“Indefinite Means Indefinite”: Mata v. N.C. Dep’t of Transportation and the Measure of Just Compensation for Map Act Corridor Takings

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in Elizabeth Mata and The Mata Family, LLC v. North Carolina Department of Transportation and North Carolina Turnpike Authority, No. 217PA24-1 (Dec. 12, 2025), is a major development in the long line of litigation arising from the now-repealed Transportation Corridor Official Map Act (the “Map Act”).

The Court resolves two closely related and foundational questions about “Map Act takings”:

Whether later legislative rescission of a corridor map can retroactively change the character of the taking—from what earlier cases called an “indefinite” taking into a “temporary” taking.
What the correct measure of just compensation is for these takings: whether it is (a) a time-spanning measure (such as rental value or diminution in value over the period the corridor was in place) or (b) a snapshot comparison of fair market value immediately before and immediately after the recording of the Map Act corridor map.

The plaintiffs, Elizabeth Mata and The Mata Family, LLC (collectively “Mata” or “the Matas”), owned approximately 94 acres in Apex, Wake County. In 1996, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) recorded an I‑540 corridor map under the Map Act, encumbering 9.93 acres and imposing stringent restrictions on development, subdivision, and improvements. These restrictions remained in place until the General Assembly rescinded all Map Act corridors on 11 July 2016 and later repealed the Act entirely in 2019.

After Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 368 N.C. 847 (2016), held that Map Act restrictions are compensable takings, the Matas filed an inverse condemnation action in 2019 seeking compensation for the twenty-year encumbrance. The trial court and Court of Appeals agreed the Map Act recording effected a taking but disagreed about the nature of that taking and the proper method for valuing it. The dispute ultimately centered on whether the intervening legislative rescission in 2016 turned what Kirby and Chappell had labeled an “indefinite” taking into a “temporary” one, thereby changing the damages framework.

The Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeals and clarifies that:

Map Act corridor recordings constitute indefinite takings of core property rights at the moment of recording, and
The correct measure of just compensation is the difference in fair market value of the property immediately before and immediately after the map recording, with interest, taking into account all pertinent factors—including the indefinite nature of the restrictions and any effect of reduced ad valorem taxes.

The Court also confirms that appraisers may rely on standard valuation methods—comparable sales, income capitalization (which may incorporate rental value), and cost—so long as they are used to arrive at fair market value on the date of the taking. A concurring opinion by Justice Dietz (joined by Justice Berger) highlights a substantial downstream concern: the potential “double payment” problem when the State first pays for the Map Act taking and later pays again in a direct condemnation after the Map Act’s repeal.

Note: This commentary is for analytical and educational purposes and is not legal advice.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Background and Procedural History

Map Act Framework. Enacted in 1987, the Map Act authorized DOT to record official transportation corridor maps. Once recorded, these maps severely restricted affected owners’ rights to:
- build structures or improvements,
- subdivide, or
- develop property within the corridor.
The Act anticipated that these restrictions could persist indefinitely: the statute did not require DOT to acquire the property by any deadline and placed the burden on owners to seek limited forms of relief.
The Mata Property.
- 1973: Elizabeth Mata acquired about 94 acres in Apex, Wake County.
- 2012: She deeded the property to The Mata Family, LLC.
- 6 August 1996: DOT recorded a corridor map for I‑540 covering 9.93 acres of this tract, imposing Map Act restrictions on that portion.
- 11 July 2016: The General Assembly rescinded all Map Act corridors in response to Kirby.
- 13 June 2019: The General Assembly repealed the Map Act in its entirety.
Litigation.
- 26 February 2019: The Matas filed an inverse condemnation action under N.C.G.S. § 136‑111 for a taking from 6 August 1996 to 11 July 2016.
- 7 April 2020: DOT filed a direct condemnation action under N.C.G.S. § 136‑103, by which time Map Act restrictions were no longer in place.
- Trial court (2023): found a “temporary” taking for the period 1996–2016 and adopted the damages framework for temporary takings (using rental value as the measure of damages).
- Court of Appeals (2024): agreed that, because of the 2016 rescission, the taking was “temporary,” but held that the correct measure of damages was diminution in value “until 11 July 2016,” citing Chappell.
- Supreme Court: allowed discretionary review and reversed.

