“Foreseeability over Self-Defense” – Sixth Circuit Clarifies the Threshold for an “Occurrence” under Michigan Homeowner Policies

Introduction

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Daniele Giannone, Nos. 24-1264/24-1265 (6th Cir. 2025), confronts a recurring tension in liability-insurance litigation: when an insured intentionally uses force—allegedly in self-defense—but unintentionally injures a third party, is the incident an “accident” (and therefore an “occurrence”) triggering the insurer’s duty to defend and indemnify?

The tragic backdrop is a driveway shoot-out. Daniele Giannone, believing he was under attack by Matthew Mollicone, fired at Mollicone’s vehicle; Mollicone’s wife, Kimberly, was killed. Kimberly’s estate sued Giannone in Michigan state court. Giannone demanded defense and indemnification from his homeowner insurer, State Farm, whose policy:

Grants liability coverage only for bodily injury caused by an “occurrence” (defined as an “accident”).
Contains an intentional-acts exclusion, yet carves out an exception when the insured employs “reasonable force to protect persons or property.”

The district court granted summary judgment for State Farm, holding the shooting was not an accident. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, publishing a robust opinion (with a scholarly concurrence) that harmonises Michigan precedent and clarifies the interplay between “occurrence,” intentional-acts exclusions, and self-defense exceptions.

Summary of the Judgment

Holding. Giannone’s conduct was not an “occurrence” under the policy because shooting at an occupied vehicle created a direct and foreseeable risk of harm; foreseeability negates accidentality.
Self-Defense Irrelevant at the “Occurrence” Stage. Even assuming Giannone acted in reasonable self-defense, Michigan courts treat intentional self-defense as non-accidental. Thus the court never reached the policy’s self-defense carve-out.
Affirmance. State Farm owes no duty to defend or indemnify Giannone in the underlying tort action.
Concurring Clarification (Judge Nalbandian). The concurrence stresses that the presence of a self-defense exception is not meaningless; coverage could exist where self-defensive force unintentionally injures someone in a truly unforeseen manner. Giannone’s facts, however, fail that test.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Masters, 595 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 1999) – defined “accident” and denied coverage where the insured’s intentional arson foreseeably caused widespread damage.
Impact: Provided the “direct risk/foreseeability” standard central to the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCarn, 645 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. 2002) – accidental shooting with a gun the teen believed unloaded; coverage allowed.
Impact: Demonstrated that unintended consequences can be accidents when the insured lacked subjective foresight. Distinguished because Giannone knowingly fired live rounds.
Metropolitan Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. DiCicco, 443 N.W.2d 734 (Mich. 1989) – accidental stabbing during a scuffle. Cited to illustrate when subjective intent negates foreseeability.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 565 N.W.2d 839 (Mich. 1997) – self-defense shooting excluded by intentional-acts clause.
Impact: Signalled that Michigan views self-defense shootings as intentional, not accidental.
Auto Club Grp. Ins. Co. v. Burchell, 642 N.W.2d 406 (Mich. App. 2001); Smorch v. Auto Club, 445 N.W.2d 192 (Mich. App. 1989).

Impact:

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Contractual Starting Point. Under Rory v. Continental, Michigan enforces clear policy language. Coverage is granted only for an “occurrence.”
Accident Analysis. Applying Masters, the court used a subjective foreseeability test: Would Giannone, in his position, have reasonably expected risk to Kimberly by shooting at a car she occupied? Yes.
Distinguishing Favorable Cases. DiCicco and McCarn involved unanticipated discharge or use of weapons; Giannone intentionally fired live bullets.
Self-Defense Does Not Convert Intentionality into Accident. Michigan precedent treats defensive force as intentional; thus it lies outside the “occurrence” threshold. Only after an act passes the occurrence test can the exclusion/exception framework activate.
Concurring Elaboration. Judge Nalbandian agrees but stresses textual coherence: the self-defense exception has practical meaning where the insured’s intentional act itself is reasonable and the resulting injury is truly unforeseen.

C. Potential Impact of the Decision

For Policyholders. Insureds cannot rely on homeowner policies for most gun-discharge cases, even if claiming self-defense, unless the injury was genuinely unforeseeable.
For Insurers. Affirms a powerful defense: argue first that no “occurrence” exists before debating exclusions—especially in jurisdictions mirroring Michigan’s foreseeability standard.
For Litigators. Highlights critical sequencing: plaintiffs seeking coverage should build the record on why harm was not foreseeable from the insured’s subjective vantage point.
For Legislative / Policy Drafting. Encourages clearer drafting if carriers truly intend to cover or exclude self-defense; ambiguity fuels litigation.

D. Complex Concepts Simplified

Occurrence vs. Accident. In insurance-speak, an “occurrence” is simply an “accident”—an event neither expected nor intended by the insured.
Intentional-Acts Exclusion. Even if an event begins as an accident, coverage evaporates if the insured acted willfully or maliciously—unless an exception applies.
Self-Defense Exception. Some policies restore coverage for intentional conduct if the insured used reasonable force to protect life or property.
Foreseeability Test. Michigan courts ask: Did the insured, subjectively, reasonably expect the injury? If yes, it was not accidental.
Sequence of Analysis. (i) Is the event an occurrence? If no, stop—no duty to defend. (ii) If yes, do any exclusions apply? (iii) If an exclusion applies, do any exceptions restore coverage?

Conclusion

State Farm v. Giannone cements a critical ordering principle in Michigan insurance law: before an insured can invoke a self-defense exception, the incident must first qualify as an “occurrence.” If the conduct inherently creates a direct, foreseeable risk of harm—as gunfire at an occupied vehicle invariably does—the event is non-accidental, ending the coverage inquiry.

The decision also foreshadows future litigation paths. The concurrence preserves space for coverage when self-defensive actions yield truly unforeseen injuries, ensuring that self-defense exceptions are not illusory. Nonetheless, the ruling warns insureds that intentional gun use, even under defensive pretences, will rarely pass the occurrence gate. Going forward, practitioners must scrutinise factual foreseeability at the earliest coverage stage, while insurers may confidently rely on the foreseeability doctrine to avoid protracted exclusion-and-exception battles.