“Heat-of-Passion” Re-Visited:
State v. Mangru Confirms the Sequential-Consideration Rule for Voluntary Manslaughter Instructions in Rhode Island

1. Introduction

Case: State v. Andrew Mangru, Nos. 2023-368-C.A. & 2023-369-C.A., Supreme Court of Rhode Island, opinion filed 15 July 2025.
Parties: The State of Rhode Island (prosecution) v. Andrew Mangru (appellant/defendant).
Trial outcome: Jury convicted Mangru of second-degree murder and several related offenses. Trial justice sentenced him to consecutive life sentences plus additional concurrent terms.
Appellate issue: Whether the trial justice erred by instructing the jury that it could consider voluntary manslaughter (heat-of-passion) only if it first found the State had failed to prove first- or second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal presented a focused but recurring problem in homicide litigation: how to craft jury instructions when a “lesser-included” offense such as voluntary manslaughter is available but evidentially thin. Mangru argued that the order-of-consideration instruction prevented jurors from testing whether malice was negated by heat of passion, allegedly violating both Rhode Island precedent and federal due-process principles drawn from Mullaney v. Wilbur. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions and affirmed the convictions.

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. The Court applied de novo review to the challenged instructions, reading them as a whole from the standpoint of an ordinarily intelligent juror.
2. It held that the charge correctly stated Rhode Island law: voluntary manslaughter is a classic lesser-included offense, properly reached sequentially after consideration of first- and second-degree murder.
3. Nothing in the instructions prevented jurors from weighing evidence of heat-of-passion mitigation while deciding the murder counts. The State’s burden to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt—including malice—was reiterated repeatedly.
4. Because malice and heat of passion are mutually exclusive mental states, the jury’s finding of malice beyond a reasonable doubt necessarily disproved heat-of-passion beyond a reasonable doubt.
5. The Court distinguished Mullaney v. Wilbur and related Rhode Island intoxication-defense cases, noting that Mangru’s instructions involved no mandatory presumption or burden-shifting.
6. Consequently, there was no instructional error and no due-process violation.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) – Held that a state may not shift to the defendant the burden of disproving malice where malice is presumed from an intentional killing.
• Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) – Limited Mullaney; states may allocate burdens regarding affirmative defenses so long as all elements of the offense remain with the prosecution.
• State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926 (R.I. 1987) & State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251 (R.I. 1981) – Expressed concern that juries might convict of the greater offense if they do not fully appreciate lesser alternatives; nevertheless accepted sequential instructions where the jury is fully charged on burdens.
• State v. Isom, 251 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2021) – Reaffirmed de novo review of jury instructions “in their entirety.”
• State v. Esdel, 317 A.3d 756 (R.I. 2024) – Clarified standard for giving lesser-included instructions (“some minimal evidence”).
• Additional explanatory citations: State v. Martinez, State v. Hinrichsen (Neb.), Dandridge v. Commonwealth (Va.).

The Court used these authorities to illustrate two propositions: (a) Rhode Island treats voluntary manslaughter strictly as a lesser-included offense; (b) federal due process is satisfied when the State retains the burden to prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt and no presumption forces the defendant to disprove it.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Nature of Malice vs. Heat of Passion. The Court emphasized the logical incompatibility of malice (deliberation, even momentary) and heat of passion (loss of self-control). If the State proves malice, it necessarily excludes heat of passion.
2. Sequential-Consideration Framework. Rhode Island juries commonly receive “step-down” instructions: first decide first-degree murder; if not proven, consider second-degree; if not, consider voluntary manslaughter. This helps jurors navigate complicated mental-state gradations while preventing compromise verdicts unsupported by evidence.
3. Burden of Proof Safeguards. The trial justice repeatedly instructed: (a) the State bears the burden at all times; (b) defendant need prove nothing; (c) failure to prove any element requires acquittal on that charge. Those admonitions removed any Mullaney problem.
4. Distinguishing Affirmative Defenses. Heat-of-passion manslaughter in Rhode Island is not an affirmative defense; it resides within the lesser-included structure. By contrast, intoxication or self-defense can be affirmative defenses requiring special burden language. Thus, the Rhode Island intoxication cases cited by Mangru were inapt.
5. No Presumption of Malice. Unlike in Mullaney, the jury was never told to presume malice from the mere fact of an intentional killing. Instead, malice had to be deduced from the circumstantial evidence of the shooting, including testimony about provocation.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

• Codifies Instructional Practice. Mangru firmly embeds the sequential-consideration approach as constitutionally sound, reducing future challenges based on Mullaney.
• Clarifies “Some Minimal Evidence” Standard. Although the State opposed any manslaughter charge, the trial justice’s decision to give it—and the Supreme Court’s tacit approval—signal that Rhode Island continues to apply a lenient threshold for lesser-included instructions, benefiting defendants.
• Guidance for Bench & Bar. Trial judges can safely instruct that voluntary manslaughter should be evaluated only after murder counts, provided they (a) fully define malice and heat of passion; (b) repeat the State’s burden; and (c) avoid presumptions.
• Strategic Effects on Defense Counsel. The ruling cautions defense attorneys that arguing both “I didn’t do it” and “I was provoked” remains permissible, but they cannot expect a jury to test provocation if it has already credited malice.
• Policy Considerations. By reaffirming that malice and passion are mutually exclusive, the Court preserves clear doctrinal lines, limiting jury confusion and supporting uniform verdicts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Malice Aforethought

A legal term for the mental state required for murder: an intent to kill or extreme indifference to human life formed before the killing—even if only for a moment.

Voluntary Manslaughter (Heat of Passion)

An intentional killing without malice because the defendant acted in the throes of intense emotion produced by “adequate provocation” (e.g., extreme assault, sudden discovery of adultery). The law regards human frailty as less blameworthy.

Lesser-Included Offense

A crime whose elements are entirely contained within a greater crime (e.g., manslaughter within murder). Juries may convict on the lesser if evidence doesn’t support every element of the greater.

Sequential-Consideration / “Step-Down” Instruction

A method directing jurors to evaluate the most serious charge first, then move to lesser ones only if the State fails to meet its burden on the greater charge. Prevents premature compromises.

Burdens of Proof & Persuasion

The State must prove each element of the charged offense “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It cannot require the defendant to disprove an element. Affirmative defenses may shift the burden of producing evidence, but not of ultimate persuasion unless constitutionally permissible.

5. Conclusion

State v. Mangru provides a meticulous reaffirmation of Rhode Island’s homicide-instruction architecture. By holding that courts may direct juries to consider voluntary manslaughter only after discounting murder, the Supreme Court harmonised local practice with federal due process. The decision:

• Confirms that malice and heat of passion are mutually exclusive states of mind;
• Validates “step-down” instructions so long as jurors are clearly told that the State must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt;
• Clarifies that Mullaney v. Wilbur forbids burden-shifting presumptions but does not compel simultaneous consideration of all homicide gradations; and
• Offers practical guidance to trial courts on crafting balanced, comprehensive jury charges.

In the broader legal context, Mangru fortifies doctrinal clarity at the malice-passion intersection and will likely curb future appellate challenges on instructional grounds. For litigants and judges alike, the opinion stands as the definitive statement that, in Rhode Island, voluntary manslaughter remains a lesser-included refuge—but only if the State’s proof of malice falters.