B. Holding

The Supreme Court announces three central holdings:

Nature of the Taking: A Map Act corridor recording effects an indefinite taking of fundamental property rights at the time of recording. Legislative rescission years later does not retroactively convert that taking into a “temporary” taking.
Measure of Damages: The proper measure of damages is the difference in fair market value of the entire tract immediately before the taking and the fair market value of the remainder immediately after the taking, as specified in N.C.G.S. § 136‑112(1), plus interest from the date of the taking to final judgment. This is a snapshot on the date of the taking (here, 6 August 1996), not a rolling valuation over the full period the restriction remained in place.
Appraisal Methodologies: While § 136‑112(1) prescribes the measure of damages, it does not constrain how appraisers determine fair market value. Experts may employ:
- comparable sales,
- income capitalization (which may include rental value), or
- cost approaches,
so long as the ultimate question remains the fair market value of the property immediately before and after the corridor recording.

Accordingly, the Court reverses the Court of Appeals and remands for further proceedings consistent with this framework, including a before-and-after valuation as of 6 August 1996 that takes into account all pertinent factors, such as:

the indefinite nature of the Map Act restrictions, and
the effect, if any, of reduced ad valorem taxes on the encumbered property.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Doctrinal Background

1. The Map Act as a Vehicle for “Indefinite” Development Controls

The Map Act allowed DOT to pre-designate transportation corridors by recording “official maps.” Once recorded, the statute:

restricted the issuance of building permits,
prohibited certain development activities, and
limited subdivision of properties within the mapped area.

Critically, the statute provided no fixed end date for the restrictions. It did not obligate DOT to acquire the properties within a given period, nor did it guarantee that the planned highway project would ever be completed. Property owners could seek exemptions or relief, but only through administrative processes that lacked definite timelines and placed the burden on the owner.

In Kirby, the Court characterized these restrictions as an “indefinite restraint on fundamental property rights,” squarely outside the scope of the State’s police power and instead an exercise of eminent domain. That conclusion is the doctrinal foundation for Mata.

2. Inverse Condemnation and Partial Takings in North Carolina

North Carolina’s eminent domain statutes address two principal settings:

Direct condemnation (e.g., N.C.G.S. § 136‑103), where the State files a proceeding to acquire specified property interests for public use.
Inverse condemnation (e.g., N.C.G.S. § 136‑111), where the property owner sues the State alleging that government action has already effected a taking without formal condemnation and seeks “just compensation.”

For partial takings (where only part of a tract is taken), N.C.G.S. § 136‑112(1) sets out the exclusive measure of damages:

Where only a part of a tract is taken, the measure of damages for said taking shall be the difference between the fair market value of the entire tract immediately prior to said taking and the fair market value of the remainder immediately after said taking, with consideration being given to any special or general benefits resulting from the utilization of the part taken for highway purposes.

This statute governs both direct and inverse condemnation cases and frames the analysis in Mata.

3. Temporary vs. Indefinite/Permanent Takings

In takings law, the distinction between:

Temporary takings (where the government’s interference with property is necessarily time-limited and known to be temporary when imposed), and
Indefinite or permanent takings (where the interference has no fixed end date and is intended to last indefinitely unless some uncertain future event intervenes)

is crucial for damages. Temporary takings are typically compensated by the value of use and occupancy during the period of interference (often measured by rental value or the fair return on the property for that period). Permanent or indefinite takings are compensated based on the diminution in the property’s fair market value at the time of the taking—in effect, the capital value of the rights taken.

Mata makes clear that Map Act takings belong on the “indefinite” side of that line and that the measure of damages must correspond accordingly.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 368 N.C. 847 (2016)

Kirby is the foundational case on Map Act takings. The Court held that:

DOT’s recording of corridor maps under the Map Act constituted an exercise of eminent domain.
The restrictions imposed an “indefinite restraint on fundamental property rights” (the rights to improve, develop, and subdivide), making the action a taking, not merely a regulation under the police power.
DOT’s Map Act regime risked allowing the State to “hinder property rights indefinitely for a project that may never be built,” which the Constitution does not permit without just compensation.

On damages, Kirby held that:

On remand, the trier of fact must determine the value of the loss of these fundamental rights by calculating the value of the land before the corridor map was recorded and the value of the land afterward, taking into account all pertinent factors, including the restriction on each plaintiff’s fundamental rights, as well as any effect of the reduced ad valorem taxes.

In Mata, the Supreme Court treats Kirby as establishing both:

the indefinite nature of the taking, and
the before-and-after fair market value framework for damages.

