“Every Civil Claim” Means Every: Second Department Holds CPLR 214‑j (Adult Survivors Act) Revives Claims Despite Prior Dismissal for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Introduction

Esposito v. Isaac (2025 NY Slip Op 04231) is a significant Appellate Division, Second Department decision clarifying the scope of New York’s Adult Survivors Act (ASA), codified at CPLR 214‑j. The plaintiff, Luisa C. Esposito, alleged sexual assaults occurring in 2005. She had filed a timely action in 2006, but that case was dismissed in 2009 for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Allen H. Isaac. In 2023—during the ASA’s revival window—she commenced a new action for the same conduct. The Supreme Court (Nassau County) dismissed, holding that CPLR 214‑j does not revive claims that were previously dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

On appeal, the Second Department reversed, holding that the ASA’s plain language—reviving “every civil claim or cause of action” time-barred as of the statute’s effective date—applies even if a plaintiff previously filed a timely suit that was later dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court refused to read into the statute a categorical exclusion for previously dismissed actions beyond the two specifically addressed in CPLR 214‑j (prior dismissals as time-barred and for failure to file a notice of claim).

This ruling resolves an important question: may adult survivors who previously attempted suit, only to be turned away on jurisdictional grounds, invoke the ASA’s revival window? The Second Department’s answer is unequivocally yes.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Department reversed the Supreme Court’s dismissal and denied the defendant’s CPLR 3211(a) motion.
The court held that CPLR 214‑j, even when narrowly construed (as revival statutes are), contains no prohibition against reviving claims simply because a prior timely action was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The phrase “every civil claim or cause of action” evidences the Legislature’s intent to revive all otherwise time‑barred adult sexual assault claims, absent an express limitation.
The statute’s specific reference to revival despite prior dismissals as time‑barred or for failure to file a notice of claim does not imply the exclusion of other previously dismissed claims (such as those dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction).
Allowing revival aligns with the ASA’s remedial purpose: to expand access to civil redress for adult survivors previously constrained by short statutes of limitations.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Esposito v Isaac, 68 AD3d 483 (1st Dept 2009): The prior action against the same defendant was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. That dismissal set the stage for the ASA revival question.
Anonymous v Castagnola, 210 AD3d 940 (2d Dept 2022); People v Galindo, 38 NY3d 199 (2022); North Shore Cent. Sch. Dist. v Glen Cove City Sch. Dist., 236 AD3d 806 (2d Dept 2024); Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577 (1998): These authorities supply foundational rules of statutory interpretation: the court’s primary task is to give effect to legislative intent, and the clearest indicator is the text itself. The Second Department leaned heavily on plain meaning as its interpretive starting point and endpoint.
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F Supp 740 (EDNY), affd 818 F2d 145 (2d Cir); Hopkins v Lincoln Trust Co., 233 NY 213 (1922): Revival statutes are “extreme” exercises of legislative power and are narrowly construed. The court acknowledged this caution but found that even a narrow reading does not justify creating a jurisdictional-dismissal exception not found in the text.
Lynch v City of New York, 35 NY3d 517 (2020): The Court of Appeals has treated words like “any” and “every” as strong signals of breadth. The Second Department applied that logic to “every civil claim” in CPLR 214‑j.
Prego v City of New York, 147 AD2d 165 (1st Dept 1989): Cited for the proposition that the word “every” imports no limitation and for rejecting artificial distinctions not supported by statutory language or purpose. This supports the ASA’s broad reach.
Kimmel v State of New York, 29 NY3d 386 (2017): The court invoked the expressio unius canon: where the Legislature lists exceptions, others are generally excluded. But the Second Department explained why that canon does not convert CPLR 214‑j’s specific references (time-bar and notice-of-claim dismissals) into a ceiling on revival.
Fossella v Adams, 225 AD3d 98 (2d Dept 2023), mod on other grounds, ____ NY3d ____, 2025 NY Slip Op 01668: Stands for the textualist point that if the Legislature meant to exclude a category, it would have said so. The absence of an express prohibition on reviving claims previously dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction weighs against the defendant’s position.
Sciangula v Montegut, 165 AD3d 1188 (2d Dept 2018): A dismissal as time-barred is a merits determination for res judicata purposes. The Second Department used this to show why the ASA expressly mentions prior time-bar dismissals: to neutralize res judicata and allow revival despite that preclusion.
Carroll v Trump, 650 F Supp 3d 213 (SDNY 2023): Quoted for the ASA’s remedial rationale: adult survivors often cannot sue within ordinary limitation periods due to trauma, suppression, or fear. The court used this to underscore the statute’s purpose.

Legal Reasoning

Text controls; “every civil claim” is expansive. The operative clause revives “every civil claim or cause of action … which is barred … because the applicable period of limitation has expired.” The Second Department treated “every” as deliberately capacious. No words in CPLR 214‑j carve out claims where a plaintiff previously filed and lost on personal jurisdiction grounds.
Express references are not exclusive limitations. CPLR 214‑j explicitly protects revival even if a prior action was dismissed as time-barred or for failure to file a notice of claim. The defense argued expressio unius: because the statute names those two dismissal types, all other types—like jurisdictional dismissals—must be excluded. The court rejected that inference, explaining that the provision is not a list of exceptions to the general revival rule, but rather a targeted override of preclusion problems (especially res judicata) that uniquely attend those two categories.
Revival statutes are “narrowly construed,” but the language remains clear. Even applying the traditional caution to revival statutes, the court found no textual foothold for denying revival where the prior action ended for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Legislative purpose confirms the broad reading. Sponsor materials and legislative debate emphasized correcting the “injustice” of short limitations periods for adult survivors. Creating a disfavored subclass—survivors who tried to sue promptly but were turned away on jurisdictional grounds—would undermine the ASA’s remedial purpose and rest on an “artificial distinction” lacking support in the text or legislative history.
Application to the case. The plaintiff’s prior action (2006) was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction (2009). Her 2023 ASA action is “barred” by ordinary limitation periods (CPLR 215[3]) but falls squarely within CPLR 214‑j’s revival. The Supreme Court’s dismissal was therefore erroneous.

