“File It or Lose It” – Fuller v. Carollo Establishes a Bright-Line Duty to File a Post-Judgment Notice of Appeal in the Eleventh Circuit

1. Introduction

In William O. Fuller & Martin A. Pinilla, II v. Joe Carollo, No. 23-12167 (11th Cir. July 17, 2025) (“Fuller v. Carollo”), the Eleventh Circuit addressed two distinct procedural issues arising from a high-profile First Amendment retaliation verdict that yielded more than $60 million in damages against Miami City Commissioner Joe Carollo.

First, the court reviewed Carollo’s allegation of jury tampering after a plaintiffs’ associate briefly spoke with a juror in an elevator. Second—and ultimately more consequential for practitioners—the court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of Carollo’s post-trial Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 motions because he failed to file a separate or amended notice of appeal after those motions were decided. The decision crystallises an exacting reading of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(c) and 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), effectively announcing a “bright-line duty”: a litigant who files a notice of appeal before disposition of post-trial motions must file another, timely notice specifically designating the order that resolves those motions, or forfeit appellate review of them.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Judges Rosenbaum, Branch, and Kidd, per curiam) reached two principal holdings:

• No Abuse of Discretion on Jury Tampering. The district judge’s meticulous, juror-by-juror inquiry and curative instructions sufficiently rebutted any Remmer presumption of prejudice stemming from a fleeting elevator conversation. Denial of mistrial was affirmed.
• Jurisdictional Dismissal of Remaining Issues. Because Carollo’s sole notice of appeal was filed before the district court denied his Rule 50(b)/59 motions, and he never filed a subsequent notice, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review those post-trial rulings—including challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the size of the damages award. Those portions of the appeal were therefore dismissed.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) – Created the presumption of prejudice for external juror contacts. The panel assumed without deciding that Remmer applied, then held the presumption had been rebutted.
• United States v. Ifediba, 46 F.4th 1225 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2007) – Provided a template for acceptable juror inquiries. The court analogised the district judge’s questioning to these cases in holding the investigation “as thorough as the situation required.”
• Bogle v. Orange County, 162 F.3d 653 (11th Cir. 1998); Weatherly v. Alabama State Univ., 728 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2013) – Together with Fed. R. App. P. 3 & 4, these authorities establish the need for a distinct notice of appeal referencing post-trial orders. Fuller v. Carollo extends this principle into a clear jurisdictional bar.
• Parrish v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1664 (2025) – The Supreme Court’s contemporaneous teaching that appellants must separately designate post-trial dispositions. The panel leveraged Parrish to emphasise Rule-3 compliance.
• A host of earlier Fifth/Eleventh Circuit cases (Forrest, Caporale, Spurlock, etc.) supplied the doctrinal scaffolding for handling extraneous juror influence.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Jury-Tampering Claim
   • Threshold Showing. Carollo’s counsel acknowledged a “colorable” claim of external influence, triggering a Remmer-type inquiry.
   • Scope of Inquiry. The district court individually questioned every juror, eliciting unequivocal statements of continued impartiality. Counsel expressly endorsed the approach, which undermined Carollo’s later complaint on appeal (invoking the invited-error doctrine).
   • Rebuttal of Presumption. The contact: (i) did not mention case facts, (ii) was non-threatening in substance, and (iii) produced no research or external materials. Jurors denied any impact on deliberations. Under Ronda, these facts rebut prejudice.
2. Appellate Jurisdiction
   • Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(i) “Spring-Back” Provision. Allows a notice filed before post-trial motions are resolved to spring forward and become “effective” as to the judgment once those motions are decided.
   • Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) & Rule 3(c) Requirements. To also appeal the order denying the post-trial motions, a new or amended notice must specifically designate that order. Because Carollo’s notice anticipated, rather than designated, the future order, it was ineffective for that purpose under Bogle and Parrish.
   • Jurisdictional Consequence. The panel had subject-matter authority only to review the mistrial denial (which was embedded in the original judgment). All other issues—sufficiency of evidence, damages excessiveness—were unreviewable and dismissed.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

a) Appellate Practice. Fuller v. Carollo will likely be cited whenever an appellant omits to file a second notice after post-trial motions. The Eleventh Circuit now signals a zero-tolerance approach: “inelegant footnotes” preserving rights are insufficient; only a Rule-3-compliant notice will do. Counsel must diary the 30-day clock immediately upon receiving post-trial rulings.

b) Trial Management of Juror Contacts. On the merits side, the case approves a “best practices” protocol for extraneous juror contacts in civil trials:

• immediate disclosure to counsel,
• individual voir dire of each juror,
• recorded assurances of impartiality, and
• targeted curative instructions.

District courts following this script may confidently deny mistrial requests absent stronger evidence of prejudice.

c) Government-Retaliation Litigation. Substantively, the First Amendment verdict itself remains intact and massive. Municipal defendants in the Eleventh Circuit should note that hostile regulatory campaigns spurred by political animus can yield staggering punitive awards—and that appellate avenues to trim those awards are procedurally unforgiving.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 50(a) vs. Rule 50(b). A Rule 50(a) motion (“JMOL”) is raised during trial after the opponent rests. To preserve the issue for appeal, it must be renewed under Rule 50(b) after the verdict. Failure to renew forfeits appellate relief (Unitherm).
• Rule 59 Motions. Two main uses: (i) request a new trial due to error or excessive damages, or (ii) seek remittitur (judicial reduction of a damages award).
• Notice of Appeal Mechanics. Under Rule 3(c) the notice must: (1) identify the parties, (2) designate the order/judgment appealed, and (3) be signed and timely. Under Rule 4(a)(4), certain post-trial motions toll the appeal deadline—but only for the judgment itself, not for the later post-trial ruling, unless a new notice is filed.
• Remittitur. A device allowing the court to condition denial of a new trial on the plaintiff’s acceptance of a lower award if a jury’s damages figure “shocks the conscience.”
• Remmer Presumption. Named after Remmer v. United States, it presumes prejudice from external contact with a juror. The burden then shifts to the verdict-winner to show harmlessness.

5. Conclusion

Although framed by a sensational political feud and eye-watering damages, Fuller v. Carollo will travel far beyond Miami politics. The Eleventh Circuit:

1. Reaffirmed that district courts enjoy wide discretion in neutralising marginal juror-contact incidents through prompt inquiry and curative instructions; and
2. More importantly, locked in a bright-line procedural rule—file an additional Rule-compliant notice of appeal after post-trial motions are denied, or the appellate court is powerless to consider those arguments.

Taken together, the opinion offers a cautionary tale: diligent trial judges will be affirmed, but inattentive appellants will be jurisdictionally barred. For litigants and counsel alike, the message is unmistakable—when it comes to notices of appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, “file it or lose it.”