“Hostile Appropriation by a Co-Owner” and “Active Concealment” as Dual Triggers for Conversion & Equitable Estoppel: An In-Depth Commentary on Su v. Yeh, 24-0653 (2d Cir. 2025)
1. Introduction
Background. Su v. Yeh concerns a priceless bronze ritual wine vessel from China’s Middle Western Zhou dynasty. Fifty-percent co-owners Yeh Yeo Hwang (“Yeh”) and Wei Su (“Su”) became locked in a transnational dispute following Su’s purchase of the other 50 % share from a third party (Zhang) in 2007—despite Su’s knowledge of Yeh’s interest.
Key Issues on Appeal.
- Whether Su’s conduct constituted conversion under New York law even though he was a co-owner in possession.
- Whether Su’s twelve-year “elaborate scheme” to hide his actions merited equitable estoppel, thereby tolling the three-year statute of limitations.
- Whether the district court improperly denied Su’s Rule 12(c) and Rule 56 motions.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The Court:
- Declined to revisit denials of Su’s pre-trial motions, citing Dupree v. Younger (2023) and Ortiz v. Jordan (2011) (“trial record supersedes”).
- Held that Su’s “hostile appropriation” transcended mere co-owner possession and therefore satisfied both prongs of New York conversion—(a) Yeh’s possessory interest and (b) Su’s unauthorized dominion.
- Affirmed equitable estoppel, finding Su actively concealed the conversion from 2007–2018, and Yeh acted diligently by filing within six months of learning Su’s identity.
- Left intact the remedy: sale of the vessel for $5.4 million with net proceeds split equally.
3. Detailed Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence
- Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, 8 N.Y.3d 43 (2006) – Defines conversion in New York; provided the basic two-element test adopted by the district court and Second Circuit.
- Osborn v. Schenck, 83 N.Y. 201 (1880) & Gates v. Bowers, 169 N.Y. 14 (1901) – Century-old decisions holding that conversion by a co-owner arises only when possession becomes “hostile appropriation.” The panel revitalised these cases, clarifying that the doctrine applies with equal force today.
- Farkas v. Farkas, 168 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 1999) & Gen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125 (1966) – Authority that active concealment alone—without fiduciary duty—can create equitable estoppel.
- Zumpano v. Quinn, 6 N.Y.3d 666 (2006); Ross v. Louise Wise Servs., 8 N.Y.3d 478 (2007); Corsello v. Verizon, 18 N.Y.3d 777 (2012) – “Mere silence” is insufficient. The Circuit distinguished these because Su engaged in affirmative acts, not simple nondisclosure.
- DeSuze v. Ammon, 990 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2021) – Standard of appellate review for equitable estoppel (mixed standard).
3.2 Legal Reasoning
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Conversion.
The Court reiterated that a co-owner may convert jointly owned property when his conduct excludes the other’s beneficial enjoyment. Su not only possessed; he:- bought full title knowing of Yeh’s half;
- twice attempted to auction the vessel as sole owner;
- filed quiet-title actions omitting Yeh; and
- ignored Yeh’s repeated inquiries.
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Equitable Estoppel.
The district court’s finding of an “elaborate scheme” was key. The Circuit parsed three elements:- Active Concealment: Su and his agents’ refusal to answer inquiries, forging or withholding documents, and secret litigation constituted affirmative acts.
- Causal Link: Yeh’s ignorance of Su’s identity and the vessel’s whereabouts was caused by those acts, satisfying Zumpano.
- Due Diligence: Once Yeh learned Su’s identity (via 2018 court-ordered notice), he filed within six months—well under the three-year period, meeting Abbas v. Dixon’s reasonableness test.
- Procedural Posture. By invoking Dupree/Ortiz, the panel clarified that once factual disputes are tried, pre-trial denials are unreviewable “ancient history.”
3.3 Potential Impact
Although issued as a “summary order” (thus non-precedential under Local Rule 32.1.1), the decision is instructive and likely to be cited for persuasive value:
- Conversion Doctrine: Reinforces that co-ownership is not an absolute defense. Any “hostile appropriation” or dealings in derogation of another’s rights equals conversion.
- Statute-of-Limitations Tolling: Confirms that active concealment alone—without a fiduciary relationship—tolls claims. Art and antiquities disputes, often spanning decades and multiple jurisdictions, will rely on this reasoning.
- Auction-House Practice: Sotheby’s exemplary reaction (withdrawing the object, interpleading rivals) versus Chongyuan’s concealment serves as a cautionary tale for international auction houses.
- Litigation Strategy: Defendants contemplating strategic silence or secret proceedings may face equitable estoppel, even where limitations statutes seem iron-clad.
4. Complex Concepts Made Simple
- Conversion – A civil “theft” claim. If you take someone’s property and treat it as yours without permission, you convert it.
- Co-Ownership vs. Hostile Appropriation – Holding joint property is lawful; but if you act like the sole owner and block your partner’s rights, your possession turns hostile and becomes conversion.
- Equitable Estoppel – A fairness doctrine: you can’t hide or lie and later benefit from a deadline you caused the other side to miss.
- Active Concealment vs. Mere Silence – Doing things to keep someone in the dark (e.g., false paperwork, secret lawsuits) is “active”; simply saying nothing is “mere silence.” Only the former tolls the limitations clock absent special duties.
- Statute of Limitations – Deadlines for suing. For conversion in NY, it is typically three years.
- Interpleader – A lawsuit where a middle-man (here, Sotheby’s) asks the court to decide ownership so it isn’t exposed to double liability.
- Summary Order – A short appellate disposition that lacks formal precedential authority but still reflects the court’s reasoning and can guide future courts.
5. Conclusion
Su v. Yeh offers two crucial lessons:
- A co-owner who actively thwarts another’s enjoyment—especially by selling or attempting to sell the whole—commits conversion.
- Active concealment, even without fiduciary duty, tolls the limitations clock through equitable estoppel, provided the plaintiff acts reasonably once the veil lifts.
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