“Fulton’s Direct Action Doctrine” – Eleventh Circuit Recognises a Self-Executing Cause of Action Under the Takings Clause

1. Introduction

In Brandon Fulton v. Fulton County Board of Commissioners, No. 22-12041 (11th Cir. 31 July 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held—over a vigorous dissent—that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, contains its own self-executing cause of action allowing suits for monetary “just compensation” directly against local governments. Because Congress has not expressly provided such a remedy, the decision fashions a new precedent—dubbed here the “Fulton Direct Action Doctrine”—permitting property owners to bypass 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (and its Monell limitations) when no state or federal statutory route affords relief.

The panel (Judge Rosenbaum writing; Chief Judge William Pryor dissenting) vacated a district-court order denying Fulton leave to amend his complaint and remanded, paving the way for a direct constitutional damages claim against Fulton County for the alleged seizure of seven horses.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Issue: Does the Takings Clause itself provide a cause of action for damages against a local government when no statutory vehicle is available?
Holding: Yes. The Takings Clause’s guarantee of “just compensation” is “self-executing” and historically intended to supply a direct judicial remedy; therefore Brandon Fulton may sue Fulton County directly under the Constitution.
Disposition: District court’s denial of leave to amend deemed erroneous; matter vacated and remanded.
Dissent: Chief Judge Pryor criticised the majority for usurping Congress, ignoring sovereign-immunity structure, and overlooking adequate alternative remedies under § 1983 and state law.

3. Background of the Case

• April 2017: Fulton County Animal Services arrested Brandon Fulton for animal-cruelty and seized seven horses.
• April 2018: Criminal charges dismissed; horses never returned nor paid for.
• May 2020: Fulton sues under § 1983; cannot allege official “policy or custom” (Monell).
• He seeks to amend complaint to plead a direct Fifth-Amendment claim.
• District court: amendment futile—Takings Clause has no direct cause of action; claim dismissed.
• Appeal ensues; after argument the Supreme Court decides DeVillier v. Texas (2024) but leaves the cause-of-action question open; Eleventh Circuit solicits supplemental briefs and issues present decision.

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited

DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285 (2024) – SCOTUS acknowledged open question; Eleventh Circuit steps in.
Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019) – clarified that takings violations are complete upon uncompensated taking.
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) – § 1983 municipal liability requires policy/custom; central impediment here.
Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933); Great Falls Mfg. (1888); Portsmouth Harbor (1922) – early recognition of self-executing nature of Clause against federal gov’t.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) – comparison with Suspension Clause; judiciary must enforce constitutional remedies.
Habeas precedents (Boumediene, Hayman) used by majority as structural analogy.

4.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Textual Hook: The Takings Clause uniquely guarantees a monetary remedy (“just compensation”). Because legal relief requires a cause of action, the remedy must carry its own vehicle.
Self-Execution: Citing Knick and ante-bellum practice, the majority asserts the right vests instantly at taking, independent of legislative action.
Historical Practice: From Revolutionary‐era grievances to 19th-century state common-law trespass and inverse-condemnation suits, courts enforced compensation without legislative grants.
Structural Parallel to Habeas: Like the Suspension Clause’s writ, Congress may regulate procedures but cannot narrow substance; if statutory substitutes (e.g., § 1983) are narrower, constitutional remedy remains directly available.
Inadequacy of Existing Remedies: § 1983 barred by Monell; Georgia inverse-condemnation time-barred by 12-month ante-litem notice; thus Fulton otherwise remediless.
Sovereign Immunity No Bar: Counties lack Eleventh-Amendment immunity; and even if they had, constitutional guarantee would override.
No Bivens Obstacle: Cause of action predates and stands apart from Bivens jurisprudence; Tucker Act suits show federal courts already entertain direct takings claims.

4.3 Impact of the Decision

New Precedent (Eleventh Circuit): Property owners within Alabama, Florida, and Georgia can sue counties and municipalities directly for compensation without satisfying Monell.
Strategic Litigation Shift: Plaintiffs will plead direct claims alongside § 1983, circumventing policy/custom hurdle; municipalities face larger exposure.
Forum & Limitations: Four-year personal-property statute applies in Georgia; other states’ limitations will be litigated anew.
Pressure on Supreme Court: Deepens split (Fifth Circuit in DeVillier skirted issue); invites eventual national resolution.
Fiscal & Insurance Repercussions: Local governments may reassess insurance, budgeting, and training of officers handling seizures.
Legislative Response Possible: Congress could amend § 1983 to relax Monell for takings—or, conversely, enact a comprehensive federal takings-damages statute to standardise procedures.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Self-Executing Right: A right that becomes legally enforceable the moment it is violated, without waiting for legislation.
Cause of Action: The legal “ticket” that lets a plaintiff enter court to seek a remedy.
Monell Policy/Custom Requirement: Under § 1983, a city or county pays damages only when an official policy or widespread custom caused the constitutional harm, not just any employee’s mistake.
Inverse Condemnation: A lawsuit by a property owner alleging the government effectively took property without formal eminent-domain proceedings.
Sovereign Immunity: A doctrine shielding governments from lawsuits unless they consent; counties generally lack federal sovereign immunity.
Bivens Action: A judge-made damages remedy against federal officers for certain constitutional violations; now disfavoured.

6. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Fulton marks a significant doctrinal development: it breathes independent life into the Takings Clause, allowing plaintiffs to demand compensation from local governments without the statutory scaffolding of § 1983. Grounded in a dense historical and structural analysis—and criticised by the dissent as judicial overreach—the decision opens a new litigation avenue and intensifies the national debate over the scope of implied constitutional remedies. Whether the Supreme Court will endorse, restrict, or overturn this “Fulton Direct Action Doctrine” remains to be seen, but for now property owners in the Eleventh Circuit hold a potent new tool, and local governments a corresponding liability, under the venerable promise that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.”