“Harassment Is Not Fraud”: People v. Wilson and the Refined Standard for Intent to Defraud under N.Y. Penal Law § 175.10

Introduction

People v. Wilson (2025 NY Slip Op 02940) arises from a modern pattern of digital-age misconduct—revenge-porn dissemination, false emergency calls (“swatting”), and social-media intrusion. Kenneth Wilson was tried in the Supreme Court, Queens County, and convicted on a raft of charges, most notably nineteen counts of falsifying business records in the first degree. At its core, the prosecution argued that Wilson defrauded emergency service providers by giving them fabricated information, thereby causing the creation of false computer-aided dispatch reports.

On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the falsifying-business-records counts and, because of a voir dire error, ordered a new trial on the remaining charges. Two doctrinal themes distinguish the judgment:

Intent to defraud re-defined: The court held that a defendant who lies to emergency services with the sole purpose of harassing a private individual does not, without more, possess the intent to defraud required by Penal Law § 175.10.
Rigorous voir dire protection: The decision re-affirms that any lingering doubt about a juror’s impartiality requires either an unequivocal assurance or removal for cause; failure to do so is reversible error when peremptories are exhausted.

Summary of the Judgment

The court reversed Wilson’s conviction on all § 175.10 counts and dismissed those charges outright. It found the evidence legally insufficient and against the weight of the evidence because the prosecution failed to prove that Wilson’s conscious objective was to defraud. Instead, the only rational inference was that his purpose was to “harass, intimidate, and embarrass” the complainant.

On the remaining counts—false reporting, computer trespass, computer tampering, criminal contempt, stalking, and coercion—the court did not disturb the indictments. However, because the trial judge erroneously denied a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror (J.M.) after equivocal statements about impartiality, the panel ordered a new trial on those charges. The resentencing appeal was dismissed as academic.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620 (1983): Sets the lens for sufficiency review—evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Wilson employs this but finds the evidence still lacking.
People v. Booker, 195 A.D.3d 743 (2021) & People v. Lappe, 169 A.D.3d 927 (2019): Earlier applications of § 175.10 where intent to defraud was found; Wilson distinguishes them because the motives there involved pecuniary or deception-based objectives, not pure harassment.
People v. Bravo, 188 A.D.3d 1086 (2020): Provides the template for “weight of the evidence” review leading to dismissal; the court in Wilson follows Bravo to conclude the verdict was against the weight of the evidence on the business-records counts.
People v. Sala, 95 N.Y.2d 254 (2000) & People v. Torres, 177 A.D.3d 579 (2019): Clarify that sufficiency and weight analysis is based on the charge as given to the jury. This mattered for sustaining the computer-related convictions.
People v. Harris, 19 N.Y.3d 679 (2012) and progeny (Reyes, Rose, Warrington, Moses): Stand for the rule that denial of a valid for-cause challenge, coupled with the exhaustion of peremptory challenges, preserves and constitutes reversible error. Wilson squarely applies this line to prospective juror J.M.

2. Legal Reasoning

Two statutory frameworks shaped the opinion: (a) Penal Law § 175.10 (Falsifying Business Records in the First Degree) and (b) CPL § 270.20 (jury challenges).

a) Intent to Defraud Under § 175.10

The statute elevates falsifying business records to the first degree where the conduct is “with intent to defraud and includes the intent to commit, aid or conceal another crime.”
Penal Law § 15.05 defines intent as a “conscious objective.” Invoking Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024), the court emphasized that defraud involves obtaining property or a benefit through deceit or causing a loss through deceit.
Here, Wilson’s deceitful 911 calls certainly produced false records, but the evidence revealed no scheme to obtain money, property, or other benefit from the emergency providers. The only rational inference was personal harassment of the complainant—an objective distinct from defrauding the service providers.
Because intent to defraud is not presumed from falsity alone, the People’s proof failed both the legal sufficiency threshold and the weight threshold, compelling dismissal of those counts.

b) Voir Dire Error and Reversible Harm

CPL § 270.20(1)(b) allows a challenge for cause where a juror holds a state of mind “likely to preclude” impartiality.
Prospective juror J.M. twice expressed equivocation—“I don’t think it would affect me” followed by “I cannot give complete assurance.” Under Arnold and Harris, such uncertainty triggers a requirement for an unequivocal rehabilitation or excusal.
The trial court declined to probe further and forced the defense to expend a peremptory strike that ultimately exhausted the panel’s supply. Under the precedent chain, that failure automatically mandates reversal.

3. Impact on Future Litigation

Tightened fraud prosecutions: Prosecutors must now demonstrate a deception-for-gain or loss component—mere misinformation that causes official record-keeping will not satisfy § 175.10 if the defendant’s goal is non-pecuniary harassment. Swatting, doxxing, and revenge-porn schemes may need alternative charging instruments (e.g., § 240.50 false reporting, stalking statutes, or the newly-enacted Unlawful Dissemination of an Intimate Image statutes).
Compliance training for emergency services: Agencies may revisit their record-keeping definitions; showing that a defendant meant to manipulate dispatch resources as “property of the state” might resurrect a fraud theory.
Voir dire practice: Trial courts in the Second Department (and likely statewide) are on notice that any unresolved hint of bias triggers mandatory clarification. Defense counsel will cite Wilson to buttress for-cause challenges and to preserve appellate rights.
Legislative ripple: The ruling exposes a gap between emerging digital harassment behaviors and fraud-based penal provisions. Albany may craft a targeted “digital harassment via emergency services” statute that removes the fraud element or defines a broader, non-pecuniary “public resource interference” intent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Intent to Defraud: A mental state where a person aims to deceive someone in order to obtain money, property, or cause loss; not satisfied by simply lying to annoy or embarrass.
Legal Sufficiency vs. Weight of the Evidence:
- Legal sufficiency asks whether any rational juror could convict on the proof viewed most favorably to the prosecution.
- Weight of the evidence permits a reviewing court to sit as a “thirteenth juror,” weighing credibility and deciding whether it would convict.
For-Cause Challenge: A request to excuse a prospective juror for a specific reason (bias, relationship, inability to serve) that, if granted, does not deplete either side’s limited peremptory challenges.
Peremptory Challenge Exhaustion Rule: If the defense is forced to use all peremptories because a biased juror was wrongfully kept, an appellate court must reverse unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conclusion

People v. Wilson draws a bright line: Without proof that a defendant intended to deceive someone for gain or to inflict monetary/ property loss, the offense of falsifying business records in the first degree is not established, even if the defendant knowingly causes false official documentation. The decision simultaneously fortifies juror-impartiality safeguards, confirming that equivocal answers require decisive judicial action.

In an era where cyber-harassment blends with traditional criminal statutes, Wilson recalibrates prosecutorial strategy and underscores the judiciary’s role in adapting legal interpretation to contemporary misconduct. Prosecutors must scrutinize motive, trial courts must police voir dire with rigor, and legislatures may need to craft nuanced provisions to fill the newly-clarified gap between fraud and harassment. Ultimately, the ruling enriches New York jurisprudence by clarifying statutory intent requirements and reaffirming the constitutional promise of an impartial jury.