“Filing Fixes the Right”
Nebraska Supreme Court Clarifies Post-Term Modification Power in Hawk v. Hawk

Introduction

In Hawk v. Hawk, 319 Neb. 120 (2025), the Nebraska Supreme Court confronted a deceptively simple dispute about when interest begins to accrue on a multimillion-dollar marital equalization payment. Beneath the surface, however, lay a fundamental jurisdictional puzzle: may a district court, after its term has ended, alter a dissolution decree in the absence of the specific grounds enumerated in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2001(4)? And if so, at what procedural moment are a movant’s rights “fixed” for purposes of the six-month limitation in § 25-2001(1)?

The Court’s unanimous opinion—authored by Judge Cassel—answers both questions, weaving together the district court’s inherent powers, the 2000 amendments to § 25-2001, and the proper use (and misuse) of “nunc pro tunc” orders. The central holding can be distilled into a crisp new rule:

When a motion seeking relief under § 25-2001(1) is filed within six months of the judgment, the movant’s rights become fixed upon filing—not disposition—allowing the district court to exercise its inherent power to modify the judgment even after the court term and the six-month period have expired.

This commentary unpacks the case, charts the doctrinal path taken by the Court, and explores its broader significance for Nebraska practitioners and trial judges.

Summary of the Judgment

• Facts. The dissolution decree (Feb. 20 2024) required David Hawk to pay Megan Hawk nearly $3 million via eight annual installments, with “judgment interest” of 7.264 % but ambiguous language on when interest began. An April 4 2024 order, agreed to by counsel, slightly clarified payment dates but not the interest-start issue.
• Procedural Posture. The district court’s term ended June 30 2024. On July 29 2024 (within six months), Megan filed a “Motion for Order Nunc Pro Tunc,” effectively asking the court to (1) channel payments through the clerk and (2) attach an amortization schedule showing interest beginning on the decree date (Feb 20). After hearing, the court entered a September 20 2024 order amending the decree: payments must be made through the clerk, interest would not accrue until the first installment’s due date (July 1 2024), and the clerk must keep the running balance. A motion to reconsider was denied; Megan appealed.
• Holdings.
  1. Section 25-2001(1) extends a district court’s inherent, within-term power to vacate or modify its judgments to the post-term period, provided a motion is filed within six months.
  2. The rights of a movant under § 25-2001(1) “become fixed” on the filing date, not the decision date (new precedent).
  3. The district court’s power under subsection (1) is independent of the enumerated “grounds” in subsection (4).
  4. The September 2024 order was a substantive amendment—not a nunc pro tunc correction—and was properly entered.
  5. No abuse of discretion occurred in delaying the start of interest until July 1 2024.
• Disposition. District court order affirmed.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Bradley v. Slater, 58 Neb. 554 (1899) – Early articulation of the court’s inherent power to modify judgments within term.
• Moackler v. Finley, 207 Neb. 353 (1980) – Established that pre-term motions could be decided after the term changed; Hawk extends this rationale to § 25-2001(1) motions.
• Andersen v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 249 Neb. 169 (1996) – Pre-2000 reluctance to allow post-term modifications absent statutory grounds; Hawk distinguishes it due to 2000 legislative change.
• Johnson v. Antoniutti, 318 Neb. 465 (2025) – Recent application of inherent power within term; used to show continuity of doctrine.
• Priest v. Priest, 251 Neb. 76 (1996) – Governing rule on discretionary award of interest in marital property distributions; applied to uphold district court’s decision on interest start-date.
• Clerical vs. Judicial Distinction Cases. In re Interest of Luz P., 295 Neb. 814 (2017) and other clerk-power decisions (e.g., Building Systems, Inc. v. Medical Center, Ltd., 228 Neb. 168 (1988)) were cited to rebuke misuse of nunc pro tunc.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Reading of § 25-2001.
   • Subsection (1) authorises exercise of the power “after the end of the term” if a motion is “filed within six months.” The Court invokes plain-meaning canon: nothing in the language ties the exercise date to the six months—only the filing.
   • Subsection (4) lists separate grounds for relief. The Court reasons these are irrelevant if the court is acting under its inherent power as extended by subsection (1). This divorces the two subsections for distinct analytic paths.
2. “Filing Fixes the Right.”

