michigan.

Summary of the Judgment

Holding. A duly-enacted county ordinance is “law” within the meaning of § 3.5(a) of the Macomb Charter; therefore, Ordinance 2017-04 § 10(H) validly requires the Executive to provide real-time, read-only software access to the Commission’s designee.
Disposition. Court of Appeals judgment reversed; matter remanded to circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Vote. 6-0 (Justice Hood not participating).
Key Reasoning. The ordinary meaning of “law,” the Charter’s textual structure, and Michigan’s home-rule framework all point to a broad reading that embraces local ordinances unless the Charter expressly narrows the term.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court positioned its ruling within a line of Michigan and federal cases recognizing ordinances as binding “law” where permitted by higher authority:

People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich 611 (1889) – oft-quoted for the proposition that a local ordinance, when authorized, is “as much entitled to respectful obedience…as a law enacted by the Legislature.” The Court used this case to support the parity between ordinances and statutes.
Bivens v. City of Grand Rapids, 443 Mich 391 (1993) – confirmed that an ordinance exceeding charter authority is void. The Court contrasted Bivens to show that Hackel involves no direct conflict with the Charter.
Wayne Cty. v. Wayne Cty. Retirement Comm., 267 Mich App 230 (2005) – supplies the rule that counties may not create “greater or lesser rights” than the Charter; here, however, the Court reasoned the Charter itself invited limitation “by law.”
Detroit v. Qualls, 434 Mich 340 (1990) – for the presumption of ordinance validity.
US Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Guenther, 281 U.S. 34 (1930) – Supreme Court precedent interpreting “law” generically to include municipal ordinances.
Casco Twp. v. Secretary of State, 472 Mich 566 (2005) and Fraser Twp. v. Haney, 509 Mich 18 (2022) – establishing standards for declaratory relief and mandamus, framing the Court’s remedial authority.

B. Core Legal Reasoning

Textual Interpretation of § 3.5(a). The Charter grants the Executive control over departments “except as otherwise provided by this Charter or law.” The majority observed:
- “Law” is left unmodified—no adjective like “state” or “statutory” appears—implying an intentionally broad scope.
- Elsewhere in the Charter, the drafters use limiting phrases (“state law,” “federal law”), demonstrating that when narrowing was desired it was done explicitly.
Ordinary Meaning of “Law.” Dictionaries (Black’s, Merriam-Webster) define “law” capaciously, easily encompassing local enactments.
Home-Rule Framework. Under Const. 1963 art. 7 § 2 and MCL 46.11(j), counties possess ordinance power over matters of “county concern.” Budget and financial reporting plainly fall within that realm.
Compatibility & Non-Conflict. No Charter or state provision expressly conflicts with the access requirement; thus, the ordinance stands unless preempted—an argument no party raised.
Presumption of Validity. Detroit v. Qualls’ presumption was never overcome: the Executive showed no statutory or constitutional barrier.
Separation of Powers Re-balanced. The Court stressed that the Commission’s authority is concurrent and overlapping in budget matters; providing information access does not usurp executive control but facilitates informed legislative decision-making.

C. Anticipated Impact

County Governance State-wide. The definition of “law” announced today will guide charter interpretation in Wayne County (the only other charter county) and influence general-law counties when they adopt or amend charters.
Transparency & Fiscal Oversight. Legislative bodies are empowered to obtain direct digital data, reducing dependence on executive-filtered reports.
Charter Drafting. Future charters may more precisely guard executive prerogatives by adding “state law” or similar qualifiers—absent such limits, ordinances will likely be deemed “law.”
Litigation Posture. Executive officials resisting legislative mandates must now show conflict with higher law, not merely argue departmental “control.”
Technology & Records Access. Expect ordinances compelling dashboards, APIs, or software access in budgeting, procurement, and HR systems; the case green-lights such modern transparency tools.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Charter County vs. General-Law County. A charter county drafts its own “mini-constitution,” while general-law counties operate under state default statutes.
Home Rule. Michigan’s Constitution allows local units to legislate on local matters unless preempted by state law.
Mandamus. A court order compelling a public official to perform a clear legal duty.
Real-Time, Read-Only Access. A user can view live data within a system but cannot alter it—ensuring transparency without risking data integrity.
Preemption. When a higher law (state or federal) overrides a local ordinance. The Court found none here.
Appropriations Ordinance. A local law adopting a budget and authorizing spending for a fiscal year.

Conclusion

Hackel v. Macomb County Board of Commissioners does more than resolve a six-year standoff over software credentials; it re-defines the reach of county ordinances within Michigan’s constitutional architecture. By holding that the term “law” in a county charter presumptively includes local ordinances, the Supreme Court endowed county legislatures with a potent instrument to shape the contours of executive authority—provided they legislate within the bounds of state law and the charter text. The decision simultaneously advances governmental transparency by affirming the Commission’s right to contemporaneous fiscal information necessary for sound budgeting. Going forward, drafters, litigators, and public officials must assume that unless a charter unmistakably says otherwise, “law” means every valid source of positive law within the jurisdiction, ordinances included.