“Fictitious‐Staff Deception” as Professional Misconduct:
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter (2025-Ohio-2406) and the Escalation of Sanctions for Patterned Dishonesty

1. Introduction

In Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 2025-Ohio-2406, the Supreme Court of Ohio confronted an attorney’s three-year pattern of client neglect, mismanagement of funds, and a new, brazen form of deceit—sending messages under the guise of a non-existent paralegal (“Yolanda Harris”). The case involved Jeffrey Dwight Hunter, a criminal-defense lawyer, whose conduct affected three vulnerable clients (Wills, Gibson and Shaffer) and culminated in nineteen admitted violations of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.

Key issues before the Court were:

• Whether Hunter’s repeated use of a fictitious employee and false statements to a tribunal warranted an actual suspension exceeding the normal one-year stayed suspensions previously given in similar cases.
• How cooperation during the disciplinary process should be weighed when the lawyer simultaneously lies to the disciplinary authorities.
• What restitutionary and treatment-oriented conditions should accompany reinstatement.

The judgment crystallises the principle that the intentional creation of a fictitious staff identity to deceive clients constitutes aggravated dishonesty under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and mandates a substantial, partly unstayed suspension even where the lawyer nominally “cooperates” in the proceedings.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court adopted the Board of Professional Conduct’s findings and imposed:

• A two-year suspension from the practice of law.
• Stay of the final six months conditioned on:
  • Payment of $12,500 restitution to Lillian Lancaster (mother of Miles Gibson).
  • Payment of $2,500 restitution to Vicki Deitenbeck & Jack Shaffer (parents of Derek Shaffer).
  • Payment of all disciplinary costs.
• Completion of an Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (OLAP) assessment and compliance with any treatment or counselling recommendations.

Chief Justice Kennedy and Justice Fischer each concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing respectively for permanent disbarment (Kennedy) and an indefinite (not permanent) suspension (Fischer). The majority opinion (Per Curiam) emphasised six aggravating factors and only one limited mitigating factor.

3. In-Depth Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Weight

• Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187 (1995) – Established that dishonesty normally warrants actual suspension. Hunter’s deceit through a fake paralegal squarely invoked Fowerbaugh’s rule.
• Disciplinary Counsel v. Proctor, 134 Ohio St.3d 359 (2012) – Reaffirmed Fowerbaugh; used to confirm that abundant mitigating evidence is required to avoid an actual suspension. The Court found Hunter lacked such evidence.
• Disciplinary Counsel v. Cheselka, 2019-Ohio-5286; Disciplinary Counsel v. Talikka, 2013-Ohio-1012; Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaaban, 2023-Ohio-3671 – Comparators for sanction calibration. Hunter’s pattern of deceit was deemed “slightly more serious,” justifying a longer unstayed period (18 months).
• Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 2013-Ohio-3998 – Cited to confirm that pressuring a client to withdraw a grievance falls within the catch-all dishonesty/failure-of-fitness provision, Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Rule Violations Established by Clear and Convincing Evidence: Eleven separate rules were breached, with multiple counts under Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15, 1.16, 3.3, 8.1, 8.4 (c), (d), (h).
2. Aggravating vs. Mitigating Factors: The Court enumerated six aggravators (prior discipline, selfish motive, pattern, multiple infractions, false statements in the disciplinary process, harm to vulnerable clients) and acknowledged only one mitigator (cooperation). Significantly, the majority signalled that “cooperation” is discounted when the lawyer simultaneously lies—foreshadowing possible future tightening of the cooperation mitigation doctrine.
3. Sanction Selection Methodology: The Court benchmarked against Cheselka, Talikka and Shaaban, but distinguished Hunter’s case on the ground that he:
• Invented a fictitious paralegal to prolong deceit.
• Lied directly to a judge and produced suspect evidence (a single luggage tag) to cover the lie.
• Demonstrated minimal genuine mitigation.

The result: a longer actual suspension (18 months) than in the comparator cases (12 months).

3.3 Impact on Future Practice and Jurisprudence

Although disciplinary decisions are fact-driven, Hunter is likely to influence at least four fronts:

1. “Fictitious-Staff Deception” Doctrine: The Court formally identifies the creation of a non-existent employee for client communications as an aggravated form of dishonesty. Future respondents should expect little leniency if they fabricate staff or correspondence.
2. Limited Weight of “Cooperation” When Tainted by Falsehoods: The majority’s comments (and the Chief Justice’s separate opinion) send a warning that partial lies during the disciplinary process can neutralise a cooperation claim. Boards will likely scrutinise “cooperation” assertions more vigorously.
3. Restitution as a Condition of Stay: The judgment reinforces a trend of conditioning any stayed portion of a suspension on full restitution within 90 days. Lawyers facing discipline for fund mishandling will know early repayment is vital.
4. Emphasis on OLAP Assessment: Mandating an addiction/mental-health assessment (even without proven impairment) reflects the Court’s holistic view that patterns of deceit may signal underlying issues requiring intervention.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Actual vs. Stayed Suspension
• Actual suspension – The lawyer is barred from practice for a set period.
• Stayed suspension – The suspension is held in abeyance (like probation) provided the lawyer satisfies specified conditions. Here, Hunter serves 18 months actually suspended and may avoid the final 6 months by meeting the conditions.

Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Account (IOLTA)
A separate, interest-bearing account in which lawyers must keep client funds (retain­ers, settlements) until earned or distributed. Commingling client money with personal funds violates Prof.Cond.R. 1.15.

Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) – Catch-All “Fitness” Provision
Covers misconduct not expressly listed elsewhere but that “adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness.” Coercing a client to withdraw a grievance, as Hunter did, is recognised as a violation under this catch-all rule.

5. Conclusion

Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter breaks new ground by elevating the sanction for “fictitious-staff” deception and clarifying that nominal cooperation is insufficient where the lawyer’s honesty remains in doubt. The decision tightens the nexus between patterned dishonesty and lengthy actual suspensions, underscores restitution as non-negotiable, and hints that further dishonesty during the disciplinary process may soon erase cooperation as a mitigating factor altogether.

Practitioners should draw three core lessons:

• Any fabrication—no matter how small—directed at clients, courts, or regulators will likely tip the scales toward an actual suspension.
• Maintaining a genuine IOLTA and promptly documenting fee status (earned vs. unearned) is essential risk management.
• Prompt restitution, transparent dealings, and bona fide treatment interventions are the only viable routes to mitigate sanctions once misconduct surfaces.

As the legal profession continues to grapple with public perceptions of trustworthiness, Hunter serves as a stark reminder that integrity—both in substance and appearance—is the non-negotiable cornerstone of lawyering in Ohio.