“From Notice to Action” – The Donaldson Standard on Engineering Delay, Suicide-Prevention Measures and the Bridge Owner’s Duty of Reasonable Care

Introduction

Donaldson v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 2025 NY Slip Op 02719, is the latest decision in a closely watched series of George Washington Bridge (GWB) suicide-prevention cases. The plaintiff, Marybeth Donaldson, sued the bi-state Port Authority after her husband Andrew Donaldson died by suicide in 2017. She alleged that the Authority breached its duty of reasonable care by failing to install higher fencing (“suicide barriers”) along the pedestrian walkways despite indisputable notice of prior suicides.

The litigation had already produced a 2021 appellate ruling (Feldman v. Port Authority, 194 AD3d 137) holding that the Port Authority was acting in a proprietary capacity (not a “governmental function”) with respect to bridge design and maintenance. Therefore, traditional negligence principles—not governmental-immunity doctrine—control. On remand, however, Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the Authority; the Appellate Division now affirms. The critical question: has the Authority, as a matter of law, demonstrated that the steps it did take (and the time it took) were reasonable in light of the bridge’s age, complexity, and historical status?

Summary of the Judgment

• The First Department affirms summary judgment dismissing the wrongful-death complaint.
• It holds that the Port Authority did meet its prima facie burden under ordinary negligence by showing:
  • the original four-foot rail complied with all applicable standards;
  • extensive engineering studies and historic-preservation approvals were required before installing higher barriers;
  • temporary and interim measures (police patrols, hotline phones, signage, CCTV, training, partial walkway closures) were implemented promptly and proved “reasonably effective.”
• The plaintiff offered no expert to contest those assertions, relying chiefly on news articles and policy critiques—insufficient to create a triable issue.
• The Court also:
  • upholds denial of plaintiff’s motion to vacate the note of issue (untimely); and
  • dismisses as abandoned her appeal from denial of leave to renew.
• A dissent argues that the majority improperly relied on a negligence theory the Authority never briefed, and that factual questions remain about a two-year delay after engineering tests cleared higher fencing.

Analysis

1. Key Precedents Cited

1. Feldman v. Port Authority, 194 AD3d 137 (1st Dept 2021) – Established that GWB design/maintenance is proprietary; ordinary negligence applies.
2. Brown v. State, 31 NY3d 514 (2018) – Government actor must take “reasonable steps in a reasonable time” once on notice of a dangerous condition.
3. Friedman v. State, 67 NY2d 271 (1986) – Unjustifiable delay in implementing an adopted safety plan can be actionable; but delays justified by engineering or funding constraints are not.
4. Valenti v. Camins, 95 AD3d 519 (1st Dept 2012) – Court may grant summary judgment on an unpleaded theory if no surprise or prejudice.
5. Wittorf v. City of New York, 23 NY3d 473 (2014); Perlov v. Port Authority, 189 AD3d 1624 (2d Dept 2020) – Scope of roadway owner’s proprietary duty.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Burden Shifting on Summary Judgment

• Because Feldman already fixed the standard (ordinary negligence), the motion court and Appellate Division were free to “search the record” (CPLR 3212[b]) for that issue, even if defendant emphasized governmental immunity.
• The Authority’s affidavits (engineer Gorman; Lt. Duffy) sufficed to meet its prima facie burden: they asserted compliance with industry standards, explained the years of wind-tunnel testing and historic-review requirements, compared timelines to the Golden Gate Bridge project, and quantified interim prevention results (53 of 60 attempts foiled in 2016).
• Lacking a counter-expert, plaintiff could not raise fact questions about whether earlier fencing was feasible or whether interim steps were inadequate.

b. Reasonableness of Engineering Delay

• The bridge is nearly 100 years old; any alteration implicates aerodynamic stability and historic-preservation law. Tests ran Feb 2015–Dec 2015; mock-ups and contract bidding followed into 2017.
• Friedman’s “reasonable delay” doctrine shields owners who study, design, obtain approvals, and sequence work before altering critical infrastructure.
• The Court implicitly adopts an engineering-constraints safe-harbor: if an owner can document that design/testing/approvals were complex and continuous, delay alone will not evidence negligence.

c. Effect of Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Choices

• By relying on news articles rather than expert testimony, plaintiff left core technical assertions unrebutted, dooming her claim under Buchholz v. Trump 767 Fifth Ave. LLC, 5 NY3d 1 (2005).
• The decision signals a practical warning: in infrastructure-safety suits, expert engineering evidence is indispensable.

3. Impact of the Decision

Donaldson sets a concrete, two-part standard for suicide-prevention claims against bridge owners (public or private):

1. Notice triggers duty—but compliance exists if the owner (a) initiates professional studies promptly and (b) adopts interim deterrent measures.
2. Documented engineering process shields delay—extensive testing, historic-preservation consultations, or aerodynamic concerns constitute “reasonable justification” for multi-year timelines.

Future plaintiffs must now marshal engineering experts able to dispute the practicability of earlier installation, the adequacy of interim safeguards, and the interpretation of structural tests. Municipal defendants, conversely, are encouraged to create thorough paper trails (reports, timelines, comparators) to defeat negligence claims at the summary-judgment stage.

Procedurally, Donaldson also broadens courts’ willingness to search the record for unbriefed theories—so long as the opposing party cannot show prejudice. Litigants should anticipate and address all viable liability theories, even those their adversary seems to disavow.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Governmental vs. Proprietary Function – A governmental entity ordinarily enjoys immunity when performing core governmental tasks (e.g., policing). When it behaves like a private landlord or engineer (maintaining a bridge), it is “proprietary” and held to ordinary negligence.
• Law of the Case – Once an appellate court decides a legal point (here, the proprietary nature of the duty), that ruling binds lower courts for the rest of the litigation.
• Prima Facie Showing – The initial burden on a movant for summary judgment to produce evidence that, if uncontroverted, would entitle it to judgment.
• Search the Record – CPLR 3212(b) permits a court to grant summary judgment on grounds not raised by the movant if the record fully supports it.
• Reasonable Delay Doctrine – Under Friedman, an owner may delay implementing a remedy if the delay arises from bona fide design studies, funding priorities, or similar constraints.

Conclusion

Donaldson v. Port Authority crystallizes a pragmatic equilibrium between public-safety expectations and engineering realities. Once alerted to a suicide hazard, a bridge owner must act—but courts will deem it reasonable to:

• conduct sophisticated testing and obtain mandatory approvals before altering a complex, historic structure;
• implement interim, non-structural deterrents; and
• document each step meticulously.

The “Donaldson Standard” thus supplies a roadmap for infrastructure custodians—and a cautionary tale for plaintiffs: without targeted expert testimony challenging the technical rationale and the project timeline, negligence claims alleging delayed safety improvements are unlikely to survive summary judgment.