“Fresh Enough”: Seventh Circuit Re-Affirms that Two-Week-Old Intelligence Can Sustain Probable Cause for Warrants Targeting Ongoing Drug Operations

1. Introduction

In United States v. Gregory Harris, No. 24-2053 (7th Cir. June 23, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a non-precedential order—but one that nonetheless provides an instructive primer on several Fourth and Sixth Amendment doctrines as well as sentencing practice under the federal guidelines. The case revolved around Gregory Harris’s conviction for possessing methamphetamine and heroin with intent to distribute, an eventual guilty plea, and his attempt—through appointed appellate counsel—to challenge the district court’s suppression and sentencing rulings. The appellate court, applying the Anders framework, ultimately granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal as frivolous.

Despite its summary nature, the decision clarifies and reinforces a number of doctrinal touchstones, most notably:

The correct approach to “staleness” in search-warrant affidavits where drug trafficking appears continuous, not isolated;
The breadth of the good-faith exception under United States v. Leon;
The stringent showing required to obtain a Franks hearing based on alleged omissions;
How Anders procedure channels appellate review when counsel sees no non-frivolous issues.

“We grant the motion [to withdraw] and dismiss the appeal.” – Seventh Circuit

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit conducted the limited inquiry prescribed by Anders v. California, scrutinizing every potential issue identified by counsel. It held that:

Probable cause and staleness: Three controlled buys within a two-week window connected the Dolton residence to a continuing narcotics enterprise. A 13-day delay between the last buy and the warrant application did not render the information stale.
Good-faith safety net: Even if the affidavit had been technically deficient, officers relied on the warrant in objective good faith, triggering the Leon exception to the exclusionary rule.
No Franks error: The defendant failed to make the required “substantial preliminary showing” that the omitted facts were material or the affiant recklessly disregarded the truth.
Plea colloquy was Rule 11-compliant: Minor omissions were harmless, and the guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent.
Sentence was substantively reasonable: The court departed downward on criminal-history grounds and imposed a below-Guidelines term of 150 months, well-explained under § 3553(a).

Having found no non-frivolous issues, the panel dismissed the appeal.

3. In-Depth Analysis

3.1 Key Precedents and Their Influence

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Established the protocol for counsel seeking to withdraw when an appeal would be frivolous. The Seventh Circuit’s entire review was shaped by this template.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (implicitly relied upon). Provides the good-faith exception. The panel repeated the principle that a warrant brings a presumption of good faith; the defendant must overcome it.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Governs challenges to the veracity of warrant affidavits. The decision applied Franks to omissions and reiterated the high “substantial preliminary showing” bar.
United States v. Yarber, 915 F.3d 1103 (7th Cir. 2019). Invoked for the proposition that short delays do not defeat probable cause when drug trafficking is ongoing.
United States v. Jones, 56 F.4th 455 (7th Cir. 2022). Confirmed that evidence from “just ten days before” a warrant application was not stale. The panel analogized Harris’s 13-day delay.
United States v. Woodfork, 999 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2021). Reiterated the standard for materiality in Franks claims.
United States v. Holder, 94 F.4th 695 (7th Cir. 2024). Addressed the presumption of reasonableness for below-Guidelines sentences.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeded in four logical steps:

Define Scope of Review: Under Anders, the court limited itself to the issues flagged by counsel, but still examined them for potential merit.
Fourth Amendment Issues:
- Probable Cause & Staleness: Drug trafficking is typically a protracted venture. Therefore, the affidavit’s reference to three separate controlled buys—spread across only 14 days—established an “ongoing pattern,” rendering the 13-day gap insignificant.
- Good-Faith Exception: Because a neutral magistrate issued the warrant and no glaring misstatements appeared, officers reasonably relied on it. This independently justified admission of the seized evidence even if probable cause were marginal.
- Franks Hearing: The omitted facts (Harris did not live at the Dolton home; it was his child’s mother’s residence) did not negate probable cause because the target location was tied to the drug transactions by Harris’s repeated presence. Lacking materiality, no hearing was warranted.
Plea Validity: Rule 11 errors were minor and harmless. Citizenship meant immigration warnings were unnecessary; counsel already appointed made the right-to-counsel warning superfluous; forfeiture was addressed in the plea agreement.
Sentencing: The district court’s downward departure from Category IV to III, and then an additional variance to 150 months (well below even the reduced range), was amply justified. Under Gall/Kimbrough the sentence was “substantively reasonable.”

3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision

Although labeled “nonprecedential,” the order offers persuasive authority and practical guidance:

Re-emphasizes ‘ongoing enterprise’ doctrine: Practitioners can cite the case to argue that controlled buys spaced over a month or less typically render evidence “fresh” for warrant purposes.
Strengthens reliance on Leon: Judges may more readily deny suppression when officers obtain a warrant unless the affidavit is egregiously deficient.
Sets high bar for Franks based on omissions: Simply alleging that omitted facts paint the target in a better light is insufficient; the omissions must obliterate probable cause.
Practical lesson for defense counsel: When counsel believe no viable issues exist, a comprehensive Anders brief is an ethically sound route, and courts will carefully validate its thoroughness.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Staleness Doctrine: Information in a warrant affidavit must be “fresh.” The more continuous the suspected crime, the longer the permissible gap. For drug dealing—a business with daily transactions—courts tolerate longer intervals than for isolated offenses.
Good-Faith Exception (Leon): Even if a warrant lacks probable cause, evidence is usually admissible if officers reasonably relied on it. Only four narrow exceptions override good faith (e.g., lying to the magistrate, facially deficient warrants).
Franks Hearing: A mini-trial to attack a warrant’s truthfulness. The defendant must first make a “substantial preliminary showing” that the officer deliberately or recklessly misled the magistrate and that the misstatement/omission was essential to probable cause.
Anders Brief: A filing by appointed counsel who sees no non-frivolous appellate issues. Counsel must identify anything that “might arguably support the appeal,” and the court independently verifies.
Converted Drug Weight: Guidelines convert various drugs into a common “marijuana equivalent” to set a base offense level. Harris’s 106,000-kilogram converted weight triggered level 38.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Gregory Harris may not bind future panels, yet it provides a compact tutorial on modern search-and-seizure jurisprudence, the mechanics of Anders review, and federal sentencing practice. It underscores that:

Probable cause for an ongoing drug enterprise remains robust for at least two weeks;
The good-faith exception is often decisive when officers obtain a warrant;
Defendants face a steep climb to earn a Franks hearing based merely on omissions;
A thoroughly documented Anders brief can expedite resolution of meritless appeals.

For lawyers and judges alike, the decision reinforces existing principles while sharpening practical contours—especially the interplay between staleness, probable cause, and good faith—in the ever-evolving landscape of Fourth Amendment litigation.