“Just to Be Safe” Is Not Reasonable Suspicion: The Tenth Circuit Narrows Terry Frisks and Rejects Hypothetical Protective Sweeps in United States v. Huerta

Introduction

In United States v. Huerta, No. 25-1050 (10th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025), the Tenth Circuit issued a significant Fourth Amendment decision tightening the limits on Terry frisks during traffic stops and cabining reliance on the inevitable discovery doctrine via a “protective sweep.” The case arose from a Denver investigation into a convenience-store shooting earlier that day. Officers stopped a white Dodge Durango at a gas station after noticing expired plates. One passenger, Noah Huerta, was handcuffed and frisked; officers felt a firearm magazine on his person and, after the driver consented, recovered a handgun from the vehicle near Huerta’s seat.

Huerta moved to suppress the magazine and handgun, arguing the frisk was unsupported by reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. He also moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon-in-possession) is unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi. The district court denied both motions, positing that even if the frisk were unlawful, the gun would have been inevitably discovered because the scene presented “the perfect circumstances for a protective sweep.”

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the suppression ruling, holding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk Huerta and that inevitable discovery did not apply. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, noting that its recent decision in Vincent v. Bondi forecloses Huerta’s Second Amendment challenge in this circuit.

Summary of the Opinion

Reasonable suspicion to frisk: The court held the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that Huerta was armed and dangerous. A detective’s radioed “hunch” that a passenger was “somewhat similar” to the shooting suspect and that officers should stop the car “just to be on the safe side” did not suffice. Nor did the passengers’ ordinary movement at a gas station, a high-crime location, or a slight, innocuous movement by Huerta.
Inevitable discovery via “protective sweep”: The court rejected the district court’s sua sponte inevitability finding. A protective sweep requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect poses a danger and may gain immediate access to a weapon; the record neither showed such suspicion nor evidence that officers were otherwise going to conduct a sweep independent of the unlawful frisk.
Section 922(g)(1) challenge: The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, citing Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025), which held that Rahimi did not abrogate the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and progeny (United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)): Anchor the “reasonable suspicion” standard for investigatory stops and frisks. The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion requires more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch” (citing White and Sokolow).
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), and Poolaw v. Marcantel, 565 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2009): Stand for the proposition that mere proximity to suspected criminal activity does not, by itself, create reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a frisk. The Tenth Circuit applied this to reject the notion that being near the suspect’s vehicle or with a person who was “somewhat similar” to the suspect could justify frisking Huerta.
United States v. Gurule, 935 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2019): Confirms that officers may order passengers out during a valid traffic stop but may frisk only if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous. The court relied on this framework but found the facts did not meet the threshold.
United States v. Garcia, 751 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Rice, 483 F.3d 1079 (10th Cir. 2007): Underscore that reasonable suspicion is assessed under the “totality of the circumstances” with appropriate deference to reasonable inferences drawn from officer training and experience. The court stressed that such deference has limits.
United States v. Samilton, 56 F.4th 820 (10th Cir. 2022): Reaffirmed that a hunch is insufficient and that the reasonableness standard, though modest, imposes genuine constraints. The court repeatedly characterized the detective’s broadcast as a “hunch.”
United States v. Jones, 998 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1993): Held that very general suspect descriptions (e.g., two Black men in a black Mercedes) do not generate reasonable suspicion. Here, superficial similarities (race, facial hair) were outweighed by obvious dissimilarities (skin tone, baldness, beard, visible face tattoo), and officers had the suspect’s photo.
United States v. De La Cruz, 703 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013): Rejected extending a stop “just to be safe,” a phrase that reflects uncertainty rather than articulable suspicion. The court analogized the detective’s “just to be on the safe side” broadcast to De La Cruz.
United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165 (10th Cir. 2022): Warn that courts’ deference to officer experience is not unlimited and cannot transmogrify innocuous conduct into suspicion without a concrete reason. The court applied this when evaluating the passengers’ normal behavior at a gas station and Huerta’s minimal movements.
United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374 (10th Cir. 2015): Clarifies that officers need not rule out innocent explanations, but there must be a concrete, non-innocent interpretation supported by specific facts. The court found that concrete link lacking.
United States v. Hammond, 890 F.3d 901 (10th Cir. 2018): Although numeric parity between officers and vehicle occupants can heighten safety concerns, Hammond involved robust additional facts (gang affiliation, ongoing feud, prior weapons arrests) missing here. The panel distinguished Hammond and refused to bootstrap suspicion based on headcount alone.
United States v. Daniels, 101 F.4th 770 (10th Cir. 2024): Notes that time/place (e.g., high-crime area) may be relevant but not dispositive; a busy, well-trafficked setting can diminish safety inferences. The gas-station context weighed against heightened suspicion.
United States v. Canada, 76 F.4th 1304 (10th Cir. 2023): Sets the standard for a vehicle “protective sweep”: reasonable suspicion that a suspect poses a danger and may gain immediate access to a weapon. This undercut the district court’s inevitability ruling.
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 2014): Govern the inevitable discovery doctrine; the government must show by a preponderance that lawful discovery would have occurred. The government fell short.
United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Jacquez, 284 F. App’x 544 (10th Cir. 2008): Allow reliance on reasonable mistakes of fact. The panel explained those cases do not help where what officers relied on was an articulated “hunch,” not a reasonable factual mistake.
Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025): Controls the constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1), holding that Rahimi did not abrogate its validity. The court followed Vincent to affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss.

