“Five-Years-Means-Five-Years”: Supreme Court of Ohio Clarifies that Jail-Time Credit Cannot Shorten the Post-Mandatory Waiting Period for Judicial Release

Introduction

State v. Clinkscale, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-2043, presents a focused but consequential statutory-interpretation question: When an offender receives both a mandatory prison term and additional non-mandatory terms, does pre-sentence jail-time credit (R.C. 2967.191) reduce the separate five-year waiting period that must elapse “after the expiration of all mandatory prison terms” before the offender may seek judicial release under R.C. 2929.20(C)(1)(d)?

The Tenth District Court of Appeals answered “yes,” permitting Aarin Clinkscale—convicted of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and two counts of involuntary manslaughter—to apply 762 days of jail-time credit to both his mandatory term and the subsequent five-year waiting period. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Deters, reversed, holding that the five-year waiting period is a fixed span of calendar time untouched by jail-time credit.

Beyond Mr. Clinkscale, the decision resolves a question that generated conflicting trial-court and appellate results across the state and clarifies the interaction of Ohio’s jail-time-credit and judicial-release statutes.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court held that jail-time credit does not reduce the statutory five-year waiting period that begins once an offender completes all mandatory prison terms.
Because Clinkscale filed his second motion for judicial release less than five calendar years after finishing his three-year mandatory firearm-specification sentence, the motion was premature and should not have been considered.
The judgment of the Tenth District affirming the grant of judicial release was reversed, and the matter was remanded for that court to address Clinkscale’s equal-protection argument, which the Supreme Court did not reach.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State v. Moore, 2018-Ohio-3237
Confirmed that jail-time credit cannot be used to shorten a mandatory term itself. Both parties accepted Moore; the dispute concerned the period after the mandatory term.
Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C., 2020-Ohio-1056, and Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992)
Stand for the proposition that once an issue is properly presented, a party may advance any legal argument in support of that issue. These cases enabled the State to refine its statutory-language argument despite an earlier miscalculation.
O’Toole v. Denihan, 2008-Ohio-2574, and Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979)
Provide canons on the disjunctive use of “or,” supporting the Court’s reading that R.C. 2929.20(C)(1)(d) creates two distinct, mutually exclusive eligibility tracks.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds by ordinary statutory construction:

Textual Distinction Between the Two Clauses.
R.C. 2929.20(C)(1)(d) sets separate triggers: (i) for solely non-mandatory sentences, the offender may apply “after the date on which the offender has served five years of the stated prison term”;
(ii) for mixed mandatory/non-mandatory sentences, the offender may apply “not earlier than five years after the expiration of all mandatory prison terms.” Only the first clause references the defined term “stated prison term.” The second clause does not, signalling the General Assembly’s intent to impose a fixed calendar waiting period irrespective of credit.
Role of Jail-Time Credit.
Jail-time credit by statute reduces “the prisoner’s prison term,” but does not alter historical calendar dates. Because the mandatory-terms clause measures five years after the mandatory term’s expiration, and not five years of any sentence being “served,” credit never enters the calculation.
Disjunctive “or” + Comma.
The comma-“or” combination divides two discrete categories of offenders; canons require each to be given independent significance. Importing “stated prison term” from the first clause into the second would collapse the distinction and render the five-year “after expiration” language superfluous.
Practical Workability.
A bright-line rule simplifies administration: prison officials and courts track a single calendar date— completion of all mandatory terms—then add five years. Allowing credit to erode the period would force recalculations and generate inconsistent results statewide.

3. Potential Impact of the Judgment

The opinion’s ripple effects will be felt across criminal practice:

Uniform Sentencing Administration — Clarifies for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, trial courts, and defense counsel that the post-mandatory waiting period is untouchable, reducing litigation and clerical error.
Strategic Considerations for Defenders — Counsel must now advise clients that pre-trial confinement savings do not accelerate judicial-release eligibility when a mandatory term exists.
Prompted Legislative Review — If the General Assembly prefers a credit-inclusive approach, it must amend the second clause to mirror the first; absent such action, the Court’s fixed-period interpretation controls.
Equal-Protection Litigation — The remand leaves open Clinkscale’s equal-protection argument. Future appellate analysis could spur further refinement or uphold the statute’s bifurcated scheme as rational.
Re-entry Planning — Offenders and re-entry program coordinators must adjust timelines for education, programming, and re-integration efforts that hinge on judicial-release windows.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandatory Prison Term: A sentence the judge must impose by statute—for example, the three-year firearm-specification term in this case—during which courts have no authority to reduce or suspend time.
Non-Mandatory (Discretionary) Term: A term that a court may later shorten through judicial release, good-time credit, or other mechanisms.
Jail-Time Credit (R.C. 2967.191): Day-for-day credit against an offender’s total sentence for time spent in jail (or other confinement) before sentencing, ensuring the person does not serve more than the court imposed.
Stated Prison Term: The aggregate of all sentences in the case, expressly reduced by jail-time credit. Used by the General Assembly to set certain waiting periods.
Judicial Release (R.C. 2929.20): A statutory mechanism allowing a trial court—after minimum time requirements are met—to suspend the remainder of a non-mandatory sentence and place the offender on community-control supervision.
Fixed Waiting Period: An eligibility span measured from a calendar date, unaffected by credits or earned reductions.

Conclusion

State v. Clinkscale cements a bright-line rule: for offenders with at least one mandatory prison term, the judicial-release clock starts only after the mandatory term ends, and it runs for an unalterable five years. Jail-time credit, while vital for preventing over-incarceration, cannot erode this legislatively imposed waiting period. The decision harmonizes conflicting lower-court interpretations, simplifies eligibility calculations, and preserves the General Assembly’s chosen distinction between offenders with and without mandatory sentences. Whether the divide withstands future constitutional challenge—or legislative revision—remains to be seen, but for now, the Ohio Supreme Court has spoken with clarity: “five years means five years.”