“Lawfully Entitled to Have Applied” – Ohio Supreme Court Bars Dependents from Reviving a Denied Scheduled-Loss Claim
Commentary on State ex rel. Byk v. Industrial Commission (2025-Ohio-2044)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State ex rel. Byk v. Industrial Commission (2025-Ohio-2044) resolves a long-running controversy over whether a dependent may obtain scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B) & 4123.60 when the injured worker’s own scheduled-loss claim was previously denied.

The dispute arose after Bohdanus Byk suffered catastrophic brain injury in 2012, was denied scheduled-loss compensation for loss of use of his arms and legs in 2014, and died in 2015. His widow, Pin Cha Byk (“Byk”), reapplied for the same award as a dependent, arguing that her claim was independent and that the earlier denial was legally flawed. The Industrial Commission rejected the request; the Tenth District Court of Appeals granted a limited writ ordering a new merits review; and both the Commission and the employer, Republic Steel, appealed.

In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate judgment and denied the writ. The Court held that, under the plain language of R.C. 4123.60, a dependent may seek compensation only if, at the moment of death, the decedent “would have been lawfully entitled to have applied” for the award. Because Mr. Byk’s claim had already been finally denied, he possessed no lawful entitlement to reapply, and his widow could not revive it.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: A dependent is ineligible for scheduled-loss compensation under R.C. 4123.60 when the decedent’s identical claim was denied before death and the decedent therefore lacked a legal basis to apply again.
• Disposition: Judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed; writ of mandamus denied.
• Key Statutes Interpreted: R.C. 4123.57(B) (scheduled-loss award); R.C. 4123.60 (payment to dependents of compensation unpaid at death).
• Core Rationale: The statute’s phrase “lawfully entitled to have applied” requires an extant legal right to file a fresh application. Once the Commission issues a final order denying the specific scheduled-loss compensation, res judicata applies, and the worker has no lawful entitlement to file a second identical application—absent statutory language authorizing such refiling or a successful invocation of the Commission’s limited continuing jurisdiction.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. State ex rel. Smith v. Industrial Commission, 2014-Ohio-513
   The 2014 SHO had relied on Smith—which limited scheduled-loss awards where loss of function stems from brain injury—to deny Mr. Byk’s claim. The Tenth District later examined whether Smith was properly applied. The Supreme Court sidestepped that substantive debate, holding it irrelevant once the threshold of “lawful entitlement to apply” was unmet.
2. State ex rel. Nicholson v. Copperweld Steel Co., 1996-Ohio-198
   Established that dependents’ claims under R.C. 4123.60 are separate from the worker’s rights but still bound by statutory prerequisites.
3. State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Industrial Commission, 1998-Ohio-174
   Confirmed the application of res judicata to Commission proceedings, reinforcing the Court’s conclusion that earlier denial barred re-litigation.
4. State ex rel. Walters v. Industrial Commission, 2024-Ohio-552, and State ex rel. Zarbana Industries v. Industrial Commission, 2021-Ohio-3669
   Reiterated standards for mandamus relief—clear legal right, clear legal duty—which the Court found unsatisfied here.
5. Statutory-construction cases (Caldwell v. Whirlpool, 2024-Ohio-1625; AutoZone Stores, 2024-Ohio-5519)
   Supplied interpretive canons: respect for plain meaning and avoidance of judicial insertion of words.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning marched through three logical stages:

1. Textual Focus on R.C. 4123.60. The Court emphasized the precise wording “would have been lawfully entitled to have applied,” distinguishing entitlement to apply from entitlement to receive compensation.
2. No Statutory Authority to Re-Apply. Unlike other subdivisions of R.C. 4123.57 (e.g., permanent-partial applications that may be “refiled” or “subsequent” applications expressly permitted), subsection (B) contains no language authorizing a repeat application for an already-decided scheduled-loss claim. The absence of such authorization, coupled with the presence of express re-filing provisions elsewhere in the statute, led to the inference that repeat filings are disallowed.
3. Res Judicata & Limited Continuing Jurisdiction. Because the prior decision was final, res judicata attached, barring identical later claims. The Court acknowledged the Commission’s continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52 but clarified that it is triggered only by narrow grounds (new and changed circumstances, fraud, clear mistake, etc.). Neither Mr. Byk nor Mrs. Byk invoked those grounds before the Commission.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

• Dependents’ Claims Tightened. Survivors can no longer rely on alleged errors in a decedent’s unsuccessful scheduled-loss application; unless the worker could lawfully file a fresh application at death, dependents are barred.
• Incentive to Preserve Errors Promptly. Injured workers must challenge erroneous denials through timely mandamus actions. Dependents cannot resurrect forfeited opportunities post-mortem.
• Clearer Boundary for R.C. 4123.60. The Court’s distinction between “entitled to an award” and “entitled to apply” will inform future litigation over unpaid or unfiled claims, reducing uncertainty about the statute’s reach.
• Administrative Efficiency. The ruling discourages serial or duplicative scheduled-loss filings, reinforcing finality and minimizing repetitive Commission proceedings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Scheduled-Loss Compensation (R.C. 4123.57(B))

A lump-sum/weekly benefit for permanent loss or loss of use of specific body parts (e.g., 225 weeks for an arm), payable regardless of wage-loss or total disability.

R.C. 4123.60

Allows dependents to collect compensation that the worker could have lawfully applied for but did not receive before death. The dependent must file within one year of death and only if the worker had a legal right to file at that moment.

Res Judicata

A doctrine preventing the same parties from re-litigating an issue finally decided. Applied to Industrial Commission proceedings, it bars repetitive claims absent statutory authorization.

Continuing Jurisdiction (R.C. 4123.52)

The Commission’s limited power to revisit previous orders upon proof of new circumstances, fraud, or clear mistake. It is not a blanket right to re-file denied claims.

Writ of Mandamus

Extraordinary court order compelling a public body to perform a clear legal duty when no adequate legal remedy exists. Requires proof by clear and convincing evidence.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State ex rel. Byk sharply delineates the boundaries of R.C. 4123.60. By holding that dependents may proceed only when the decedent had a presently valid legal right to file a fresh application, the Court prevents collateral attacks on final Industrial Commission orders and preserves the principle of res judicata in workers’ compensation proceedings.

Practitioners should advise injured workers to challenge adverse scheduled-loss determinations promptly and, where appropriate, invoke the Commission’s limited continuing jurisdiction rather than rely on dependents to revive claims later. Meanwhile, dependents must now focus on demonstrating the decedent’s standing to file at death—an inquiry independent of whether the original denial was legally correct.

Ultimately, Byk underscores the General Assembly’s precise statutory framework: absent express authority to re-apply, final means final. In the broader legal context, the decision strengthens procedural finality, curtails repetitive litigation, and clarifies a previously murky phrase—“lawfully entitled to have applied”—that will guide Ohio workers’ compensation jurisprudence for years to come.