2. Chappell v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 374 N.C. 273 (2020)

Chappell reaffirmed and refined Kirby:

It described Map Act restrictions as creating “an indefinite negative easement,” again emphasizing the indefinite character of the taking and the deprivation of “fundamental property rights.”
On damages, it confirmed that the applicable measure is the statutory before-and-after fair market value rule in N.C.G.S. § 136‑112(1), applied as of the date of the taking.
It held that when property essentially has no fair market value after the corridor recording, it is appropriate to:
- treat the property as effectively valueless in the “after” valuation, while
- adjusting compensation to reflect any reduction in ad valorem taxes actually paid during the encumbrance (as a “pertinent factor” under Kirby).
At the same time, Chappell stressed that the phrase “all pertinent factors” leaves room for case-specific treatment of tax effects and other economic impacts.

Mata relies heavily on Chappell to:

reject the Court of Appeals’ recharacterization of Map Act takings as temporary, and
insist that damages are calculated as a single, date-of-taking diminution in value, not a multi-year diminishing process “until 2016.”

3. Dep’t of Transp. v. M.M. Fowler, Inc., 361 N.C. 1 (2006)

Fowler is cited for the proposition that the law of eminent domain:

prescribes an exclusive measure of damages (fair market value before and after), but
does not restrict the methods appraisers may use to determine fair market value.

The Court notes that acceptable appraisal methods include:

comparable sales,
capitalization of income, and
cost approach.

Mata uses Fowler to reaffirm that appraisers may use income-based methods (including rental value assumptions) in Map Act cases, as long as they are ultimately tied to a fair market value determination as of the date of the taking.

4. Wilkie v. City of Boiling Spring Lakes, 370 N.C. 540 (2018) & Standard of Review

Wilkie is cited primarily for the standard of review: legal questions, especially those about the scope of the State’s eminent domain powers and constitutional takings issues, are reviewed de novo. This reinforces that the Supreme Court was not bound by the lower courts’ characterizations of the taking as “temporary” or “indefinite,” but rather independently reviewed that question.

5. Other References

Town of Midland v. Wayne, 368 N.C. 55 (2015). Cited in the concurring opinion for the uncontroversial rule that the State must pay just compensation for the bundle of rights the owner holds at the time of a taking.
United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002). Cited in the concurrence for the “bundle of sticks” metaphor describing property as a collection of discrete rights.
Sanders v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., No. COA22‑440 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2024) (unpublished). The Court of Appeals in Mata had relied by analogy on Sanders to support a temporary-taking, rental-value methodology. The Supreme Court notes that Sanders is being reversed in a companion decision the same day, further cementing the uniform treatment of Map Act takings as indefinite and governed by the before-and-after valuation rule.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Nature of the Taking: Indefinite at the Moment of Recording

The core legal question is whether a taking that begins as indefinite can be retroactively reclassified as “temporary” just because it eventually comes to an end through legislative action. The Court’s answer is an unequivocal no.

The Court emphasizes that:

The character of the property interest taken is fixed at the time of the taking. It is determined by what the State does and what rights it restricts at that moment, not by what later happens.
On 6 August 1996, when the 1996 Corridor Map was recorded, DOT:
- took the Matas’ fundamental rights to improve, develop, and subdivide the 9.93-acre portion,
- for an unlimited period of time, because the Map Act imposed no expiration or acquisition deadline and placed the burden on owners to seek uncertain relief.

The Court of Appeals had emphasized that, in hindsight, the restrictions lasted from 6 August 1996 to 11 July 2016 and thus argued that the taking was no longer “indefinite.” The Supreme Court labels this a confusion between:

the duration in fact of the restriction (which ultimately turned out to be about 20 years), and
the nature of the interest that was taken at the outset (which was indefinite because neither party knew when or whether it would end).

In other words, a restriction can be:

indefinite in character when imposed (no set end date), yet
limited in actual duration by subsequent events (e.g., repeal of the Map Act, or eventual acquisition).

The Court concludes:

The nearly twenty-year duration is a factual consequence of the indefinite restriction DOT imposed; the eventual rescission of the subject corridor map and the Map Act generally did not transform the indefinite taking of restricted property into a temporary one.

Thus, the taking that occurred on 6 August 1996 was indefinite, and it remained so as a matter of legal characterization, even though it ended in 2016.

2. The Proper Measure of Damages: Fair Market Value “Immediately Before and Immediately After”

Having confirmed that the taking was indefinite, the Court turns to the measure of just compensation. It rejects the Court of Appeals’ view that damages should be measured as “diminution in value … until 11 July 2016,” i.e., as a kind of rolling depreciation over time.

