“Exhaust First or Lose the Class”
Seventh Circuit Clarifies that PLRA Exhaustion Bars Use of the Inherently-Transitory Exception

Introduction

In Eugene Westmoreland v. Latoya Hughes, No. 24-2153 (7th Cir. 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confronted a familiar but thorny trio of procedural doctrines: (1) the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s mandatory exhaustion requirement, (2) Article III mootness, and (3) the special mootness exceptions available in class actions. The court’s opinion, authored by Judge Jackson-Akiwumi, holds that when a prisoner-plaintiff fails to exhaust available administrative remedies, the resulting “strong exhaustion defense” makes him an inadequate class representative. Consequently, the court ruled that the putative class cannot rely on the inherently transitory exception to revive otherwise moot claims.

The decision arises from wheelchair-using inmate Eugene Westmoreland’s attempt to secure accessible showers at the Illinois Department of Corrections’ Northern Reception and Classification Center (NRC). After filing suit—but before the district court could act—he was transferred to a permanent facility with accessible showers. The district court dismissed the action as moot, and the Seventh Circuit now affirms, clarifying the interaction between exhaustion and mootness in prisoner class litigation.

Summary of the Judgment

• Mootness: Westmoreland’s transfer from the NRC eliminated his personal interest in prospective injunctive relief, rendering his individual claim moot.
• Capable-of-Repetition Exception: Rejected; there was no realistic prospect he would return to the NRC.
• Inherently-Transitory Exception: Inapplicable because Westmoreland—who never exhausted the prison grievance process—faces a “strong exhaustion defense” and thus is an inadequate class representative. Without an adequate representative, no live class claim exists to be preserved.
• Holding: Judgment of dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (mootness) affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43 (2024) – Reiterates Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement.
2. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Schober, 366 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2004) – Confirms that moot cases must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
3. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013) – Explains that a plaintiff must maintain a personal stake throughout litigation.
4. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) – Recognizes the inherently-transitory exception, allowing a properly certified class to avoid mootness.
5. Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2010) – Articulates the two-part test for inherently transitory claims.
6. Koos v. First Nat’l Bank of Peoria, 496 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1974) – Holds that a named plaintiff subject to a unique defense is an inadequate class representative.
7. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016) – Establish the PLRA’s strictly mandatory exhaustion requirement.
8. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) – Central precedent; filing outside prescribed prison-grievance rules constitutes non-exhaustion and forecloses federal litigation.
9. Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2006) – Clarifies that if the prisoner’s own inaction causes unavailability, the process is not “unavailable” for PLRA purposes.
10. Trotter v. Klincar, 748 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984) – Explains that only a certified class can preserve claims via the inherently-transitory doctrine.

By weaving these cases together, the court reinforced two propositions: (i) PLRA exhaustion is a “jurisdictional-like” hurdle that cannot be sidestepped by clever pleading, and (ii) the inherently-transitory doctrine helps only if a viable class representative exists. Because Woodford squarely condemned attempts to file untimely or premature grievances, it controlled the exhaustion analysis and dictated Westmoreland’s inadequacy.

2. Legal Reasoning

1. Mootness Determination
   • Prospective relief became impossible to grant once Westmoreland left the NRC.
   • Personal stake vanished; therefore, Article III jurisdiction evaporated unless an exception applied.
2. Exhaustion as a “Strong Defense”
   • PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), demands exhaustion of “available” administrative remedies.
   • Prison rules required grievances about “other facilities” to be filed with the Administrative Review Board. Westmoreland filed none.
   • Woodford forecloses a loophole that would let prisoners sue before – rather than after – conditions arise.
   • The defense is not only “colorable” but formidable, establishing typicality/adequacy failure under Rule 23(a).
3. Collapse of the Inherently-Transitory Exception
   • Requirement #1 from Olson – duration too short for class certification – was met (median NRC stay: 24 days).
   • Requirement #2 – existence of a constant class of persons – also met (new inmates continuously arrive at NRC).
   • However, the exception presupposes a certifiable action. Because Westmoreland is inadequate, the class cannot be certified; the exception never triggers.

3. Anticipated Impact

• Heightened Importance of Pre-Filing Grievances
  Prisoners intending to litigate systemic conditions must file (or attempt to file) grievances even when transfer is imminent. Failure dooms not only individual claims but also potential class actions.
• Strategic Selection of Class Representatives
  Civil-rights NGOs and counsel will need to identify would-be class representatives who have clean exhaustion records or who remain in the affected facility long enough to complete grievances.
• Litigation Timing Pressures
  The Seventh Circuit acknowledges the “24-day window” dilemma but, absent congressional change, maintains a doctrinal barrier. Counsel may explore expedited grievances, preliminary injunction motions, or joinder of multiple inmates to hedge against transfers.
• Possible Institutional Responses
  IDOC and similar agencies may face renewed policy attention, because the opinion indirectly underscores that short-stay facilities with systemic deficiencies can evade review unless addressed politically or administratively.
• Circuit Authority
  Although the decision interprets settled Supreme Court caselaw, it is the first explicit appellate holding that PLRA non-exhaustion renders a named plaintiff inadequate for purposes of the inherently-transitory exception. Other circuits are likely to cite it when analogous disputes arise.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III Mootness

Federal courts only decide ongoing disputes. If the plaintiff no longer stands to gain anything concrete, the case is “moot” and must be dismissed.

PLRA Exhaustion

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, an inmate must follow the prison’s grievance system all the way to the end before suing in federal court, unless that process is “unavailable.”

Inherently-Transitory Exception

A doctrine allowing certain class actions to survive mootness when the challenged condition is so short-lived that no plaintiff can obtain a ruling before it ends.

Capable-of-Repetition-But-Evading-Review

An exception preserving jurisdiction when (i) the same plaintiff is likely to be subject to the challenged action again, and (ii) the action is too brief to be fully litigated each time.

Class Representative Adequacy (Rule 23(a)(4))

The named plaintiff must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, which is impossible if unique defenses threaten to derail only his claim.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Westmoreland v. Hughes closes a perceived escape hatch around the PLRA’s exhaustion mandate. By holding that a failure to exhaust makes a prisoner an inadequate class representative—and therefore ineligible to invoke the inherently-transitory exception—the court reinforces a strict, bright-line rule: exhaust first, certify later.

Although the court recognizes the practical difficulty of exhausting grievances during a short NRC stay, it views that hardship as a policy matter for Congress, not a basis for judicial relaxation of statutory requirements. Going forward, litigators must plan for rapid grievance filing or identify alternative plaintiffs if they hope to obtain systemic relief for transient prison populations. The decision thus stands as a significant procedural precedent at the intersection of disability rights, class action practice, and prison litigation.