“Every Means Every”: Idaho Code § 59-901(1)(e) Applies to All Elected Offices, Making Vacancies Automatic Upon Moving Outside the Electoral District

1. Introduction

Case: Sanchez v. City of Boise, Supreme Court of Idaho, 23 June 2025.

The Idaho Supreme Court confronted a novel question: Does an elected city-council member automatically forfeit her seat when she inadvertently moves outside the district from which she was elected? Former Boise Councilmember Lisa Sánchez, displaced by a landlord’s non-renewal, signed a new lease 13 days outside her district. The Mayor declared her seat vacant and appointed a replacement. Sánchez sued, alleging wrongful removal, due-process violations, and loss of salary. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for the City; Sánchez appealed.

The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Idaho Code § 59-901(1)(e) unambiguously applies to every elective civil office—including city-council districts—so that a seat becomes vacant “upon the happening” of the official’s cessation of residency within the district, irrespective of intent or notice.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Statutory Applicability: Section 59-901(1)(e) extends to municipal offices; the phrase “every elective civil office” is dispositive.
Automatic Vacancy: The statute is self-executing; actual physical relocation outside the district triggers an immediate vacancy. No intent element exists.
Due Process: Even assuming an elected seat is a protected property interest, any such interest is forfeited upon statutory vacancy; therefore, no additional pre-deprivation process is required.
Disposition: District court’s Rule 12(c) dismissal affirmed; Sánchez receives neither reinstatement nor damages.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court relied on, distinguished, or referenced several cases:

Elsaesser v. Gibson, 168 Idaho 585 (2021) & State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471 (2007) – establish the standard for Rule 12(c) motions (identical to summary-judgment review).
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus, 151 Idaho 889 (2011) – reiterates the plain-meaning rule and the mandate that no statutory word be rendered superfluous.
State v. McDermott, 52 Idaho 602 (1932) – distinguished; dealt with abandonment of office, not change of residency.
Miscellaneous statutory-interpretation authorities: Ada Cty. Bd. of Equalization v. J.R. Simplot Found. (2017); In re Winton Lumber (1936).

These precedents shaped the Court’s approach: strict textualism, avoidance of surplusage, and refusal to insert unexpressed elements such as intent.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Plain Language Approach. The phrase “Every elective civil office shall be vacant upon the happening of …” admits no exceptions. The Court emphasized that listing “state, district or county” following the word “resident” was descriptive of geographic areas, not limiting which governmental levels are covered. Reading otherwise would require impermissible judicial rewriting.
“Upon the Happening” = Self-Executing. By characterizing the statute as self-executing, the Court concluded that factual questions of intent, notice, or duration are irrelevant. The only fact that matters is whether the official physically resides outside the district.
Intent Not Required. The Court refused to borrow the definition of “residence” in Idaho Code § 50-402 (municipal-election chapter) because § 59-901(1)(e) was unambiguous; use of in pari materia is unnecessary absent ambiguity. Hence, intent-based “principal place of abode” tests are inapplicable.
Due-Process Discussion. Assuming arguendo that an elected office is a property right, such right is extinguished by statute once its condition subsequent (moving) occurs. Because no right survived, no pre-deprivation hearing was constitutionally required.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

This decision clarifies—and broadens—the reach of Idaho Code § 59-901(1)(e). Key ramifications include:

Local Government Practice: Idaho municipalities now have definitive authority to treat out-of-district moves as automatic vacancies without hearings, resolutions, or findings of intent.
Candidate & Incumbent Diligence: Office-holders must vigilantly ensure continuous in-district residency; even brief, unintended moves create immediate forfeiture.
Election Litigation: Future challenges will likely shift from factual disputes about intent to purely geographic/residency proofs, streamlining judicial review.
Legislative Response: The Legislature may revisit § 59-901 to add grace periods or intent requirements if it perceives the rule as unduly harsh; absent that, courts will continue to enforce strict residency.
Constitutional Landscape: The opinion signals that office-holding, at least in Idaho, may not constitute a protected property interest once a statutory forfeiture event occurs, limiting due-process claims.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Judgment on the Pleadings (Rule 12(c)). A procedural tool allowing a court to decide a case based solely on the parties’ written pleadings when no material facts are disputed.

Self-Executing Statute. A law that enforces itself automatically without additional governmental action once a triggering event occurs.

“In pari materia.” A canon of construction directing courts to read related statutes together to harmonize meaning—used only when language is ambiguous.

Property Interest (Due Process). A legally protected expectation to continue receiving a benefit. If the law itself says the benefit ends upon a condition (here, residency loss), the expectation ends too.

Abandonment vs. Vacancy. Abandonment typically requires proof of intent to relinquish office through nonfeasance or prolonged absence; § 59-901(1)(e) vacancy requires only residency change.

5. Conclusion

Sanchez v. City of Boise establishes a bright-line rule in Idaho: when an elected official moves outside the geographic boundaries of her constituency, her office is vacated instantly and irrevocably, regardless of intent, knowledge, or duration. The Court’s rigorous textualism leaves little room for equitable exceptions or due-process challenges. Going forward, Idaho officials and aspiring candidates must treat residency as an absolute condition precedent—and subsequent—to holding office. The decision enhances administrative efficiency but may prompt legislative reconsideration to balance harsh outcomes. For now, however, “every elective civil office” truly means every office.