Instead, the Court reaffirms the longstanding rule under § 136‑112(1) and its Map Act-specific elaborations in Kirby and Chappell:

Measure of damages: the difference between:
- the fair market value of the entire tract immediately before the taking, and
- the fair market value of the remainder immediately after the taking,
plus appropriate interest.
Anchor date: the date of the taking, here the date the Map Act corridor map was recorded (6 August 1996).

The Court describes this as a “snapshot comparison.” It explicitly rejects any formulation that:

measures value across a span of years, or
treats the Map Act taking like a temporary interference compensable by time-based rental value alone.

In the Court’s words, under Kirby:

[T]he trier of fact must determine the value of the loss of these fundamental rights by calculating the value of the land before the corridor map was recorded and the value of the land afterward, taking into account all pertinent factors, including the restriction on each plaintiff’s fundamental rights, as well as any effect of the reduced ad valorem taxes.

And under Chappell:

[T]he relevant determination when calculating just compensation for a taking that involves less than the entire parcel of property starts with the fair market value of the entire property before the taking and the fair market value of what remains after the taking. This is true whether the taking is an indefinite negative easement, as in the case of Map Act takings, or involves some other taking for public use.

Applied to the Mata property:

Date of taking: 6 August 1996 (recording of the 1996 Corridor Map).
“Before” value: fair market value of the entire Mata tract immediately before the recording, unencumbered by Map Act restrictions.
“After” value: fair market value immediately after the recording, taking into account the indefinite restrictions on 9.93 acres and any reduction in ad valorem taxes.
Damages: the difference between these two values, plus statutory interest from 6 August 1996 to the date of final judgment.

3. Role of Ad Valorem Taxes in the Valuation

The Court reiterates an important nuance from Kirby and Chappell: the effect of reduced ad valorem taxes is a “pertinent factor” that must be taken into account when valuing the property after the corridor map is recorded.

Conceptually:

Imposing corridor restrictions diminishes what can be done with the property (a negative), but
It may also lead to a lowered tax assessment (a positive) for the owner during the encumbrance.

A rational buyer in 1996, aware of both effects, would incorporate them into what they are willing to pay. The Court thus instructs that:

Valuation experts should consider both:
- the restraint on fundamental rights, and
- the effect of any lower taxes on the property’s marketability and net holding costs,
but the net result of those factors must be expressed as the property’s fair market value as of the date of taking.

The Court notes that in Chappell, where the property’s value was essentially wiped out post-recording, it was “appropriate” to:

treat the “after” fair market value as virtually nil, but
offset compensation for the taxes actually paid while the property had no value.

In Mata, by contrast, the record did not yet show whether the property became essentially valueless or retained some diminished value. That determination is reserved for the trier of fact on remand.

4. Appraisal Methods and the Role of “Rental Value”

The DOT’s third issue on appeal asked the Court to address whether:

rental value could be considered at all, and
whether the Court of Appeals’ language might be misread to prohibit rental value-based methodologies.

The Supreme Court clarifies:

N.C.G.S. § 136‑112(1) prescribes the measure of damages, not the analytic techniques by which appraisers estimate fair market value.
Appraisers may use:
- comparable sales,
- capitalization of income (which may draw on rental value), or
- cost approaches,
as recognized in Fowler and reaffirmed in Chappell.
The critical point is that: rental value is not itself the measure of damages in Map Act cases; it is merely one potential input into an income capitalization model used to estimate fair market value on the date of the taking.

Thus, the Court implicitly corrects trial-level confusion (seen both in Mata and Sanders) that had treated “fair rental value” as the damages baseline for Map Act takings. Rental value can influence the calculation, but the legal measure remains before-and-after fair market value.

D. The Concurring Opinion and the “Double Payment” Problem

Justice Dietz, joined by Justice Berger, concurs in full but writes separately to highlight an unresolved tension: the possibility of the State paying twice for essentially the same property interests.

1. The “Bundle of Sticks” Framework

Relying on United States v. Craft, the concurrence invokes the familiar metaphor of property as a “bundle of sticks”—a collection of individual rights (e.g., the right to build, develop, subdivide, exclude others, etc.). Under Kirby and Chappell:

When DOT recorded the corridor map, it: “reached in and took a handful of sticks out of Mata’s bundle”—namely, the rights to improve, develop, and subdivide the corridor portion of the property.
This was an indefinite taking of those sticks, compensable based on before-and-after fair market value.

