“Extraordinary Means Extraordinary”: The Supreme Court Re-cements the Rigid Threshold for Rule 60(b)(6) Motions and Rejects Any Balancing with Rule 15(a)

1. Introduction

In BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. ___ (2025), the United States Supreme Court issued a significant procedural ruling with ramifications far beyond the Anti-Terrorism Act context in which it arose. The Court confronted a recurring dilemma in federal practice: may a disappointed plaintiff reopen a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) in order to amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a)’s liberal standards? The Second Circuit had answered yes, adopting a balancing test that weighed Rule 60(b)’s finality concerns against Rule 15(a)’s policy favouring amendment. The Supreme Court unequivocally rejected this approach, holding that the stringent “extraordinary circumstances” requirement of Rule 60(b)(6) remains undiluted regardless of the movant’s ultimate goal. The decision therefore clarifies the hierarchical order of operations: Rule 60(b) relief must be earned first, and only then—if at all—may Rule 15(a) come into play.

2. Case Background

Parties – Plaintiffs are victims and families of victims of Hamas terrorist attacks (2001-2003); defendant is BLOM Bank SAL, a large Lebanese financial institution.
Substantive Claim – Aiding-and-abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. §2333(d) as amended by JASTA.
Procedural Posture – The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to plead BLOM’s “general awareness.” Plaintiffs had twice declined invitations to amend. The Second Circuit affirmed, but in doing so articulated a slightly less demanding “general awareness” test.
Rule 60(b)(6) Motion – After losing on appeal, plaintiffs sought to vacate the judgment so they could now amend their complaint to satisfy the Second Circuit’s clarified standard.
District Court on 60(b)(6) – Denied relief; the legal clarification was not “extraordinary,” and plaintiffs' deliberate refusal to amend earlier cut against them.
Second Circuit – Reversed, holding that courts must balance Rule 60(b) finality with Rule 15(a) liberality when post-judgment amendment is sought.
Issue Before the Supreme Court – Whether the “extraordinary circumstances” standard of Rule 60(b)(6) is relaxed when the movant seeks to reopen for the purpose of amending under Rule 15(a).

3. Summary of the Judgment

Justice Thomas, writing for an eight-Justice majority (Justice Jackson concurring in part), reversed the Second Circuit. The Court held:

Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) always demands “extraordinary circumstances.”
This standard does not change merely because the movant wishes to amend the pleadings if the case is reopened.
A party must clear the Rule 60(b)(6) hurdle before Rule 15(a) can even be considered.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding no extraordinary circumstances.

Justice Jackson agreed with those holdings but wrote separately to caution against reading Ackermann v. United States too broadly: declining to amend pre-judgment should not invariably defeat a later Rule 60(b)(6) motion if extraordinary circumstances otherwise exist.

4. Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949) – The fountainhead case establishing that Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved for extraordinary situations where the movant is effectively faultless. The Court invoked Klapprott to illustrate the narrow corridor in which 60(b)(6) operates.
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950) – Provided the contrasting scenario: a litigant who consciously chose not to appeal cannot later rely on 60(b)(6). The majority referenced Ackermann to underscore the role of the movant’s own litigation choices.
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) – Reaffirmed the extraordinary-circumstances test and the importance of finality.
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) – Plaintiffs relied on Foman to argue for leniency; the Court distinguished it as a Rule 59(e) case where finality concerns are less acute.
Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 604 U.S. ___ (2025) – Cited for the proposition that courts must decide Rule 60(b) motions before reaching any underlying merits or jurisdictional questions.

4.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Textual and Structural Reading of Rule 60(b)
Because 60(b)(6) comes after five enumerated grounds, it can apply only to reasons not covered by (1)–(5), and allowing easy use of (6) would nullify the one-year limitations attached to (1)–(3).
Finality vs. Flexibility
Final judgments enjoy a special status. Rule 60(b)(6) is intentionally strict to protect that finality. By contrast, Rule 15(a) operates before final judgment; therefore, its liberal ethos cannot retroactively dilute 60(b)(6).
Order of Operations
The district court must answer two discrete questions in sequence:
1) Do extraordinary circumstances justify reopening under Rule 60(b)(6)?
2) If yes, should leave to amend be granted under Rule 15(a)?
Mixing the inquiries, as the Second Circuit did, impermissibly “balances” apples with oranges.
Application to the Facts
• Change in decisional law rarely qualifies as extraordinary.
• Plaintiffs had repeatedly declined to amend, a strategic choice the Court deemed significant.
• Accordingly, the district court acted well within its wide discretion.

4.3 Impact of the Decision

Tighter Gateway for Post-Judgment Amendments – Litigants can no longer rely on the liberal amendment norms once a final judgment is in place; extraordinary circumstances remain the price of re-entry.
Uniform Standard Across Circuits – The Second Circuit’s balancing approach is now foreclosed, resolving a nascent split and ensuring nationwide consistency.
Strategic Litigation Choices Matter – Parties must decide early whether to amend or appeal; courts will view post-judgment changes of heart with skepticism.
Greater Predictability for Defendants – Final judgments are harder to disturb, offering defendants confidence in closure once the appeals window closes.
Broader Procedural Ripple – The ruling will shape bankruptcy, intellectual-property, civil-rights and commercial disputes—any arena where parties contemplate reopening to add new claims or factual allegations.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 60(b)(6) “Extraordinary Circumstances” – Think of this as a locked door that opens only for rare, compelling reasons (e.g., incarceration preventing participation, fraud on the court). Ordinary legal developments or strategic misjudgments generally do not suffice.
Rule 15(a) Liberal Amendment – Before trial and before a final judgment, courts freely grant permission to fix or expand pleadings to ensure cases are decided on the merits.
Final Judgment – The point at which a case is effectively over in the trial court; rights to amend under Rule 15(a) vanish unless the judgment is first undone.
Balancing Test vs. Sequential Test – The Second Circuit merged the two rules into a single balancing act. The Supreme Court replaced this with a sequential approach: satisfy 60(b) first, then (maybe) 15(a).

6. Conclusion

BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman reinforces a foundational message of federal civil procedure: finality matters. Rule 60(b)(6) remains a narrow safety valve, not an alternate route to routine amendment. By rejecting any balancing with Rule 15(a), the Court preserves the integrity of Rule 60’s carefully calibrated architecture, signalling that litigants must marshal all facts and theories before judgment or live with the consequences of their strategic choices. Future plaintiffs—and their counsel—will now think twice before declining leave to amend, for once the gavel falls, only the truly extraordinary will reopen the courthouse door.