“Individualized Waiver” under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B): The Supreme Court of Nevada Clarifies that a Five-Year Dismissal Waiver Binds Only the Consenting Parties

Introduction

Case: Paul v. Second Judicial District Court (Holms), 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 38 (Aug. 21, 2025)
Court: Supreme Court of Nevada
Procedural Posture: Original petition for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition challenging denial of a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B).
Parties:

• Petitioners: Wesley J. Paul and Paul Law Group, LLP (“Paul”)
• Respondents: Second Judicial District Court, Judge David Hardy
• Real Parties in Interest: Allan Holms, Bakken Resources, Inc. (“Bakken”), and multiple related individuals and law firms

The dispute grew out of a complex, multi-year shareholder and corporate-governance battle inside Bakken, a Nevada mineral-rights company. Three separate complaints, later consolidated, alleged self-dealing by insiders (Paul and Val Holms). Years of amendments, counterclaims, stipulations, and dismissals ensued. By 2024, the litigation still had not reached trial as to Paul, who had once been dismissed and later re-added as a “counter-defendant.” He invoked NRCP 41(e)(2)(B) (the five-year dismissal rule). The district court denied his motion, holding that (i) other parties’ 2018 written waiver stopped the clock for everyone, and (ii) the 2020 amended counterclaim restarted time.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Nevada unanimously granted mandamus relief, ordering the district court to dismiss the action against Paul under NRCP 41(e)(2)(B). The Court makes two principal clarifications that now form Nevada precedent:

1. The five-year period always begins with the filing of the original complaint; subsequent amendments, counterclaims, or consolidation do not reset the clock.
2. A written waiver or stipulation extending the NRCP 41(e) period is personal to the signatory parties. It does not automatically toll the statute for non-signatories or parties not yet in the case (“Individualized Waiver Doctrine”).

Because Paul (a) never signed the 2018 waiver and (b) was first sued in 2014, the five-year period (minus two acknowledged COVID/related stays totaling 434 days) expired long before his 2024 dismissal motion. Dismissal is therefore “mandatory.”

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 113 Nev. 1343 (1997) – Recognized mandamus as proper vehicle to enforce mandatory NRCP 41(e) dismissals.
• Thran v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 79 Nev. 176 (1963) – Early authority granting writ relief for NRCP 41(e) violations.
• Edwards v. Ghandour, 123 Nev. 105 (2007) – Automatic bankruptcy stay of one defendant does not toll five-year clock for other defendants; supports “separate clock per party.”
• United Ass’n v. Manson, 105 Nev. 816 (1989) – Five-year rule applies to the whole “action,” not individual claims; amendments do not create new actions.
• Volpert v. Papagna, 85 Nev. 437 (1969) – An amended pleading does not restart the limitation period.
• Great Western Land & Cattle Corp. v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 86 Nev. 282 (1970) – Estoppel cannot arise from conduct short of written stipulation under NRCP 41(e).
• Monroe v. Columbia Sunrise Hosp., 123 Nev. 96 (2007) – Defines when an action is “brought to trial” for NRCP 41(e) purposes.

These authorities collectively underpin the Court’s conclusions: (i) strict construction of NRCP 41(e), (ii) writ relief is proper, (iii) tolling/waiver doctrines are narrowly construed, and (iv) the time bar is defendant-specific.

2. Legal Reasoning

1. Mandamus Standard. Because NRCP 41(e)(2)(B) uses mandatory language (“must dismiss”), the district court lacked discretion once the five-year period lapsed. Mandamus therefore lies to compel performance of a non-discretionary duty.
2. Commencement of the Clock. The term “action” in NRCP 41(e) means the litigation as a whole, beginning with the first complaint. The Court reiterates that complexity, consolidation, new claims, or new parties are irrelevant to commencement.
3. Tolling for Stays. Only two categorical stays (COVID administrative orders and a 47-day writ stay) paused the clock (total 434 days). Even after subtracting those periods, more than five years had run.
4. Individualized Waiver Doctrine. Grounded in both NRCP 41(e)(5) and contract law (“no one is bound to a contract except parties to it”), a waiver is personal. Imputing the 2018 waiver to Paul would conflict with Edwards (separate clocks).
5. Amended Counterclaim ≠ New Action. Following Manson and Volpert, the 2020 amended counterclaim was part of the same action; thus no clock reset occurred.
6. “Brought to Trial” Inquiry. Prior summary judgment between other parties did not adjudicate Paul’s rights; therefore the action, as to Paul, had never been “brought to trial.”

3. Impact of the Judgment

The decision has both immediate and systemic ramifications:

• Party-Specific Vigilance. Litigants must monitor the five-year period individually. A waiver signed by co-defendants does not protect later-added or non-signatory parties.
• Strategic Implications in Complex Litigation. In derivative suits, class actions, and consolidated matters, counsel must evaluate NRCP 41(e) for each defendant, especially when parties are added late or claims are realigned.
• Contractual Formality Reinforced. Courts will not infer waiver from participation, discovery, or informal statements. Only a written stipulation endorsed by the particular party stops the clock.
• Case-Management Discipline. Trial courts risk writ relief—and dismissal—if they let languishing cases persist despite a valid NRCP 41(e) motion.
• Predictive Value for Other Jurisdictions. Although Nevada-specific, the reasoning echoes nationwide trends favoring defendant-specific application of “speedy trial” analogues. Other states interpreting equivalent civil-procedure rules may cite this opinion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• NRCP 41(e)(2)(B) (Five-Year Rule). Nevada’s analogue to a “civil speedy-trial” rule: if a lawsuit is not tried within five years of filing (excluding specified tolling), the court must dismiss it.
• Waiver/Stipulation. Parties can sign a written agreement giving themselves more time. Under this case, that agreement protects only the signers.
• Writ of Mandamus vs. Prohibition. Extraordinary writs used by appellate courts to direct lower courts. Mandamus compels an affirmative duty; prohibition stops improper actions. Here, mandamus was appropriate to compel dismissal.
• Tolling. Legal rule that pauses a limitation period. Examples: court-ordered stay, bankruptcy stay, COVID administrative orders.
• Derivative Action. Lawsuit by shareholders on behalf of the corporation. Complexity arises because the corporation is a nominal defendant but also a real beneficiary.
• Counterclaim / Amended Counterclaim. A defending party’s claim against an opposing party; amendment merely updates an existing pleading and does not create a new lawsuit.

Conclusion

Paul v. District Court (Holms) crystallizes Nevada’s approach to NRCP 41(e)(2)(B) in two decisive ways: the five-year limitation begins with the very first complaint and, critically, waiver is not transferrable. The ruling empowers defendants—particularly those drawn into protracted, multi-party litigation—to invoke mandatory dismissal even when co-litigants have consented to extensions. Practitioners should memorialize any waiver in writing and obtain signatures from every party intended to be bound. Failure to do so leaves the action vulnerable to dismissal and appellate intervention by extraordinary writ. In the broader legal landscape, the decision promotes expedition, individual accountability, and clarity in civil-procedure time bars.