“Label Does Not Confer Jurisdiction” – Seventh Circuit Clarifies Functional Test for Appealable Colorado River-Style Stays

Introduction

Case: East Gate-Logistics Park Chicago, LLC v. CenterPoint Properties Trust, Nos. 24-2696 & 24-2813 (7th Cir. July 21 2025).
Panel: Easterbrook, Rovner & Lee, JJ. – Opinion by Easterbrook, J.

The decision arises out of a turf battle in the “Joliet Intermodal Zone,” where competing developers seek to route heavy trucks either over a privately funded toll bridge built by CenterPoint or through an alternative access road secured by East Gate/NorthPoint. When the Illinois state court preliminarily enjoined East Gate’s access road, the East Gate parties filed a federal antitrust action claiming that the underlying Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between CenterPoint and local governments constituted an illegal market-allocation scheme. The federal district judge:

Rejected CenterPoint’s dismissal motions under Rooker-Feldman and Noerr-Pennington.
Stayed the federal case—invoking Colorado River—until the parallel state contract dispute is resolved.

Both sides noticed appeals: East Gate from the stay; CenterPoint from the denial of its motions to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion addresses a single gateway issue: Does it have appellate jurisdiction over those interlocutory orders? The answer—no. Because the stay does not place the federal plaintiffs “effectively out of court,” it is not a final, appealable order; and the denial of Rule 12 motions is routinely non-appealable.

Summary of the Judgment

The court dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
A stay, even when labelled “Colorado River abstention,” is appealable under 28 U.S.C. §1291 only if it functions as a dismissal or otherwise renders the parties “effectively out of federal court.” That was not the case here because federal antitrust claims are within exclusive federal jurisdiction and remain untouched by the state litigation.
The collateral-order doctrine does not supply jurisdiction because the order resolves only a timing issue, not an important question separate from the merits.
The denial of the Rooker-Feldman and Noerr-Pennington motions is a non-final, non-appealable interlocutory ruling.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) – Provides the framework for abstention where parallel state and federal suits exist. The Seventh Circuit distinguishes genuine Colorado River abstention (which can be appealable because it ends federal involvement) from a mere stay for case-management purposes.
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) & Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) – Classical examples where the Supreme Court treated abstention orders as effectively final, thus appealable. The panel explains why the current case fails the same functional test: the core federal antitrust claims remain to be adjudicated in federal court.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962) – Source of the “effectively out of court” formulation for abstention finality.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) & D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) – Relied upon by CenterPoint below; rejection of those arguments remains unreviewed until final judgment.
Noerr / Pennington doctrine – Raised defensively by CenterPoint; its denial also remains unreviewable until final judgment.
Seventh Circuit precedents: Loughran v. Wells Fargo (2021), R.C. Wegman Constr. Co. v. Admiral Ins. (2012), Croffy v. Chicago Heights (1988) – Help demarcate when a stay is or is not effectively final.

Legal Reasoning

The panel employs a functional, not formal, approach to finality:

“Jurisdiction depends on what the order does and not what name the district judge applied.” – Easterbrook, J.

No surrender of federal jurisdiction. Antitrust claims fall within exclusive federal jurisdiction (15 U.S.C. §§4, 15). The state court will determine contract validity, not federal antitrust liability. Hence, the federal court retains the “core” dispute.
Stay as case-management tool. The district judge paused the case merely to receive guidance on state-law contract questions, anticipating more accurate antitrust analysis thereafter. Such sequencing orders are routine and non-appealable.
Collateral-order doctrine rejected. The stay settles no important issue “completely separate from the merits”; it only postpones decision.
Cross-appeal dismissed. Denials of Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) motions are quintessential interlocutory orders, reviewable after final judgment.

Impact of the Decision

Re-affirms the “effectively out of court” test. Lawyers cannot rely on a district judge’s mere citation to Colorado River or “abstention” language to obtain immediate review. The substance—not the label—controls.
Guidance for district courts. Judges should articulate whether they intend to dismiss or merely stay proceedings, as mislabeling can sow confusion. Nevertheless, appellate courts will look past the label.
Clarifies strategic considerations. Parties contemplating parallel state/federal actions must recognize that an interlocutory stay generally delays, rather than accelerates, the path to appellate review.
Preserves federal primacy over antitrust. The exclusive federal jurisdiction over Sherman Act claims means state courts cannot foreclose subsequent federal adjudication; this decision underscores that divide.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Colorado River Abstention: A narrow doctrine allowing federal courts to dismiss or stay duplicate litigation when there is a parallel state proceeding and exceptional circumstances (e.g., water rights adjudication). Dismissal ends federal involvement; a mere stay pauses it.
“Effectively Out of Court” Test: An abstention order is appealable if the parties are, in substance, kicked out of federal court with nothing left to decide. The Seventh Circuit applies this test, rather than focusing on the order’s formal label.
Collateral-Order Doctrine: An exception permitting appeal from certain interlocutory orders that (1) conclusively decide an issue, (2) are separate from the merits, and (3) would be unreviewable later. Timing-only stays rarely fit.
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Bars federal district courts from acting as appellate courts over final state-court judgments. The doctrine did not apply here because the federal plaintiffs do not seek reversal of a final state judgment.
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine: Protects parties from antitrust liability when they petition the government. Its limits (e.g., sham litigation) were not analyzed on appeal because the denial of CenterPoint’s motion is non-final.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion is a procedural—but significant—checkpoint, reinforcing that the finality of an abstention order depends on its practical effect, not its nominal designation. Because the district court’s stay neither dismissed the antitrust claims nor surrendered federal jurisdiction, the order is non-appealable, and the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction. Litigants must therefore await a final judgment—or a stay that truly ends federal participation— before seeking appellate intervention. The ruling sharpens the boundary between routine case-management stays and genuine abstention dismissals, preserving judicial economy while ensuring that exclusive federal questions, like antitrust claims, receive their day in federal court.