“For the purpose of” is not a culpable mental state: Colorado Supreme Court holds “knowingly” is the mens rea for soliciting for child prostitution under § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b)

“For the purpose of” is not a culpable mental state: Colorado Supreme Court holds “knowingly” is the mens rea for soliciting for child prostitution under § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b)

Introduction

In Randolph v. People, 2025 CO 44 (Colo. June 23, 2025), the Colorado Supreme Court resolved a long-standing split over the mental state required to convict under Colorado’s child-prostitution solicitation statute, section 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b), C.R.S. (2024). The Court held that “knowingly,” not “intentionally,” is the applicable culpable mental state, and that the phrase “for the purpose of” in the statute does not itself designate a culpable mental state.

The case arose from an undercover operation in which the petitioner, Deshawn Lynn Randolph, communicated with an investigator using a fictitious profile (“Nicole”), who indicated she was just under 18. Randolph offered to arrange sex work for Nicole. Charged under subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of section 18-7-402, Randolph argued at trial and on appeal that “for the purpose of” equated to a specific intent requirement, and thus the jury should have been instructed that the State had to prove he acted “intentionally.” The trial court instructed the jury using “knowingly,” and the court of appeals affirmed.

Taking certiorari to settle conflicting court of appeals decisions—People v. Emerterio (1991) (knowingly) and People v. Ross (2019 COA 79) (“Ross I”) (intentionally)—the Colorado Supreme Court has now clarified that “knowingly” governs and has expressly overruled Ross I. In reaching this outcome, the Court relied on statutory text, the structure of the Criminal Code’s mental state framework, canons of consistent usage, and prior decisions construing “for the purpose of.”

Summary of the Opinion

  • The applicable culpable mental state for soliciting for child prostitution under § 18-7-402(1)(a) and (1)(b) is “knowingly.”
  • The phrase “for the purpose of” in § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b) does not itself designate a culpable mental state and does not import “intentionally.”
  • Sections (1)(a) and (1)(b) are silent as to mental state, but under § 18-1-503(2), a mental state must be imputed; “knowingly” best fits because these subsections describe conduct and attendant circumstances, not a required result.
  • Reading “for the purpose of” to mean “intentionally” would make § 18-7-402(1)(c) illogical by conflating knowledge and intent (“knew that his intent”), and would disrupt consistent usage of the same phrase across the statute.
  • Ross I is overruled; Emerterio is vindicated; the court of appeals in this case is affirmed.
  • Consistent with Ross II (2021 CO 9), the mens rea applies to every element of the offense, including that the purpose of the defendant’s conduct was the prostitution “of or by a child.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

People v. Emerterio, 819 P.2d 516 (Colo. App. 1991)

  • Held that “knowingly” is the mens rea for § 18-7-402(1)(a). Emphasized that the “gist” of solicitation is the defendant’s awareness of what he is doing; focus is on the initial solicitation, not any later sexual act.
  • Emerterio dominated Colorado law for nearly three decades and provided the foundation for the “knowingly” reading reaffirmed in Randolph.

People v. Ross (“Ross I”), 2019 COA 79, 482 P.3d 452

  • Concluded that “for the purpose of” in § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b) denotes “intentionally” (specific intent), relying on dictionary definitions and analogies to the Model Penal Code’s “purposely.”
  • Randolph expressly rejects Ross I’s approach, faulting its substitution of MPC “purposely” for Colorado’s narrower “intentionally,” and its reading of “for the purpose of” as a designated culpable mental state.

People v. Ross (“Ross II”), 2021 CO 9, 479 P.3d 910

  • The Court declined to resolve whether “intentionally” or “knowingly” applies, but held that a culpable mental state is required and that it modifies every element, including that the purpose of the conduct was prostitution “of or by a child.”
  • Randolph builds on Ross II by selecting “knowingly” as the operative mental state.

People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006)

  • Addressed “knowingly,” “knowing,” and “for the purposes of” in sexual assault on a child statutes. Held the offense is a general intent crime despite “for the purposes of” language; the absence of “intentionally/with intent” was decisive.
  • Supports Randolph’s conclusion that “for the purpose of” does not itself install a specific intent element absent clear legislative direction.

Candelaria v. People, 2013 CO 47, 303 P.3d 1202

  • Interpreted “for the purpose of” in the sexually violent predator (SVP) statute. Rejected a specific intent requirement; when the General Assembly wants specific intent, it says “intentionally” or “with intent.”
  • Used in Randolph to caution against judicially legislating a specific intent requirement from the phrase “for the purpose of.”

People v. Mason, 642 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1982)

  • In the adult-prostitution analogue (§ 18-7-202), the crime is complete upon the prohibited conduct; no result (e.g., subsequent sexual act) is required.
  • Randolph uses this logic to characterize § 18-7-402(1) as a conduct + attendant circumstance offense, not a result crime—fitting “knowingly,” not “intentionally.”

Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2000); People v. Moore, 674 P.2d 354 (Colo. 1984); People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1980); People v. Lawrence, 55 P.3d 155 (Colo. App. 2001); People v. Naranjo, 612 P.2d 1099 (Colo. 1980)

  • Collectively stand for imputing “knowingly” when a non-strict-liability statute is silent on mens rea and there is no clear reason to impute a different or more stringent mental state.
  • Randolph applies this default principle to § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b).

People v. Krovarz, 697 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1985); People v. Childress, 2015 CO 65M, 363 P.3d 155; People v. Derrera, 667 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1983)

  • Explain that “intentionally” in Colorado is defined solely in terms of results; “knowingly” can attach to conduct, attendant circumstances, and results.
  • Underpin Randolph’s reasoning that “intentionally” does not fit a conduct + circumstance statute like § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b).

Statutory interpretation anchors: § 18-1-501(4)-(6) (culpable mental states defined), § 18-1-503(1)-(2) (designation and imputation of mental states), § 2-4-101 (technical meanings by legislative definition), and the 1971 Criminal Code overhaul to standardize mens rea terminology.

Legal Reasoning

1) The statutory text and structure

Section 18-7-402(1) defines three ways to commit the offense: (a) soliciting another “for the purpose of” prostitution of or by a child; (b) arranging or offering to arrange a meeting of persons “for the purpose of” prostitution of or by a child; and (c) directing another to a place “knowing such direction is for the purpose of” prostitution of or by a child. Subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) do not expressly mention any culpable mental state; subsection (1)(c) expressly uses “knowing.”

The Court reads the statute as comprising prohibited conduct (soliciting, arranging/ offering to arrange, directing) accompanied by an attendant circumstance (that the conduct is for the purpose of prostitution of/by a child). No particular effect or result is required; the crime is complete upon the conduct in the relevant circumstance. This is crucial because Colorado’s “intentionally” is defined only in relation to results, while “knowingly” can attach to conduct and circumstances.

2) “For the purpose of” does not designate a culpable mental state

The phrase “for the purpose of” is not listed among Colorado’s four culpable mental states in §§ 18-1-501(4) and 18-1-503(1). The General Assembly, when it wishes to define culpability, ordinarily employs “intentionally,” “knowingly,” “recklessly,” or “criminal negligence,” and has eschewed the MPC’s “purposely.” The Court refuses to insert a fifth mental state by judicial construction or to treat “for the purpose of” as a legislative proxy for “intentionally.”

Reading “for the purpose of” as “intentionally” would also make subsection (1)(c) incoherent; the State would have to prove a defendant “knew that his intent” in directing another to a place was prostitution of/by a child—an illogical mixture of knowledge and intent. Under the canon of consistent usage, the same phrase should carry the same meaning across subsections absent clear contrary indicators. None exists here.

3) Because the statute is not strict liability and is silent, a mental state must be imputed

Under § 18-1-503(2), when a statute defining an offense is silent, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required if the proscribed conduct “necessarily involves” one. Ross II already confirmed a mens rea is required for § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b). The only plausible candidates are “intentionally” or “knowingly” (recklessness and criminal negligence are ill-fitting and not argued).

4) Why “knowingly” fits and “intentionally” does not

  • Knowingly: can attach to conduct (awareness of what one is doing) and to attendant circumstances (awareness the circumstance exists). That maps onto § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b)’s conduct-plus-circumstance structure.
  • Intentionally: in Colorado is defined only with respect to a required result (conscious objective to cause the specific result). Because § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b) does not require that any result occur, “intentionally” is a poor fit and would be superfluous if attached to conduct or circumstances.

The Court therefore imputes “knowingly” to subsections (1)(a)-(b). This continues a common Colorado approach: when a non-strict-liability statute is silent, “knowingly” is generally implied unless a clear reason compels a different mental state.

5) The role of the MPC’s “purposely” and Colorado’s mens rea taxonomy

Ross I treated MPC “purposely” as interchangeable with Colorado’s “intentionally.” Randolph rebukes that move. The MPC’s “purposely” covers conduct, circumstances, and results; Colorado’s “intentionally” is narrower and result-specific. The Legislature’s deliberate choice not to adopt “purposely” in 1971 reinforces that courts should not backfill via “for the purpose of.”

6) “Purpose” in common parlance versus “specific intent”

The Court acknowledges that in some contexts it has equated “purpose” with “intent” in the everyday sense (e.g., Frysig; Childress). But that common usage is distinct from the defined culpable mental state of “intentionally” in § 18-1-501(5). In § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b), “for the purpose of” expresses the reason or motivation behind the conduct, not a special culpable mental state.