Impact and Implications

Revival after jurisdictional dismissals is allowed. Survivors who previously commenced timely actions that were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction are not disqualified from ASA revival. This will affect a meaningful subset of ASA cases where early, good‑faith filings foundered on service or jurisdictional defects.
Textual guidance for future “lookback” statutes. The decision reinforces a textualist approach: words like “every” and “any” will be read broadly, and courts will resist implied exclusions absent clear legislative direction. This reasoning may inform interpretation of the Child Victims Act (CPLR 214‑g) and any future revival windows.
Res judicata and prior dismissals. The court underscores that the ASA expressly neutralizes certain preclusion barriers (time‑bar and notice-of-claim dismissals). For other types of prior dismissals—particularly merits determinations—res judicata may still apply. Esposito does not hold that ASA wipes out all preclusion; it clarifies that prior jurisdictional dismissals do not foreclose revival, and that the statute’s enumerations are not a ceiling on what can be revived.
Defense strategy must shift toward the merits. Defendants can no longer rely on a prior jurisdictional dismissal to defeat an ASA action on a CPLR 3211(a) motion. The focus will move to substantive defenses (failure to state a claim, proof, privileges, etc.) and, where applicable, other preclusion doctrines tied to merits-based terminations.
Uniformity and potential cross‑department influence. As a published Second Department opinion, Esposito will be persuasive beyond Nassau and Kings Counties and may prompt consistency across departments. Unless and until the Court of Appeals speaks, Esposito is likely to be followed widely in ASA cases raising the same issue.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Adult Survivors Act (ASA) / CPLR 214‑j: A “revival” statute that temporarily reopened civil limitation periods for adults alleging sexual offenses that occurred when they were 18 or older. It allows otherwise time‑barred claims to be filed during the window.
Revival statute: A law that gives plaintiffs a fresh chance to sue even though the ordinary statute of limitations has expired. Because these statutes disturb settled expectations, courts traditionally construe them cautiously—but still according to their text and purpose.
Statute of limitations: The deadline for filing a lawsuit. For intentional torts like assault and battery, CPLR 215(3) generally imposes a short limitations period (historically one year).
Personal jurisdiction: A court’s power to bind a defendant. If a court lacks personal jurisdiction (for example, because service was defective or the defendant had insufficient minimum contacts), the case must be dismissed. Such dismissals are not decisions on the merits.
Res judicata (claim preclusion): A doctrine preventing parties from re‑litigating claims that have been finally adjudicated. A dismissal as time‑barred is treated as “on the merits” for res judicata purposes, which is why the ASA expressly allows revival despite prior time‑bar dismissals.
Notice of claim: A pre-suit notice that must be served on municipalities or certain public entities as a precondition to suing them. The ASA expressly allows revival despite a prior dismissal for failure to file such a notice.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: A canon of statutory construction meaning “the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.” Esposito explains why this canon does not convert CPLR 214‑j’s explicit references (time‑bar and notice‑of‑claim dismissals) into an exclusive list of what can be revived.
CPLR 3211(a) motion: A pre‑answer motion to dismiss on specified grounds, including statute of limitations and certain defenses apparent on the face of the pleading or documentary evidence.

Practice Notes

For plaintiffs: If a prior action was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, Esposito supports proceeding under ASA revival without fear of dismissal on that ground. Be ready to address any other preclusion (e.g., merits-based determinations) and to litigate the substance of claims.
For defendants: A prior jurisdictional dismissal will not defeat an ASA suit on a 3211 motion. Consider whether the earlier case involved a merits determination that would trigger res judicata, or whether other defenses (e.g., failure to state a claim, privilege, or other statutory immunities) can be raised.
For courts: Evaluate ASA claims under the statute’s broad text and remedial purpose. Do not infer exclusions not found in the statute. Distinguish between (i) prior dismissals that the ASA expressly or logically accommodates and (ii) prior merits judgments that still carry preclusive effect.

Conclusion

Esposito v. Isaac sets an important precedent: CPLR 214‑j revives adult survivors’ civil claims even when the plaintiff previously filed a timely action that was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Second Department grounds its holding in the statute’s plain text—“every civil claim or cause of action” time‑barred as of the ASA’s effective date—and in the ASA’s remedial purpose to expand survivors’ access to civil justice. The court rejects an implied limitation based on the statute’s explicit mention of two kinds of prior dismissals, explaining that those references are not exclusive and serve chiefly to overcome unique preclusion issues like res judicata.

The key takeaway is twofold. First, courts must not restrict the ASA’s reach by importing unstated exceptions; the Legislature could have excluded jurisdictional dismissals but did not. Second, while revival is broad, it does not displace all preclusion doctrines; prior merits adjudications may still bar relitigation. Within those boundaries, Esposito ensures that survivors who attempted to pursue justice earlier—but were turned away on jurisdictional grounds—receive the benefit the ASA promised: a meaningful day in court.