Legal Reasoning

The court conducted a granular, factor-by-factor analysis and then assessed the totality:

“Somewhat similar” and “just to be on the safe side” are not articulable facts. The detective’s broadcast lacked specific, particularized reasons to think the suspected shooter was in the Durango. With a readily available suspect photo, the person of interest (Mr. Marshall) was plainly dissimilar from the suspect (skin tone, baldness, beard, facial tattoo). The court characterized the broadcast—and reliance on it—as a “mere hunch,” insufficient to create reasonable suspicion to believe any passenger, including Huerta, was armed and dangerous.
Passengers’ ordinary movement at a gas station was innocuous. Two occupants exited and walked toward the store before officers activated lights or otherwise asserted authority. Once told to stop, they complied. The court concluded that an objectively reasonable officer would not infer contraband or danger from such commonplace conduct in that context.
Huerta’s “slight” movement and post-grab “squirmishness” lacked probative weight. Body-worn camera footage showed Huerta exiting with a phone in one hand, no object in the other, and making no meaningful reach toward a waistband. Officers grabbed and handcuffed him within seconds; his fidgeting and questions were normal reactions and not violent resistance. The court refused to elevate this into danger.
“High-crime area” and “scattered” occupants did not tip the scale. While context can inform risk, these generic factors do not substitute for specific, articulable indications that a particular person is armed and dangerous—especially at a daytime, populated gas station.
Criminal histories cannot create reasonable suspicion to frisk. Records checks revealing felony histories do not supply the missing suspicion that someone is presently armed and dangerous. The panel reiterated this limit.
Totality came up short. Aggregating all factors—broadcast hunch, routine gas-station movement, minimal body movements, location—the government still failed to carry the “minimal level of objective justification” required for a frisk.
Inevitable discovery via protective sweep failed on two fronts: (1) A protective sweep demands reasonable suspicion that a suspect poses a danger and may gain immediate access to a weapon (Canada); that was lacking here; and (2) the record affirmatively indicated officers sought consent to search only because they had already found the magazine on Huerta. The court would not accept a post hoc hypothesis that a sweep would have occurred anyway.