   The Court analogises pre-term motions (Moackler) and concludes the same principle applies in the 6-month statutory context: once the motion is timely filed, the court retains power to rule even after the six-month period lapses. This is the decision’s key doctrinal innovation.

3. Characterisation of the Motion.

   The justices rejected the label “nunc pro tunc” because the requested relief substantively changed the judgment (interest start-date, payment channel, clerk instructions). Citing Luz P., they reaffirm that nunc pro tunc only corrects the record, not the judgment. Because Megan’s own counsel admitted the motion was not truly nunc pro tunc, the court treated it as a motion to alter or amend—permissible under § 25-2001(1).

4. Standard of Review.

   The Court applied de novo review to the jurisdictional/statutory questions, but abuse-of-discretion to the interest-start determination—finding the district court reasonably sought to incentivise prepayment and avoid duplicative accrual during the five-month gap.

C. Impact of the Judgment

Practical Implications

• Litigation Strategy. Practitioners now know that filing a § 25-2001(1) motion within six months safeguards the court’s power, even if argument or ruling occurs months later.
• Drafting Decrees. Counsel must draft interest provisions with precision; otherwise, parties may seek post-term modifications and courts will have jurisdiction to entertain them.
• Nunc Pro Tunc Discipline. The decision serves as a cautionary tale against reflexively labeling substantive amendment requests as “nunc pro tunc”—a misnomer that can cause confusion and mis-filings.
• Clerk’s Role Clarified. By emphasising that clerks lack judicial power, the Court underscores that calculation disputes remain squarely within judicial, not ministerial, competence.

Jurisprudential Significance

• Hawk is the first Nebraska case explicitly stating that “the rights … become fixed at the time the motion is filed” under § 25-2001(1). Expect citation in any future battle over late dispositions.
• The decision reinforces a broader national trend: state supreme courts carving out pragmatic mechanisms for trial courts to revise judgments within a short safety window, balancing finality with fairness.
• The Court’s separation of § 25-2001(1) from (4) may spur legislative reflection on whether the statute’s structure should be fine-tuned or left as now interpreted.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Inherent Power

The authority courts possess by virtue of being courts, independent of any statute, to control their judgments and process.

Term of Court

A fixed one-year period (Douglas County runs July 1–June 30). Historically significant because a court’s intra-term powers differ from post-term powers.

§ 25-2001(1) vs. § 25-2001(4)

(1) – Gives courts a six-month window post-judgment to use any ground “upon the same grounds” as inherent power.
(4) – Lists specific grounds (e.g., clerical error, irregularity, fraud) for relief after the six-month window. Hawk clarifies they are distinct tracks.

Nunc Pro Tunc

Latin for “now for then.” It allows clerical corrections to the record so that it accurately reflects what the court previously decided; it cannot change the substance of the decision.

Abuse of Discretion

A ruling is “untenable” or results in injustice. Appellate courts will not overturn merely because they might have ruled differently.

Conclusion

Hawk v. Hawk turns a routine marital-property squabble into a landmark clarification of Nebraska’s post-term modification doctrine. By holding that the mere filing of a § 25-2001(1) motion within six months “fixes” the movant’s rights, the Court expands the functional toolkit available to trial judges to correct or refine judgments in the interests of justice—without being shackled to the calendar. The opinion simultaneously polices the boundaries of nunc pro tunc orders, reinforces the clerk-court division of labor, and reaffirms the discretionary nature of interest awards in deferred property divisions.

Lawyers drafting or attacking judgments must now keep two mantras in mind: (1) File swiftly—filing is jurisdictional life support; (2) Name accurately—substance, not label, controls. With these guideposts, Nebraska’s trial and appellate courts can navigate the tension between finality and fairness with renewed clarity.