“Good-Bye, Chevron: The Supreme Court of North Carolina Re-Establishes Pure De Novo Review in Savage v. N.C. Department of Transportation”

1. Introduction

Savage v. N.C. Dep’t of Transportation, No. 235PA23 (N.C. Aug. 22, 2025) squarely addresses two distinct questions: (1) Who has the last word on the meaning of a state statute—the courts or the executive agency that administers it? and (2) Does the criminal-dismissal statute in N.C.G.S. § 20-34.1 apply to the recertification of school-bus drivers? The petitioner, Thurman Crofton Savage, was a “driver education program specialist” discharged by the North Carolina Department of Transportation (“NCDOT”) after admitting that he recertified drivers without completing required ride-along observations. NCDOT invoked § 20-34.1, arguing that Savage entered “false information concerning a drivers license” and that the statute mandated his dismissal.

After an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in Savage’s favour, the Court of Appeals reversed, deferring to NCDOT’s reading of § 20-34.1. The Supreme Court of North Carolina granted discretionary review to resolve whether such deference is appropriate and how the statute should be read. In an opinion by Justice Dietz, the Court:

Formally abolishes Chevron-style agency deference under North Carolina law and overrules any Court of Appeals decisions to the contrary;
Holds that courts must apply traditional de novo review to all questions of statutory construction;
Concludes that § 20-34.1 does not reach the school-bus certification data altered by Savage; and
Reverses and remands for the Court of Appeals to address the remaining “just-cause” issues.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously agrees on the outcome (with separate opinions), but its principal holding is two-fold:

Standard of Review: Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law for the judiciary and must be reviewed de novo. Any formulation that obliges a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation is rejected.
Statutory Meaning: The phrase “false information concerning a drivers license” in § 20-34.1 refers exclusively to information about a driver’s license or a special identification card—not to the separate credential (school-bus driver’s certificate) at issue. Accordingly, Savage’s actions do not trigger the criminal penalty or mandatory dismissal provisions of the statute.

The Court thus vacates the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remands for further consideration of whether NCDOT nonetheless had “just cause” for termination under general state-employment principles.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (overruled by Loper Bright) – The federal wellspring of “Chevron deference,” which instructed courts to yield to reasonable agency interpretations when a statute is ambiguous.
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) – The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent repudiation of Chevron; relied upon by Savage to argue that agency deference is likewise unwarranted in state practice.
County of Durham v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res., 131 N.C. App. 395 (1998) – An earlier Court of Appeals decision importing Chevron-type deference into North Carolina jurisprudence; decisively overruled here.
In re Summons Issued to Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. 612 (2009), N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649 (2004), and Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 N.C. 748 (2024) – Supreme Court decisions affirming de novo review for legal questions and foreshadowing the demise of deference.
High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. N.C. Dep’t of Transportation, 366 N.C. 315 (2012) – Often read as supporting deference; the Court explains that “great weight” meant “respectful consideration,” not blind obedience.
Classic constitutional sources – White v. Worth, 126 N.C. 570 (1900) and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), emphasising the judiciary’s duty to “say what the law is.”

Collectively, these authorities underpin the Court’s conclusion that Chevron-style deference never truly took root in North Carolina and cannot coexist with the state’s separation-of-powers doctrine.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Textual Analysis of § 20-34.1
- The statute penalises false entries “concerning a drivers license or a special identification card.” The Court observes that the General Assembly defined “license” broadly elsewhere (§ 20-4.01(17)), but conspicuously did not use the broader term in § 20-34.1. Therefore the narrower, ordinary meaning controls.
- A school-bus driver’s certificate, though essential to operating a school bus, is a distinct credential; misstatements about it cannot be re-described as misstatements about a “drivers license.” The Court rejects NCDOT’s attempt to conflate the two via cross-references.
Standard of Review Discussion
- The Court dissects the historical creep of Chevron into state courts, attributing it to misinterpretations of “give great weight” language in earlier cases.
- Citing Article IV, Section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution, it reiterates that judicial power cannot be ceded to the executive, except where the Constitution expressly allows quasi-judicial delegation. Even then, courts must independently review questions of law.
- By expressly disavowing Chevron, the Court removes any ambiguity for lower courts: “What it cannot do is control our judgment.”

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation and Administrative Law

Restoration of the Judiciary’s Interpretive Monopoly
Lower North Carolina courts must now review all statutory questions ab initio, without affording controlling weight to agency interpretations. Litigants can expect more robust judicial scrutiny of agency positions.
Agency Rule-Making and Guidance Vulnerability
While agencies may still promulgate rules under delegated authority, their interpretations will carry only “power to persuade.” Expect increased challenges to administrative rules, especially where the enabling statute is ambiguous.
Employment-Law Consequences
Because § 20-34.1 no longer mandates dismissal in analogous scenarios, state agencies will need to satisfy the ordinary “just cause” standard for employee discipline—inviting closer ALJ and judicial review.
Influence Beyond North Carolina
As many states grapple with the fate of Chevron after Loper Bright, Savage provides a clear roadmap for abandoning deference while still according respectful consideration (i.e., Skidmore) to agency expertise.

3.4 Complex Concepts Simplified

Chevron Deference: A now-discarded federal doctrine that told courts: “If the statute is unclear and the agency’s reading is reasonable, accept the agency’s view—even over your own.”
De Novo Review: Latin for “from the new.” The appellate court looks at the legal question as though it were never decided before, without obligatory respect for the previous decision-maker’s conclusion.
Skidmore Deference: Named after Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944). Agencies may persuade courts through thoroughness and logic, but courts remain free to disagree.
Just Cause (State Employment): Under the North Carolina Human Resources Act, most state employees can be disciplined only for “just cause,” which includes (1) unacceptable personal conduct, (2) grossly inefficient job performance, or (3) unsatisfactory job performance.
School-Bus Driver’s Certificate vs. Driver’s License: A commercial driver’s license (CDL) authorises operation of large vehicles generally. The certificate is an additional credential verifying training specific to school buses. They are legally distinct.

4. Conclusion

Savage v. N.C. Dep’t of Transportation will stand as a watershed in North Carolina administrative law. By jettisoning Chevron-style agency deference, the Court restores the judiciary’s exclusive province to interpret statutes and aligns state doctrine with the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent holding in Loper Bright. At the same time, the decision clarifies the narrow reach of § 20-34.1, preventing agency over-extension of a criminal-dismissal statute to disciplinary contexts that the General Assembly did not intend.

Going forward, agencies must ground their actions in clear statutory language and defend them on the merits. Courts, for their part, must engage fully with the text, structure, and purpose of legislation—mindful that while agency experience may inform, it can never dictate, judicial judgment.