“From ‘Any District Court’ to ‘The Proper County’: The New Mexico Supreme Court Clarifies Venue for NMCRA Claims in City of Roswell v. Sanchez-Gagne

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of New Mexico, exercising its original jurisdiction, resolved a pivotal question under the newly-enacted New Mexico Civil Rights Act (NMCRA): Where may plaintiffs sue a municipality for alleged state-constitutional rights violations? After a fatal police shooting in Roswell (Chaves County), the decedent’s relatives and survivors (“Real Parties in Interest”) sued only the City of Roswell in Santa Fe County’s First Judicial District Court. The City moved to dismiss for improper venue, contending that NMSA 1978, § 38-3-2 (1939) dictates that suits against a municipality must be brought in the county where the municipality is located. The district court disagreed, relying on NMCRA § 41-4A-3(B) which states a plaintiff “may maintain an action … in any New Mexico district court.”

Because multiple NMCRA suits were being filed in foreign counties and lower-court rulings had diverged, the high court accepted a petition for a writ of superintending control. The decision now clarifies the boundary between jurisdiction (a court’s power to hear a type of case) and venue (the geographic place to file it) for all future NMCRA litigation.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding 1: Section 41-4A-3(B) of the NMCRA confers jurisdiction on district courts statewide; it is not a venue statute.
• Holding 2: Venue in actions against municipalities remains governed by § 38-3-2, which requires the lawsuit to be instituted “only in the district court of the county in which such municipality is located.”
• Outcome: The Court issued a writ directing Judge Sanchez-Gagne to dismiss the Santa Fe case for improper venue, compelling refiling in Chaves County if plaintiffs choose to proceed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court’s reasoning draws on a tapestry of precedent governing statutory construction, superintending control, and venue:

• Johnson & Johnson v. Wilson, 2025-NMSC-003 – confirmed broad authority under Article VI, § 3 to regulate “pleading, practice, and procedure” via superintending control.
• Baker v. BP America Production Co., 2005-NMSC-011; Blancett v. Dial Oil Co., 2008-NMSC-011; Gardiner v. Galles Chevrolet Co., 2007-NMSC-052 – each underscores that the “proper interpretation of the venue statute” is a matter of substantial public interest warranting extraordinary review.
• Lujan Grisham v. Romero, 2021-NMSC-009 – reiterates de novo review of constitutional and statutory questions.
• Bolen v. New Mexico Racing Commission, 2025-NMSC-___ – describes the NMCRA as a “state analogue” to § 1983 and the Legislature’s waiver of sovereign immunity.
• Statutory exemplars such as § 41-4-18(B) (Tort Claims Act venue) helped illustrate how the Legislature traditionally embeds venue language (“shall be in the district court for the county…”) when it intends to do so.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Examination. The key verb in § 41-4A-3(B) is “maintain,” which the Court contrasts with verbs commonly used to designate venue (“bring,” “institute,” “commence,” “file”). “Maintain” implies pursuit of an already-filed action, not the initiation of suit.
2. Structural Comparison. Surveying dozens of New Mexico statutes, the Court observes that every true venue provision:
   • Identifies a county or counties, and
   • Uses initiation verbs.
   Section 41-4A-3(B) does neither. Therefore, reading it as a venue rule would make it an anomaly and disturb the longstanding § 38-3-2 framework.
3. Harmonious Construction. Under canons of interpretation, courts avoid construing statutes to conflict when they can be read together. Treating § 41-4A-3(B) as a jurisdictional grant leaves § 38-3-2 fully operative.
4. Policy Concerns. Floodgates were opening in the First Judicial District (Santa Fe) because plaintiffs perceived a permissive statewide venue. The Court feared “forum shopping,” redundant litigation over the same threshold issue, and waste of public funds until appellate guidance arrived.
5. Superintending Control Justified. Contrary to the Real Parties’ characterization of a “mundane venue dispute,” the combination of (i) newly minted rights, (ii) inconsistent district-court rulings, and (iii) imminent proliferation of suits against every city and county elevated the issue to one of “substantial public interest.”

3.3 Potential Impact

• Immediate Procedural Uniformity. Plaintiffs must now file NMCRA suits against municipalities (and boards of county commissioners) in the defendant’s home county.
• Reduced Forum Shopping. The decision curtails strategic filing in perceived plaintiff-friendly venues like Santa Fe or Albuquerque when the underlying incident occurred elsewhere.
• Resource Allocation. Local governments avoid litigating far from home, potentially saving travel costs and aligning juries with communities directly affected by the alleged conduct.
• Legislative Signal. If the Legislature desires a different venue rule for NMCRA claims, it must expressly amend the Act—mirroring the Tort Claims Act’s explicit venue clause.
• Broader Jurisprudence. By distinguishing “jurisdiction” from “venue” in statutory drafting, the Court furnishes guidance applicable beyond civil-rights litigation whenever a statute contains the phrase “may maintain an action.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Jurisdiction

The legal power of a court to hear and decide a type of case. Without jurisdiction, a judgment is void.

Venue

The location—usually the county—where a lawsuit must be filed. A court with jurisdiction can still dismiss if venue is wrong.

NMCRA (New Mexico Civil Rights Act)

2021 statute creating a state-law analogue to federal § 1983 lawsuits, authorizing damages and injunctive relief for violations of the New Mexico Bill of Rights and waiving certain sovereign-immunity defenses.

Writ of Superintending Control

An extraordinary order from the state’s highest court directing lower courts to follow proper legal procedure. It is broader than mandamus and may issue even when ordinary appeals are unavailable or inadequate.

Statutory Interpretation Canons

Judicial tools for deciphering legislative intent, such as “plain meaning,” “harmonious reading,” and avoidance of surplusage (not reading words out of a statute).

5. Conclusion

City of Roswell v. Sanchez-Gagne crystallizes a sharp but often blurred line: a statute granting the right to “maintain” a cause of action speaks to jurisdiction, not venue, unless the Legislature unmistakably says otherwise. By reaffirming § 38-3-2’s command that municipalities be sued in their own counties, the Court curbs forum shopping, restores consistency across district courts, and signals to lawmakers that precision in drafting is paramount—especially when a landmark civil-rights statute is at stake. Practitioners now have a clear roadmap: sue where the governmental defendant resides, or risk dismissal. The decision thus becomes the foundational New Mexico precedent on venue for NMCRA litigation and a lesson in statutory architecture for future legislative endeavors.