However, when the General Assembly rescinded all Map Act corridors in 2016:

The State “gave all those sticks back,” restoring the full bundle of rights in fee simple absolute to the landowner.

2. Double Payment Risk in Subsequent Direct Condemnation

After the Map Act’s repeal, DOT initiated a direct condemnation in 2020 to acquire additional rights, including on the same land once covered by the corridor map. At that moment:

The landowner again held the full bundle of sticks, because the Map Act restrictions had been lifted.
Under ordinary condemnation principles (citing Town of Midland v. Wayne), the State must now pay “just compensation” for taking that full bundle.

As Justice Dietz points out, this means:

The State first pays compensation for the indefinite Map Act taking (loss of development rights during the encumbrance), and
Later pays again for fee simple title at the time of direct condemnation, when those rights have been restored.

The result is a form of double payment for the same real estate:

once for the temporal loss of certain sticks in the past (the indefinite Map Act taking), and
again for the full bundle of sticks in the future direct condemnation.

Justice Dietz suggests that the Court of Appeals and trial courts were not ignoring Kirby and Chappell but were instead “trying to wrap their minds around” this double-payment consequence. They attempted to mitigate it by recharacterizing the Map Act taking as “temporary” and tying damages to rental value, which is more typical for a temporary taking.

The majority opinion declines to address this structural problem and instead adheres strictly to Kirby and Chappell. Justice Dietz concludes by observing:

We now know that [double payment] was [what our precedent intended].

The concurrence thus signals that although the legal rules are now clear, their fiscal and conceptual implications—especially in large-scale corridor projects—are substantial.

E. Impact and Future Implications

1. For Pending and Future Map Act Litigation

Mata is authoritative on two central points for all remaining Map Act cases:

All Map Act corridor takings remain “indefinite” in character for compensation purposes, regardless of later legislative rescission or project outcomes.
The exclusive measure of damages is the before-and-after fair market value as of the date of the corridor map recording, plus interest, with all pertinent factors considered (including indefinite duration and tax effects).

Trial courts must therefore:

reject arguments that Map Act takings are “temporary” because they eventually ended, and
structure jury instructions and evidentiary rulings around:
- date-of-taking snapshot valuations, and
- expert testimony using accepted appraisal methods that culminate in fair market value estimates.

The Court’s simultaneous reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Sanders decision further consolidates this uniform treatment and eliminates inconsistent “temporary taking / rental value” approaches.

2. For DOT and State Fiscal Exposure

The decision likely increases DOT’s aggregate liability in Map Act cases:

Owners will generally be compensated for the capitalized loss in value of their properties as of the date of recording (which may be substantial in high-growth areas like Wake County),
plus interest from that date, which in many cases will mean interest accruing over 20 or more years.

Additionally, in cases where DOT later pursued direct condemnation post-repeal, Mata (combined with the concurrence’s logic) suggests:

the State must pay full fair market value at the time of that later taking,
without offset for the prior Map Act compensation beyond what is already captured by the market value calculus (unless statutory or constitutional doctrine is later revisited).

The cumulative effect may be significant budgetary exposure for the State, particularly on corridor projects like I‑540 where many parcels were encumbered for decades.

3. For Regulatory Takings Doctrine More Broadly

Although Mata is grounded in a specific statute now repealed, its reasoning has potential influence in broader regulatory takings jurisprudence:

Character of the Taking Fixed at Inception. The Court’s insistence that the nature of a taking is determined when the government’s action first encumbers property—not by later events—may be cited in future cases involving moratoria or long-term regulatory holds on development.
Line Between Police Power and Eminent Domain. Kirby, reaffirmed in Mata, stands for the proposition that:
- regulations that impose indefinite restraints on core property rights, without clear time limits or guaranteed relief, cross the line into takings even if couched as planning tools.
Negative Easements and Partial Interests. The Court’s continued description of Map Act restrictions as “indefinite negative easements” and its adherence to the partial-taking valuation rule provide guidance on how to conceptualize other government-imposed negative easements or use restrictions.

4. For Valuation Practice in Eminent Domain

From an appraisal standpoint, Mata reinforces that:

The legal measure of damages and the technical valuation method are distinct. Courts should:
- enforce fair market value before-and-after as the measure, while
- allowing appraisers methodologically appropriate freedom (comparable sales, income capitalization, cost) to reach their conclusions.
“Rental value” is a valid input for income capitalization, but not a substitute damages formula in indefinite-taking cases.
Tax impacts (such as reduced ad valorem taxes due to encumbrance) are part of market participants’ calculus and thus relevant to valuation as of the date of taking.