Impact

Huerta sharpens several operational and doctrinal points in the Tenth Circuit:

Limits on “collective hunches”: Officers cannot bootstrap frisks from another officer’s tentative broadcast using phrasing like “just to be safe.” When fellow-officer information lacks particularized facts, it does not create reasonable suspicion for a frisk.
Contextualizing passenger conduct: Exiting a car and walking into a gas station—absent a prior show of authority—cannot be repackaged as suspicious simply by invoking officer training. The court’s emphasis on body-camera evidence will encourage careful documentation and discourage overreading innocuous movements.
Cabining protective sweeps and inevitable discovery: Courts will demand concrete, record-based showings that a sweep would have lawfully occurred. Speculative “perfect circumstances” are insufficient without reasonable suspicion of danger and immediate access to a weapon and without evidence that officers would have actually conducted the sweep independent of the unlawful search.
Reaffirmed constraints on “high-crime area” and criminal history: These considerations may color, but not create, reasonable suspicion. Officers must tie risk assessments to individualized, contemporaneous indicators of danger.
Section 922(g)(1) remains valid in the Tenth Circuit: Litigants challenging felon-in-possession indictments under Bruen/Rahimi should anticipate that Vincent v. Bondi controls, absent a change in Supreme Court guidance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Reasonable suspicion: A commonsense, articulable basis for believing criminal activity may be afoot or that a person is armed and dangerous. It requires specific facts plus reasonable inferences—not a gut feeling.
Terry frisk: A limited patdown of outer clothing for weapons, permitted only if the officer reasonably suspects the person is armed and dangerous. It is about safety, not a general evidence search.
Show of authority: Police actions (like activating lights, commands, or blocking movement) that make a reasonable person feel they are not free to leave. Before such a show, routine movement (e.g., entering a store) is not inherently suspicious.
Protective sweep of a vehicle: A quick, limited inspection of areas in a car where a weapon could be hidden, allowed only if officers reasonably suspect a person is dangerous and may gain immediate access to a weapon (Canada).
Inevitable discovery: Even if evidence was initially found unlawfully, it may be admitted if the government proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have been found through lawful means anyway (Nix; Christy). Courts require concrete proof, not speculation.
Propinquity: Mere nearness to suspected criminal activity (or to a target location) does not by itself justify searching or frisking a person (Ybarra; Poolaw).
Facial vs. as-applied constitutional challenges: A facial challenge argues a statute is invalid in all its applications; an as-applied challenge argues it is unconstitutional as applied to a particular person or set of facts. In the Tenth Circuit, § 922(g)(1) survives both under Vincent v. Bondi.

Key Takeaways and Practical Guidance

A radioed “be safe” instruction coupled with a vague resemblance to a suspect is not reasonable suspicion to frisk passengers. Officers should document the specific, individualized facts that make a person appear armed and dangerous.
Passenger behavior that aligns with ordinary, contextual expectations (like heading inside a gas station before any show of authority) cannot be treated as suspicious absent more.
Body-worn camera footage matters. Courts will closely review what it shows—and what it does not—when weighing claims of furtive movements or noncompliance.
High-crime area status, occupant headcounts, and prior criminal histories may inform—but cannot substitute for—articulable, present-tense danger indicators.
Inevitable discovery via protective sweep requires two concrete showings: that officers had reasonable suspicion of danger and immediate access to a weapon, and that a sweep would have actually been conducted regardless of the initial illegality.
Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) remain foreclosed in the Tenth Circuit by Vincent v. Bondi, notwithstanding Rahimi.

Conclusion

United States v. Huerta reinforces that the “minimal” reasonable-suspicion threshold still requires real, individualized facts. A generalized “just to be safe” broadcast and ordinary passenger behavior at a gas station do not satisfy Terry’s armed-and-dangerous predicate. Nor can inevitable discovery be built on a hypothetical protective sweep where the record lacks both the necessary reasonable suspicion and evidence that officers were poised to conduct such a sweep independent of the unlawful frisk.

At the same time, Huerta confirms that § 922(g)(1) remains constitutionally sound in the Tenth Circuit under Vincent v. Bondi. Going forward, the opinion will shape police practices during traffic stops involving multiple occupants: officers must ground frisks and protective sweeps in specific, articulable facts tied to the individual and the immediate risk of weapon access. Courts, in turn, will scrutinize “training-and-experience” rationales against body-camera records and the everyday context of citizens’ movements. The decision thus both protects officer safety doctrine from overextension and preserves the evidentiary integrity demanded by the Fourth Amendment.