“Exclusive” No More?
McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp.
and the Re-Opening of District-Court Review under the Hobbs Act

1. Introduction

On 20 June 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 6–3 decision in McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. 23-1226. Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion holds that the Administrative Orders Review Act of 1950—better known as the Hobbs Act—does not foreclose a federal district court from independently interpreting a statute in the course of an enforcement proceeding, even when the relevant agency has already adopted a contrary interpretation in a final order reviewable under the Act.

The case arose out of a class action alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) for sending unsolicited faxes without opt-out notices. After the FCC’s 2019 Amerifactors declaratory ruling excluded “online fax services” from the TCPA’s prohibition, the district court (and later the Ninth Circuit) felt constrained—under Ninth Circuit Hobbs-Act precedent—to treat the FCC’s ruling as binding. The Supreme Court reversed, establishing a new default rule: unless Congress clearly says otherwise, district courts retain authority in enforcement litigation to decide for themselves whether an agency has correctly interpreted its governing statute.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The Hobbs Act does not bind district courts to an agency’s statutory interpretation in civil (or criminal) enforcement proceedings; district courts must interpret the statute de novo, giving the agency only “appropriate respect.”
• Vote: 6–3.
  Majority: Kavanaugh, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Barrett.
  Dissent: Kagan, joined by Sotomayor, Jackson.
• Disposition: Ninth Circuit reversed; case remanded so that the district court may decide itself whether faxes sent to online fax services fall within the TCPA.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944)
     • Upheld wartime price-control regime that expressly barred any court (other than a special tribunal) from reviewing agency regulations in enforcement cases.
     • Majority distinguishes Yakus because the Emergency Price Control Act contained two clauses: one granting exclusive jurisdiction and another no-other-court bar. Hobbs Act has only the first.
2. Port of Boston (1970) & ITT World Communications (1984)
     • Earlier cases treating the Hobbs Act as foreclosing collateral attacks after a party had already litigated before the agency.
     • Majority confines them to preclusion/estoppel scenarios; does not read them as broadly foreclosing district-court review for new parties.
3. Administrative Procedure Act §703
     • Provides for enforcement-proceeding review “except to the extent” a prior, adequate and exclusive review opportunity exists.
     • Majority reads this as embodying a presumption of review unless Congress clearly bars it.
4. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)
     • Court’s 2024 repudiation of Chevron deference forms the backdrop: if agencies no longer receive automatic deference, it would be incongruous, says the majority, to impose absolute Hobbs-Act deference at the district-court level.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Justice Kavanaugh divides statutes that provide pre-enforcement review into three categories, stressing that the Hobbs Act falls into the third: statutes silent on enforcement-proceeding review. Under “fundamental principles of administrative law” reflected in APA §703 and a historical presumption in favor of judicial review, silence means that ordinary review remains available in enforcement cases. Congress knows how to preclude such review expressly (e.g., Clean Water Act, CERCLA, Clean Air Act)—and did not do so here.

He rejects McKesson’s textual argument that the phrase “exclusive jurisdiction … to determine the validity” necessarily strips district courts of power. That language, the Court says, is best read as granting courts of appeals exclusive authority to grant declaratory relief in pre-enforcement suits; it does not speak to the district court’s task of deciding liability under the correct substantive law.

Policy concerns raised by the United States (risk of inter-circuit conflict, incentives to “wait and violate”) cannot override clear statutory text, and anyway are mitigated by ordinary mechanisms such as estoppel, stare decisis, and this Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation and Administrative Law

• District-Court Autonomy Reinforced – Trial courts may now revisit agency statutory interpretations even decades after the agency acted, provided the parties in the enforcement proceeding were not already bound by earlier litigation.
• Time-Limited Pre-Enforcement Windows Weakened – The 60-day Hobbs Act filing period (or analogous windows in other statutes) no longer ensures finality for agency interpretations; defendants and private plaintiffs may raise fresh challenges later.
• Strategic Litigation Shifts – Some regulated parties might forego Hobbs-Act petitions, choosing instead to risk enforcement and litigate de novo. Conversely, plaintiffs bringing private-action enforcement (e.g., TCPA, FLSA, antitrust) must anticipate that defendants will attack underlying agency rules.
• Interaction with Chevron’s Demise – Coming on the heels of Loper Bright, the decision cements a post-Chevron landscape where courts, not agencies, have the last word on statutory meaning across all procedural postures.
• Circuit-Split Probability – Independent district-court interpretations could diverge; the Supreme Court will likely see an uptick in petitions to resolve interpretive splits once managed mainly through Hobbs-Act consolidation.
• Legislative Responses – If Congress wishes to preserve finality for particular high-risk regimes (nuclear safety, airline security, etc.) it may follow the Clean Air/Water template and expressly bar enforcement-stage review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Hobbs Act (Administrative Orders Review Act, 1950)

A statute channeling pre-enforcement challenges to certain agency orders directly to the courts of appeals within 60 days, promising nationwide effect and expedited review.

Pre-Enforcement vs. Enforcement Proceedings

Pre-Enforcement: A suit challenging a regulation or order before anyone has violated (or allegedly violated) it.
Enforcement Proceeding: A civil or criminal action—by the government or by private parties under a private right of action—alleging violation of the statute or rule.

Exclusive Jurisdiction

When a statute assigns a particular court the sole authority to hear a type of case or request for relief. The decision clarifies that “exclusive jurisdiction to determine validity” in the Hobbs Act means exclusive authority to grant declaratory or similar pre-enforcement relief, not to foreclose all later judicial consideration.

APA §703

Provision stating that agency action is reviewable in enforcement proceedings unless Congress has already provided a “prior, adequate, and exclusive” opportunity for review.

Estoppel / Preclusion

Doctrines preventing the same parties from relitigating issues previously decided between them. They remain intact—so a party that lost in a Hobbs-Act suit cannot raise the same argument in later enforcement.

5. Conclusion

McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates resets the balance between agencies, district courts, and courts of appeals. By holding that the Hobbs Act’s grant of “exclusive jurisdiction” pertains only to pre-enforcement declaratory relief, the Supreme Court restores district-court authority to decide statutory meaning in the thick of enforcement litigation. The ruling aligns with the Court’s recent skepticism toward agency interpretive supremacy and places a heavy drafting burden on Congress: if it wishes to insulate particular regimes from collateral challenges, it must do so with explicit language. Until then, litigants—from nuclear operators to fax advertisers—will wield a potent new tool: the ability to argue, even years later, that the agency got the statute wrong.