IV. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. Map Act Corridor Maps

A Map Act corridor map is essentially an official overlay that:

identifies future highway corridors, and
restricts affected landowners from:
- constructing new buildings,
- making substantial improvements, or
- subdividing their land
within the mapped area.

The effect is to “freeze” the development potential of the property without the State having to immediately purchase it.

2. Inverse Condemnation

Inverse condemnation is a lawsuit brought by a property owner, not the government, claiming that:

government action has taken property or substantially interfered with property rights,
without the government formally using eminent domain procedures, and
seeking just compensation as if a formal condemnation had occurred.

In North Carolina, Map Act cases like Mata proceed via inverse condemnation because:

DOT never filed condemnation actions when it recorded the corridor maps; instead,
it simply imposed restrictions by statute and administrative action.

3. Temporary vs. Indefinite Takings

Temporary taking: The government’s interference is known at the outset to be time-limited (e.g., a two-year construction easement). Damages are often calculated from:
- the rental value of the property during the interference, or
- the fair return that could have been earned during that defined period.
Indefinite or permanent taking: The government does not set an end date. The restriction is intended to last indefinitely, though it may in fact end later due to repeal or other events. Damages are calculated from:
- the difference in the property’s market value before and after the taking, measured at the time the taking began.

Mata confirms that Map Act restrictions belong in the latter category.

4. Fair Market Value and “Before-and-After” Valuation

“Fair market value” generally means:

What a willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept for the property, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.

For partial takings, North Carolina uses a “before-and-after” approach:

Determine the fair market value of the whole property immediately before the taking.
Determine the fair market value of what remains immediately after the taking.
The difference is the measure of damages (subject to adjustments for special or general benefits and interest).

5. “Bundle of Sticks” Metaphor

Property ownership is often described as owning a “bundle of sticks,” each stick representing a separate right:

the right to possess,
the right to use,
the right to exclude others,
the right to develop or improve,
the right to subdivide, etc.

Government action may:

take some sticks (partial interests, such as easements or development bans), or
take the whole bundle (fee simple, as in many condemnations).

The Map Act is best understood as taking specific sticks—the rights to improve, develop, and subdivide—for an indefinite period, while leaving others (like mere possession) in the owner’s hands.

6. Ad Valorem Taxes as a “Pertinent Factor”

“Ad valorem” taxes are property taxes based on assessed value. When the State restricts land via the Map Act:

the property’s assessed value often decreases,
which reduces the owner’s tax burden while the restrictions are in place.

Kirby, Chappell, and Mata instruct that:

this tax reduction is one of the “pertinent factors” that a rational buyer and seller would consider when determining fair market value after the taking.
Therefore, it must be considered in the valuation analysis, but
it does not transform the Map Act taking into anything other than an indefinite taking for compensation purposes.

V. Conclusion

Mata v. N.C. Dep’t of Transportation cements and clarifies the law governing Map Act corridor takings in North Carolina. It holds that:

DOT’s recording of a corridor map effects an indefinite taking of fundamental property rights at the moment of recording.
Later legislative rescission does not retroactively change the character of the taking to “temporary.”
The correct measure of just compensation is the difference in fair market value immediately before and immediately after the recording, plus interest, with all pertinent factors—including indefinite duration and tax effects—taken into account.
Appraisers retain the flexibility to use standard valuation methods, including income capitalization and rental value assumptions, so long as they are aimed at estimating fair market value at the date of the taking.

In reaffirming Kirby and Chappell, and reversing the Court of Appeals’ attempt to recast Map Act takings as temporary, the Court delivers a clear and administrable rule for trial courts and litigants in the many remaining Map Act cases. At the same time, the concurring opinion underscores the broader policy and fiscal implications of this framework, particularly the prospect of “double payment” when the State later undertakes direct condemnation after the Map Act’s repeal.

Doctrinally, Mata reinforces fundamental themes in takings law:

the character of a taking is determined at its inception, not with hindsight;
indefinite restraints on core property rights are compensable takings, not mere exercises of regulatory power; and
just compensation for such takings is grounded in the property’s market value at the time the government first invades or restricts those rights.

As North Carolina continues to unwind the legacy of the Map Act, Mata will serve as a key precedent guiding both compensation awards and the design of any future land-use planning tools that approach the line between regulation and eminent domain.