Impact

1) Immediate doctrinal effects

  • Resolves the division split by overruling Ross I and embracing Emerterio’s “knowingly” reading for subsections (1)(a)-(b).
  • Confirms that “for the purpose of” is not itself a culpable mental state and does not import “intentionally” absent clear legislative signal.
  • Harmonizes the meaning of “for the purpose of” across § 18-7-402’s three paths (a)-(c), avoiding illogical conflations in (1)(c).

2) Jury instructions and trial practice

  • Pattern instructions for § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b) should use “knowingly” and should reflect Ross II’s rule that mens rea applies to each element, including that the purpose of the conduct was prostitution “of or by a child.”
  • Trial courts should not give instructions equating “for the purpose of” with “intentionally” or defining the phrase to require a conscious objective to cause prostitution to occur.
  • Because “knowingly” is a general intent mental state, voluntary intoxication is not a defense to these charges (contrast with specific intent crimes).

3) Evidentiary focus for prosecutors and defense

  • Prosecution: show the defendant’s awareness that his conduct (soliciting/arranging/ offering to arrange) was undertaken for the reason of prostitution involving a child. Communications acknowledging the minor’s age or purpose of the arrangement will be central.
  • Defense: challenge whether the State proved awareness that the conduct was for that purpose and that a child was involved as part of that purpose. Mere puffery or unrelated motives may be argued, but the jury may infer awareness from context.

4) Broader statutory interpretation beyond child prostitution

  • Reinforces a general rule: the phrase “for the purpose of” in Colorado statutes does not, by itself, insert a specific intent element. Courts will look for explicit “intentionally/with intent” language or clear legislative signals before reading in specific intent.
  • Affirms the default to “knowingly” when a statute is silent and not strict liability, unless text or structure clearly demands otherwise.
  • Guides interpretation of other “for the purpose of” provisions (e.g., SVP designation), consistent with Vigil and Candelaria.

5) Policy and systemic considerations

  • Balances child protection with fair notice of culpability: the State must prove awareness of the proscribed conduct and its purpose, but need not prove a conscious objective to cause prostitution to occur.
  • Promotes coherence in the Criminal Code’s mens rea framework and respects the 1971 legislative effort to standardize mental states.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mens rea vs. actus reus: Most crimes require both a prohibited act (actus reus) and a culpable mental state (mens rea). Here, the act is soliciting/arranging/ offering to arrange; the mens rea is “knowingly.”
  • Colorado’s four culpable mental states: Intentionally (result-focused), knowingly (awareness of conduct/circumstances or practical certainty of result), recklessly, and criminal negligence. “For the purpose of” is not one of them.
  • Attendant circumstances vs. result: Some crimes require a particular outcome (result). Others, like § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b), are complete upon conduct occurring under certain circumstances. “Intentionally” fits result crimes; “knowingly” fits conduct/circumstance crimes.
  • “For the purpose of” as reason, not mens rea: The phrase describes why the conduct occurs (the motivation), not the legal mental state the State must prove. The State must still show the defendant knew that the conduct was for that reason.
  • Consistent usage canon: The same phrase appearing in different parts of a statute is presumed to carry the same meaning unless the Legislature indicates otherwise. This prevents subsection (1)(c) from becoming incoherent.
  • Imputing mens rea when silent: If a statute is not strict liability and does not specify a mental state, courts typically impute “knowingly” unless text or structure calls for a different choice.
  • MPC “purposely” vs. Colorado “intentionally”: The MPC’s “purposely” encompasses conduct, circumstances, and result; Colorado’s “intentionally” is narrower (result only). Courts should not equate the two sub silentio.

Conclusion

Randolph v. People establishes a clear and administrable rule: “knowingly,” not “intentionally,” is the culpable mental state for soliciting for child prostitution under § 18-7-402(1)(a)-(b). The phrase “for the purpose of” neither designates a culpable mental state nor imports specific intent. Instead, it describes an attendant circumstance—the reason the conduct occurs—that the prosecution must prove the defendant was aware of. By overruling Ross I and validating Emerterio, the Court restores coherence to the statute, aligns with the Criminal Code’s defined mental states, preserves consistent usage across subsections, and avoids rendering statutory terms superfluous.

Practically, the ruling guides jury instructions, shapes evidentiary strategies, and limits the availability of specific-intent defenses. Conceptually, it strengthens a broader interpretive principle in Colorado law: absent clear legislative direction, courts should not manufacture specific-intent requirements from phrases like “for the purpose of,” and should default to “knowingly” when a non-strict-liability statute is silent. Randolph thus offers both a definitive resolution in the child-prostitution context and a durable template for analyzing mens rea in similarly worded offenses.

Case Details

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